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ABSTRACT 
Risk management plays a key role in water utilities.  Although tools are well 
established at operational and tactical levels of management, existing methods 
at strategic level lack a holistic treatment and a long-term perspective. In fact, 
risks are analysed per se, despite being interconnected; and long-term 
scenarios are commonly used for strategic planning, rather than for risk 
management, most of the time being related to one single issue (for example: 
climate change).   
In order to overcome the limitations identified in the existing methodologies, a 
novel approach for water utilities to manage risk at strategic level was 
developed and tested in EPAL - the largest and oldest water utility in Portugal. It 
consists of (i) setting a baseline risks comparison founded on a systemic model 
developed ‗bottom-up‘ through the business; (ii) the construction of future 
scenarios and an observation of how baseline risks may change with time.   
Major contributions of this research are the linkage between operational and 
strategic risks, capturing the interdependencies between strategic risks; the 
ability to look at long term risk, allowing the visualizing of the way strategic risks 
may change under a possible future scenario; and the novel coupling of risks 
and futures research.  
For the water sector, this approach constitutes a useful tool for strategic 
planning, which may be presented to the Board of Directors in a simple and 
intuitive way, despite the solid foundations of the underlying analysis. It also 
builds on in-house expertise, promoting the dissemination and pervasiveness of 
risk management within the companies and, on the other hand, allowing 
unveiling of existing knowledge, making it explicit and more useful for the 
organization. 
Keywords:  
Strategic risk management, futures, scenario building, water utilities, risk 
analysis, corporate management 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Context and background 
Risk management plays a key role in water utilities. Water is a critical resource 
for human survival and cannot be taken for granted by water-dependent 
businesses, as across the entire product value chain there are internal and 
external factors, some of which are uncontrollable, that threaten the overarching 
aim of water utilities (Morrison and Gleick, 2004) – to deliver safe, wholesome 
and affordable drinking water that has the trust of customers (Pollard et al., 
2004).  
Risk is generally understood as the uncertainty associated with events that 
pose a threat to the business (ISO 31000, 2009; Hrudey, 2005; Almeida, 2011). 
In purely mathematical terms, this is expressed by probability times 
consequence(s), so defining a time frame for the analysis as well as outlining 
what consequences are associated – ―risk of what to whom‖ (Pollard, 2008) – 
becomes an imperative when undertaking any risk analysis. This means that 
the evaluation of risk in the water sector, which deals with both technical and 
social risks (Renn, 2008a), is not a straightforward task: on the one hand, 
technical (factual) risks may be assessed statistically, but the correspondent 
numerical value is too reductionist to properly describe the complex interactions 
between human activities and consequences (Renn, 2008a); on the other hand, 
socially constructed risks are subjective and based on human perception, rather 
than on statistical evidence (Slovic, 1987; Slovic, 1998). A need to move 
towards an integrated understanding of risks has been noted in recent years 
(Hamilton et al., 2006; Renn, 2008b; Larson et al., 2009; Prpich et al., 2011). 
Water supply management is, in fact, subject to a mix of technical and social 
risks. It depends on diverse drivers such as political, economic, social, 
technological, regulatory and, of course, environmental. Spatially, it comprises 
not only the infrastructural system, but also the supplied region as well as the 
entire river basins and/or aquifers where the intakes are located. In terms of 
time horizons, assets are designed to last 25 to 50 years, though the demand 
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may change in shorter periods of time and the water supply system as a whole 
is expected to last for generations. Legislation and regulation contribute to 
shape water utilities‘ operational procedures, aiming to protect the consumers, 
but tension arises if it implies an increase in operational costs that utilities 
cannot directly reflect in tariffs, due to economic regulation, thus creating a 
threat to business profitability and sustainability (Pollard et al., 2004). All of this 
makes water supply strategic planning fall into the category of ―wicked 
problems‖: complex, long-term social and organisational planning problems 
(Ritchey, 2013). 
The inexistence of formal procedures for risk assessments until the 90s made 
risk management depend on individual perceptions and decisions, which are 
subject to amplification (Renn, 2008b). By ―amplification‖, Renn means both 
exaggeration and depletion of risks, which contribute to either an over 
protection against risks, or to a ―blind‖ operation of the business (Carter, 2012), 
respectively. Due to the huge responsibility concerning public health safety, and 
because the human mind reacts to bad things ―more quickly, strongly, and 
persistently than to equivalent good things‖ (Haidt, 2006), in water utilities risks 
used to be consciously or unconsciously exaggerated - rather than reduced - by 
managers, so that more power was granted to them (Slovic, 1998; MacGillivray 
and Pollard, 2008). This may partially explain why risks have historically been 
managed in silos, instead of seeking a common understanding, and points out 
the relevance of having open, transparent and integrated processes for risk 
evaluation, ultimately contributing to increasing the overall business efficiency. 
In terms of risk management, the water sector is behind other sectors like oil, 
gas and electricity (Egerton, 1996 in Pollard et al., 2004). Moreover, in the water 
sector risk managers are usually conservative and tend to focus on maintaining 
the status quo of established norms (Larson et al., 2009). Notwithstanding, 
these paradigms are changing. Since 2001, a major shift has occurred in the 
way water utilities manage their organizations, by adopting basic risk 
management processes (HM Treasury, 2004): in 2004, the Bonn Chart 
introduced the risk-based concept of Water Safety Planning, WSP (Pollard, 
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2008); and asset management has been the focus of several national and 
international risk-based frameworks and standards (e.g.: BSI PAS 55:2004, 
substantially revised in 2008). No doubt risk awareness has been increasing, 
and risk management has come to the forefront of the agenda in water utilities. 
Hence, the main challenge water utilities are facing now no longer lies in the 
initial identification and analysis of risks, but rather in the on-going review and 
improvement of risk management practices (HM Treasury, 2004).  
Tools for strategic risk management, i.e., the risks of not meeting high-level 
business objectives (HM Treasury, 2004), are still poorly developed: existing 
methodologies either adopt risk rankings, where risks are frequently described 
by an opaque number, or seek full risk characterisation and understanding, from 
where priorities are difficult to distil (Prpich et al., 2011).  These methods 
invariably assess strategic risks independently - despite risks being 
interdependent (Hamilton et al., 2006; Pollard et al., 2009) - and the respective 
outcomes tend to represent a ―snap-shot‖ in time, regardless the fact that 
strategic objectives are set for the long-term.  
On the other hand, future scenarios have been used to inform strategic planning 
in water utilities, but most of the time focusing on a single specific issue - e.g.: 
climate change (Means et al., 2010) - and, not rarely, based on extrapolation of 
past trends (Cosgrove, 2013). These approaches lack the integrated 
perspective underlying the complexity of the water business and concentrate on 
projected consequences, thus missing the link with risk management in the 
future, due to the unaccounted perspective of the projected likelihood.  
Overcoming these difficulties represents a challenge, which this research work 
seeks to answer, through the development of a novel holistic approach linking 
strategic risks and futures research.  
1.2 Motivation 
Water utilities are capital intensive, which means that their economic 
sustainability strongly depends on achieving the correct balance between risk, 
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cost and performance throughout the lifecycle of the respective assets (BSI 
PAS 55:2008).   
As Head of Asset Planning at EPAL – Empresa Portuguesa das Águas Livres, 
SA, the centenary water company that supplies almost one third of the 
Portuguese population, the researcher was involved in the implementation of 
risk based approaches in the company at operational and tactical levels, namely 
the Water Safety Plan and the delivery of the Capital Investment Plan, 
respectively. However, no existing methods were found adequate to implement 
risk management at strategic level, in order to support long-term planning, 
which led the Board of EPAL to propose the development of a PhD under this 
theme, funded by the company. This work represents, therefore, a paradigmatic 
case of practitioner-based research.  
And so, at the outset of this work there is a real need from EPAL to better 
manage risk at a strategic level and, on the other hand, the recognition that 
existing strategic risk management approaches for water utilities are not yet well 
developed. The outcomes of this research are expected to expand the scientific 
knowledge on strategic risk management while providing water utilities - namely 
EPAL – with a tool to enable them to better achieve their strategic objectives.  
1.3 Thesis structure 
In chapter two the current literature on strategic risk management and future 
scenarios is reviewed, with emphasis on the water sector. A gap analysis 
resulting from the state of the art review is then presented, thus justifying the 
research objectives identified in chapter three. 
Chapter four describes the theoretical approaches used in this research: an 
action-centred approach employing diverse methods such as (i) observation, 
conversation, interviews and document analysis to generate qualitative data; 
(ii) cognitive mapping; (iii) semi-quantitative risk assessments; (iv) development 
of visualization tools; and (v) morphological analysis to build future scenarios.  
Chapter five sets the scene of the case study, namely by introducing a brief 
description of EPAL, including its water supply system and the respective 
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governance, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the assembled team.  
The development, implementation and testing of the novel methodology for 
strategic risk management in water utilities is presented in chapter six, focusing 
on the three main steps: risk identification; systemic analysis of strategic risks; 
and futures and long-term strategic risks. 
Chapter seven presents a discussion of the research findings, highlighting the 
novelty and significance of the work in both academic and practical contexts. 
Chapters eight and nine offer the conclusions and suggestions for further 
research, respectively. 
1.4 List of Publications, Presentations and Awards 
PUBLICATIONS 
 Luis, A., Pollard, S. and Lickorish, F. (2014), ―Evolution of strategic risks 
under future scenarios for improved utility master plans‖,  in preparation 
to submit to Water Research 
 Luis, A., Lickorish, F. and Pollard, S. (2014), ―Assessing interdependent 
operational, tactical and strategic risks for improved utility master plans‖,  
in preparation to submit to Water Research 
 Allan, R., Mauelshagen, C., Luís, A. M., Jeffrey, P. and Pollard, S. (2013) 
Making risk management stick: reflections on risk governance in water 
utilities.  In U. Borchers, J. Gray and K. C. Thompson (eds.), Water 
Contamination Emergencies: Managing the threats, RSC Publishing, 
Royal Society of Chemistry, Cambridge, ISBN 978-1-84973-441-7, 
pp.33-46, DOI: 10.1039/9781849737890-00033. 
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS and WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS 
 Luis, A., Lickorish, F., Pollard, S., Uma nova abordagem para a gestão 
do risco a nível estratégico para entidades gestoras de abastecimento 
de água – o case study da EPAL, 12.º Congresso da Água / 16.º ENaSB 
/ XVI SILUBESA, Lisboa, Portugal, Mar. 2014 
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 Luis, A., Lickorish, F., Pollard, S., Managing future risk – a novel 
approach for strategic risk management in water utilities, 
ENEG2013,Coimbra, Portugal, Dec. 2013 
 Allan, R., Mauelshagen, C., Luis, A., Jeffrey, P., Pollard, S., Risk 
governance and the board: Supporting pervasive risk management in 
water utilities, in the Proceedings of the 5th Water Contamination 
Emergencies: managing the threats, Mülheim-an-der-Ruhr, Germany, 
Nov. 2012 
 Luis, A., Pollard, S., Wu, S., Strategic Risk Management - Case Study: 
EPAL, in the Risk Governance – a water utility manager‘s 
implementation guide Workshop, London, United Kingdom, March 2012 
 Pollard, S., Luís, A., Mauelshagen, C., Keynote speech in the Risk 
Governance – a water utility manager‘s implementation guide Workshop, 
London, United Kingdom, March 2012 
 Luis, A., Pollard, S., Wu, S., Strategic Risk Management for International 
Water Utilities - State-of-the-art Review, in the Proceedings of the 11th 
Water Congress, Porto, Portugal, Feb. 2012 
AWARDS 
 Honour Awards for the Planning Category of the 2014 IWA Europe & 
West Asia Regional Project Innovation Awards for the project ―Managing 
future risk - a novel approach for strategic planning in water utilities‖, by 
EPAL, SA / Cranfield University, Portugal  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 General considerations 
The following chapter begins with the examination of different aspects of risk 
management, related to this research project. It begins with a broad overview of 
risk management in the water sector, including established frameworks, tools 
and techniques, followed by an outline of risk governance issues and a specific 
attention on enterprise risk management (ERM), or other similar approaches 
that intend to assess different risks at corporate, strategic level. As strategic 
risks are long-term changing risks, the literature review proceeds with 
investigating how future scenarios are set up, how these are being used to 
inform water utilities in their long-term planning and how they are related to risk 
management. The main insights from the literature review are summarized at 
the end of the chapter. 
2.2 Risk management in water utilities 
2.2.1 Risk management frameworks, tools and techniques  
Tools and techniques for the analysis of the different types of risk vary by their 
sophistication and design, and a wide range of approaches are available 
(Pollard et al., 2004), from the use of standards to the entrenching of safety and 
risk in the company values.  
The most common risk management frameworks (e.g. AS/NZS 4360:2004; ISO 
31000, 2009) are embedded in risk assessments approaches or procedures 
(MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008) with specific purposes in water utilities, such as 
the water safety plans, which are primarily aimed at securing drinking water 
quality (Pollard, 2008); asset management practices, that envisage the 
optimization of maintenance and rehabilitation decisions in order to maximize 
assets‘ useful life (BSI PAS 55:2008); or occupational health and safety 
procedures (Molak, 1997).  
Methodologically, at the outset of any risk assessment exercise, the clear and 
explicit problem formulation – risk of what, to whom – is critical (Pollard, 2008). 
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Then, all frameworks evidence a double step approach1: first, the evaluation of 
risk; secondly, the analysis of the risk, based on risk tolerability criteria, followed 
by the proposal of risk treatment measures (Figure 2-1):  
 
Figure 2-1 - Risk evaluation (left) and risk based decision making practices 
(right) (MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008) 
 Risk evaluation  
after the problem formulation phase is ready, hazards identification can be 
undertaken, usually by relevant experts on the risks being analysed, who 
also identify the existing exposures and controls. Risk identification requires 
consistent choices regarding how hazards are grouped – they may be 
categorized in terms of the stressor agent (e.g.: lead), the activity causing 
the hazard (e.g.: mining), the endpoint of concern (e.g.: people) and so on 
(Willis et al., 2004).  
Consequence and likelihood may be evaluated using quantitative, 
qualitative or semi-quantitative methods. Usually, the more focused the 
analysis is, the more that quantitative methods can be applied (Gormley et 
al., 2011; Ray et al., 2008; Pollino et al., 2007). For example, water utilities 
typically adopt this type of methods for assessing the risk of assets‘ 
                                            
1 A comprehensive portfolio of methods that may be used in the risk evaluation step is 
presented in ISO 31000 (2009). 
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mechanical failures. Nevertheless, recent research evidences these 
methods are expanding to assess risks at system level (Lindhe et al., 2009; 
Lindhe et al., 2012). Quantitative methods are less subject to ambiguity 
(Gormley et al., 2011) and allow the determining of absolute risk measured 
on whatever scale of units is chosen (Altenbach, 1995). However, they 
require historical data in order to determine probability distributions, as well 
as trained people; they may be too time consuming or costly (Altenbach, 
1995) and, in case more than one dimension is analysed, a common 
measure for consequences shall be defined (Llewellyn, 1998; Almeida, 
2011).  
Semi-quantitative risk assessments offer a lot of advantages, as they may 
be used even if there is insufficient data for detailed analysis and are more 
transparent, since no sophisticated mathematical model is necessary 
(FAO/WHO, 2009). They are also able to evaluate a larger number of risk 
issues, offering a consistent and systematic approach when risk 
prioritization is required (Gormley et al., 2011), and can either incorporate 
the results of fully quantitative risk assessments (FAO/WHO, 2009) or be 
used as initial screening for subsequent quantitative analysis (AS/NZS 
4360:2004). Semi-quantitative risk assessments often require the same 
data as a qualitative risk assessment, but have a greater focus on 
attempting to evaluate the components of the risk to within defined 
quantitative bounds (FAO/WHO, 2009). These methods are widely adopted 
by water utilities, usually by placing the risks into quite broad sets of 
categories, for example five for probability and five for impact, not including 
zero, which gives 25 possible combinations (FAO/WHO, 2009; Pollard et 
al., 2013). Therefore, care must be taken so that categories are wisely 
constructed, because the numbers chosen may not properly reflect 
relativities and, even so, numbers should only be combined using a formula 
that recognizes the limitations of the kinds of scales used (AS/NZS 
4360:2004); otherwise, semi-quantitative methods can lead to inconsistent, 
anomalous or inappropriate outcomes, particularly when either 
consequences or likelihood are extreme (AS/NZS 4360:2004; Cox, 2008). 
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Cox (2008) examines some of the mathematical properties of risk matrices 
and concludes that they frequently exhibit the following limitations: (a) poor 
resolution – two quantitatively very different risks may have been rated 
equally; (b) errors – depending on the way they are built, higher qualitative 
ratings can be assigned to smaller risks; (c) suboptimal resource allocation; 
(d) ambiguous inputs and outputs, as they require subjective interpretation. 
He then introduces the concept of weak consistency to explain logical 
compatibility of risk matrices with quantitative risks, from where some 
lemmas or rules for building risk matrices are derived. 
When using semi-quantitative methods, consequences are described by 
attributes, and choosing a set of attributes that comprehensively describe 
hazards‘ impacts while keeping the list short enough to be cognitively 
tractable, remains a challenge – it requires methodological compromise to 
balance totality and usability (Willis et al., 2004; Prpich et al., 2011).  
Though the order through which likelihood and consequences are assessed 
is considered to be interchangeable by most risk frameworks – or, at least, 
no reference is made about it –, MacGillivray and Pollard (2008) reasoned 
that ranking impacts should be done first, because evaluating likelihood 
detached from a specific consequence leads to an overestimation of risk. 
Moreover, assessing likelihood first has the potential for major risks to be 
dismissed prematurely (Caldwell, 2012). 
 Risk based decision making  
How organizations develop an understanding of their appetite for risk is 
poorly understood and few formal approaches appear to be in place (HM 
Treasury, 2004; Pollard et al., 2005; Allan et al., 2013). At the stage of a 
specific risk, though, an acceptable level of exposure can be defined in 
terms of both a ―tolerable impact‖ and a ―tolerable frequency‖, against which 
residual risk – i.e., the risk left over after a risk treatment option has been 
implemented, removing the source of the risk, modifying the consequences, 
changing the probabilities, transferring the risk, or retaining the risk (ISO 
31000, 2009) – may be compared to decide whether or not further action is 
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required (HM Treasury, 2004). It is worth noting that ―zero risk‖ does not 
exist, and there is no sharp line between safe and unsafe, because safety 
has a meaning on a relative basis (Hrudey, 2005). A new concept related to 
risk appetite is now arising: the risk attitude (ISO 31000, 2009). The main 
difference between the two of them is that risk appetite depends on the 
organizational culture, driven by individuals‘ values and their propensity for 
risk taking (Pollard et al., 2013), whereas risk attitude evidences the level of 
risk a company is actually approaching, by considering the control barriers 
in place or the need to revise them. Risk attitude is, therefore, more focused 
on the residual risk.  
Translating concerns about risks to risk management priorities is not a 
straightforward task (Willis et al., 2010). Making credible and defendable 
decisions in organizations requires an institutional capacity to be predictive 
rather than reactive when managing risk, and an aptitude to learn from 
experience (Pollard et al., 2004; MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008; Hrudey, 
2005). MacGillivray and Pollard (2008) state that the outputs of a risk 
analysis should provide decision support, not ―carte blanche‖ decisions. The 
same idea is emphasized by Hrudey (2005): for most of the difficult risk 
management issues concerning drinking water, the level of uncertainty 
about the nature and magnitude of risks will be too large for the risk 
estimates alone to determine the best course of action for risk 
management; therefore, good risk management must inform but will not 
dictate most risk management decisions. Similarly in other areas of difficult 
decision-making, like individual medical care, Hrudey (2005) advocates that 
it is appropriate for risk managers within the water industry to consider the 
merits of a set of ethical principles to guide risk management actions to: i) 
do more good than harm; ii) fair process of decision-making; iii) ensure an 
equitable distribution of risk; iv) seek optimal use of limited risk 
management resources; v) promise no more risk management than can be 
delivered; vi) impose no more risks than you would tolerate yourself. 
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At the end of any risk assessment, legitimate concerns about its credibility and 
validity often arise. Expertize, impartiality, adherence to good scientific practice 
and transparency, are some commonly identified attributes to assure the 
credibility of risk assessments (Wiedemann et al., 2013; FAO/WHO, 2009; ISO 
31000, 2009; Hokstad and Steiro, 2006). Despite their credibility, which derives 
mainly from competence and trustworthiness (Hovland, 1959 and Hovland and 
Weiss, 1951 in Wiedemann et al., 2013), risk assessments still need to be 
validated. The outcomes of the risk evaluation phase should be validated by risk 
experts, either when the results meet the initial expectations, or, and especially, 
when odd things show up.  
As noted by Rosness (1998) in MacGillivray and Pollard (2008), the accuracy of 
risk analyses depends to a large extent on the competency of analysts to 
critically evaluate information and integrate it, so education and training in risk 
analysis (Summerill et al., 2010), irrespective of the technical complexity of the 
methods adopted, is a must. To avoid human error or bias, risk identification 
and the correspondent evaluation of likelihood and consequences, as well as 
the validation of the results, may be done through peer reviews or expert 
elicitation, the latter requiring adequate facilitation (Johnson and Johnson, 
2000) so that no opinion leader prevents others from being heard and, on the 
other hand, a consensus may be reached even if initial disagreements occur 
(Willis et al., 2004; Vlek, 2013; MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008; Powers et al., 
2012).  
2.2.2 Risk governance 
It has been recognized that risk analysis needs to go beyond the boundaries of 
engineered systems to also include management and human factors (Pollard et 
al., 2005; Schiller and Prpich, 2013). Risk research has recently turned to 
understanding organisations and their capability to manage risk (Power, 1999, 
2008 and Hutter and Power, 2005 in Schiller and Prpich, 2013; Summerill et al., 
2010; Allan et al., 2013).  
Generally, three levels of risk management involving different actors within an 
organization can be pointed out: operational – operational staff; tactical – middle 
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managers; and strategic – the Board and corps of directors or senior managers 
(Pollard et al., 2013). Operational teams manage risks on an everyday basis, 
even if they might not be aware of that (Allan et al., 2013), by ensuring the 
effectiveness of existing controls (e.g.: sensors, membranes, chlorination 
points, etc.). Middle management within utilities plays a key role in ensuring that 
risks are managed appropriately within the organisation, and their focus tends 
to be risks posed by a similar hazard at diverse locations (Pollard et al., 2013), 
time bounded to the financial year (Allan et al., 2013). Board members, 
directors and senior managers may take a longer term strategic view of the 
company, and are usually most interested in the financial stability and wellbeing 
of the organisation they lead, through the accomplishment of the strategic 
objectives (Allan et al., 2013). Through their buy-in and leadership, the board 
and senior management are critical for the implementation and internalizing of 
corporate risk management across business functions (Fraser and Simpkins, 
2009 in Pollard et al., 2013; Summerill et al., 2010), as well as for securing open 
communication with external stakeholders, thereby shaping the organizational 
culture (Pollard et al., 2009).  
The need to improve communication between experts, managers and the Board 
has been noted (Summerill et al., 2010; Allan et al., 2013), whether risk 
governance is centralized in a dedicated team (which often includes auditing 
functions) or spread among employees with other core responsibilities (Pollard 
et al., 2013). Both models present advantages and disadvantages, but 
guaranteeing that information flows across the different levels in the 
organization is what makes risk management truly effective (MacGillivray et  al., 
2006; Hrudey et al., 2006). Best in class utilities have developed proper tools 
(e.g. web-based technology) in order to facilitate information sharing (Pollard et 
al., 2013).  
As a whole, organizations may face different stages of maturity in risk 
management. MacGillivray and Pollard (2008) define the highest level of 
maturity as the state where an organization is capable of learning and adapting 
itself – a challenge that the majority of water utilities have not met, yet, as we 
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can infer from Summerill et al. (2010) and Allan et al. (2013). Previous stages 
include processes that are ad-hoc (level 1), repeatable (level 2), defined (level 
3) and controlled (level 4). Benchmarking their own capability maturity level is 
important for water utilities, because institutional capacities, rather than 
technical aspects, are the fundamental limiting factor in implementing and 
securing the pervasiveness of risk management (MacGillivray and Pollard, 
2008; Allan et al., 2013). Establishing key performance indicators for risk 
management may help internal auditing (Pickett, 2005 and UK government‘s 
Risk Support Team, 2004 in Pollard et al., 2013), although risk management is 
often described by directors as an audit and bureaucratic function rather than as 
a process improvement used to leverage off competitive advantage (Allan et al., 
2013). 
2.2.3 Strategic risk assessments  
Concepts like ―corporate risk management‖, ―enterprise risk management‖, 
―strategic risk management‖ and so forth, are based on the principle that risk 
management is an overarching strategic discipline, rather than a regionalized 
process within individual business functions (MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008). 
For water utilities, corporate risk management involves the comparison of a 
large number of diverse environmental, engineering and security risks (Prpich et 
al., 2011), as well as project, commercial and financial risks, such as those 
associated with infrastructure investment, merger and acquisition activities, 
company reputation, outsourcing and the long term viability of investment 
decisions (Pollard et al., 2004; Pollard et al., 2005). Moreover, besides 
providing information for water utilities to direct resources, plan research efforts 
and devise strategies to address the worst risks, corporate risk management is 
also expected to improve the culture of risk and communication across business 
functions within utilities, and, most of all, to contribute for knowledge generation 
(Schiller and Prpich, 2013). 
In water utilities, most risk management processes have been developed at 
operational and tactical levels, like the ones used to support occupational health 
and safety procedures, water safety plans and mid-term asset management 
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plans. The need to move to a strategic level is obvious, if strategic risks are 
thought of as ―high-level risks that threaten corporate objectives‖, including ―the 
utility‘s licence to operate‖ and ―the ability to secure lasting revenue to support 
strategic investment plans‖, among others (Pollard et al., 2013). Four main 
reasons can be pointed out for the limited implementation of strategic risk 
assessments: (i) the challenge of dealing with a higher number of risk 
dimensions, requiring multi-disciplinary knowledge (Almeida, 2011); (ii) the 
difficulty of capturing risks interconnections; (iii) the need to establish cross-
departmental communication, which may represent a big effort at large utilities 
(Prpich et al., 2011); and (iv) the higher degrees of uncertainty involved, due to 
spatial and temporal variability. In fact, strategic objectives are, in their nature, 
long-term objectives (Keeney, 1992), so the risk of not meeting those objectives 
should also be assessed in the mid and long-term, as they can be affected by 
changing trends in population growth, asset deterioration, climate change, land 
use, technological developments and other known or unknown elements 
(Pollard et al., 2013).  
Conventionally, present-day strategic risks as well as risks prone to upsurge in 
the long-term, have been, despite their interconnections, appraised in isolation 
but there is a growing recognition of the need to integrate and harmonize these 
analyses (Means et al., 2010; Hamilton et al., 2006; Renn, 2008b; Larson et al., 
2009; ISO 31000, 2009; Prpich et al., 2011).  
Attempts to relate physical or environmental risks like water quality, supply and 
resource have existed for over a decade (Bouwer, 2000; Hamilton et al., 2006; 
Pollard et al., 2004; Powers et al., 2012). The first generation of environmental 
strategic risk analysis (SRA) tools sought to establish nominal rankings, and an 
extensive work on this domain was developed by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency, USEPA (Prpich et al., 2011). Most of these tools used a 
common measure to characterize harms, so that comparisons could be made 
(Almeida, 2011; Llewellyn, 1998). Nonetheless, this way of comparing and 
ranking risks of a different nature was generally criticized due to the multi-
dimensional nature of environmental harms, which makes any quantitative 
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ranking exercise necessarily imperfect, giving way to the second generation of 
SRA. These tools then emphasized the importance of a good and 
comprehensive characterization of the risks and the respective tolerability, 
rather than the setting of quantitative ranks – the broad framework for risk 
assessment and risk management for environmental protection set out by the 
Environment Agency of England and Wales is a good example (Prpich et al., 
2011; Llewellyn, 1998). However, implementation difficulties related to 
communication issues (e.g. tensions between scientists and decision makers; 
tensions between the objectives stated by the Boards and what the technical 
staff believed to be important) revealed that this new approach had still to be 
improved (Prpich et al., 2011). Therefore, a third generation of SRA tools is now 
emerging, focusing on a more realistic approach about what can be achieved, 
and on the delivery of a set of visualizations that can provide a base for rich 
discussions and understanding of the risks, instead of delivering a ―top-ten‖ 
ranking (Prpich et al., 2011). One of the main challenges consists of detailing 
the analysis as much as possible, in order to make it defendable, while keeping 
it simple enough for decision-makers to understand it (Prpich et al., 2011). The 
work developed for Defra – the UK Government Department for Food and Rural 
Affairs, with the purpose of comparing environmental strategic risks (Prpich et 
al., 2011) constitutes a good example of these third generation tools.  
In spite of these attempts to integrate physical/environmental risks, a step 
change is still required to, like other sectors (e.g: electricity), further integrate 
water risks with business, financial and other corporate risks, given the ever 
more complex and interconnected risk environment driven by increased 
globalisation, supply chain, innovation, outsourcing and strategic alliances 
(Frigo and Anderson, 2012). 
In response to this problem, the concept of enterprise risk management has 
grown in the last decade to become the dominant business risk paradigm 
(COSO, 2004). ERM was initially developed in the finance and insurance 
sectors to manage risks associated with investments and liability, but now it 
stands separate from other organisational risk management systems as the 
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only one that attempts to integrate strategic, financial, hazard and operational 
risk into a single framework to inform an organisation‘s strategic objectives 
(Hoffman, 2008; Schiller and Prpich, 2013) - it is even open to including cultural 
organizational risks (Schiller and Prpich, 2013). One of the most well-known 
ERM frameworks is the COSO framework, which was developed by the private 
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission in 1992, 
and revised in 2004.  
The concept of ERM has expanded to regional or national levels, as well (e.g. 
HM Treasury, 2004). Several national risk assessments have been undertaken 
internationally, with the Netherlands and the UK in leading positions since 2007 
(Vlek, 2013), and these are now spread across not only Europe but also 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States (Vlek, 2013).  
Most literature on ERM is produced by consultants, whereas business case 
reports are often confidential, and there is little scientific investigation on this 
subject (Schiller and Prpich, 2013). Nonetheless, the following fundamental 
conceptual weaknesses of ERM may be evidenced: 
 Current methods to aggregate risk within ERM are semi-quantitative, 
using ordinal assessments of risk in a risk matrix, which, as mentioned 
above, do not provide an objective, quantitative means to integrate 
multiple risks or prioritise risk mitigation options – they can,  instead, be 
used as a basis to enrich discussions about the risks.  
 While integrating different risks creates the opportunity to optimise 
business plans and strategies for risk and reward, it also creates a risk of 
inappropriate risk to risk trade-offs (Schiller and Prpich, 2013). For 
example, business risks may be inappropriately compared to water 
quality and public health risks (where risk appetite is lower), so risk 
appetite and tolerance should clearly be stated separately for each type 
of risk (Rittenberg and Martens, 2012).  
 ERM ignores the possibility of incommensurability and incomparability 
among risks, as its framework is strongly commensurable (COSO 2004; 
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HM Treasury 2004) – this may explain why ERM implementation has 
come to add ever more risks to the portfolio (Schiller and Prpich, 2013). 
 No existing ERM framework has consideration for the differences 
between organisations and their diverse institutional contexts (Shiller and 
Prpich, 2013). This is particularly relevant for water utilities, because the 
effects of water are felt locally and depend on external contexts that differ 
from basin to basin. 
 ERM guidance (e.g. COSO 2004; HM Treasury 2004) suggests that 
organisations can only address risks to the strategy or objective of 
organisations, inhibiting the search for ‗known unknowns‘ or ‗unknown 
unknowns‘ (Schiller and Prpich, 2013). This is seconded by the way in 
which some risk assessments are conducted, namely when 
communication with risk experts is made through emailed inquiries, 
rather than through appropriate forums of discussion, that would enable 
the sharing of information among different experts, minimizing bias, as 
well as the opportunity for new risks to come up. 
 ERM does not take into account that most risks are interdependent as 
they are embedded in complex social systems, nor acknowledges that 
interdependencies between risks are also created by the ERM process 
itself, not least through the competing budget (Beasley and Frigo, 2007 
in Schiller and Prpich, 2013).  
 Consentaneously with SRA, ERM should consider the long-term evolving 
risks, though there is no empirical evidence that this has been done 
already. 
As a result of the above, water utility risk management, in its integrated form, 
might be viewed as entering a new era whereby risk specialists have far closer 
engagement with financial modellers, economists, business planners and 
information technology specialists, in addition to their existing engagement with 
water treatment and distribution engineers on issues such as safety, public 
health and water quality (Schiller and Prpich, 2013). However, until now the 
technologies and advocacy required to fully achieve integrated enterprise risk 
management have not emerged, and the arbitrary, biased and limited 
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implementation of the existing frameworks may create a false belief that 
corporate risks are being properly managed (Schiller and Prpich, 2013). 
2.3 Future scenarios 
2.3.1 Evolution of futures studies 
Scenarios are plausible descriptions of how the future may develop, based on a 
coherent set of assumptions about key relationships and driving forces - they 
are neither predictions nor forecasts, but plausible future chains of cause and 
effect (CERF, 2012; Kahn, 1967 in Amer et al., 2013). 
Historically, Kuosa (2011) suggests that there are three paradigms in the 
evolution of future scenarios. The first one is the ―age-old prediction tradition 
that combines thinking about the future with mystic explanations‖, like 
prophecies. The second paradigm is the emerging of futures research as a 
discipline, still considered radical by many (Defra, 2008), which was initiated by 
the US Military after the second world war (Kuosa, 2011; Amer et al., 2013; Van 
der Heijden, 1996 in Varum and Melo, 2010). According to Kuosa (2011), there 
are three phases in this second paradigm: (i) the 40s and 50s – a post war 
golden time of planning, trade, space travel and other technological foresights in 
general, when the main actors in futures research were think tanks and 
research units of the US military, like Herman Kahn from RAND, Research ANd 
Development (Amer et al., 2013); Snowden (2010, in Kuosa, 2011) described 
this phase as Management oriented, with the aim of controlling functions; (ii) the 
60s-70s, when the increasing awareness of long-term effects of social 
movements, population and economic growth leveraged futurists to emerge 
beyond the military centres, like the paradigmatic case of Pierre Wack from 
Royal Dutch Shell – the first documented experience evidencing how better-
prepared Shell was coping with the oil crisis in the 70s (Wack, 1985 in O‘Brien, 
2004); this was also the period when the majority of the existing tools and 
techniques were developed; (iii) from the 80s till now, when a stabilization of the 
discipline occurred, along with an overall fragmentation and a search for this 
field identity – this and the former phases were designated by Snowden (2010, 
in Kuosa, 2011) as Systems thinking oriented, aiming at controlling information. 
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Kuosa (2011) advocates that a third paradigm in futures research is now 
emerging, where ―studies are moving towards critical hermeneutical 
understanding, emancipatory dialects, and diversity‖; this will be Systems and 
Cognition oriented, aiming to ―identify structures of network, optional 
connections, constraints and contexts‖ (Snowden, 2010 in Kuosa, 2011), 
enabling a ―new understanding of dynamical systems‖ and developing 
―applicable interdisciplinary methodology‖. Kuosa (2011) warns that though 
Systems thinking is coming to an end, it does not necessarily mean that the 
third paradigm is immediately reached, since it requires ―hard work and 
willingness to a new mindset‖. Figure 2-2 illustrates the evolution of futures 
research, according to Kuosa (2011). 
 
Figure 2-2 – Evolution of futures studies (Kuosa, 2011) 
Future scenarios have been widely used as a strategic management tool, in 
order to support companies, agencies, governments, etc. devising long-term 
strategies (O‘Brien, 2004; Chermack et al., 2001 and Porter et al., 1991 and 
Saritas et al., 2004 in Amer et al., 2013) – as a collateral benefit, many state 
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that the opportunity to open ―mental maps‖ of managers and to initiate new 
conversations – the process – is as important, if not more so, than the 
strategies themselves – the product (Wack, 1985 in Brummell and MacGillivray, 
2008; Amer et al., 2013). In a world with ever more complex interactions 
between the economic, environmental, technological, or socio-political sectors 
of society, scenarios help in dealing with the unpredictability of future events 
(Malaska et al., 1984 in Amer et al., 2013; O‘Brian, 2002; Habegger, 2010; 
Saritas and Nugroho, 2012), and are suitable to address what Rittel and 
Webber (1973 in Ritchey, 2013) designated as wicked problems: complex, long-
term social and organisational planning problems. Nonetheless, apart from 
capital intensive industries like aerospace, petroleum, etc. (Amer et al., 2013), 
Lemmens and Munsters (2007) argue that, in practice, few companies 
systematically integrate scenario planning and simulation into the planning 
process, mainly due to fear of the unknown, lack of time or lack of adequate 
training in developing scenario plans and techniques.  
Though much is found about processes and tools for building scenarios, little is 
known about the outcomes and the experience of actually using them, namely 
on the effects of scenario planning on company performance and 
competitiveness (O‘Brien, 2004; Varum and Melo, 2010).  Exceptions are 
perhaps the scenario planning frameworks that, just like SRA / ERM 
frameworks (see 2.2.3), have extended to national or regional levels, in order to 
support public policy. Initially focusing on technology or security fields, countries 
like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland, France, as well as Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Japan have realized single-issue focus 
is in many instances insufficient, and, consequently, they have started cutting 
across the traditional boundaries of policy areas and government departments 
(Habegger, 2010), with the United Kingdom (UK), Singapore, and the 
Netherlands being at the vanguard of this trend (Habegger, 2010).  
2.3.2 Review of scenario planning approaches 
Before progressing further with the literature review on scenario planning 
approaches, it is essential to clarify some of the specific lexicon adopted by 
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futures experts, such as trends, drivers of change, wild cards/shocks, 
discontinuities and weak signals. Given the wide variety of existing definitions 
(Kuosa, 2011; Saritas and Smith, 2011), Saritas and Smith (2011) suggest one 
single definition for each concept, considered by them as the most applicable 
after exploring the different perspectives: 
 trends are ―somewhat gradual forces, factors and patterns that are 
pervasively causing change in society generally; the speed of change 
may be deemed comparatively slow or fast depending upon one‘s 
vantage point, but the important aspect of a trend is its pervasiveness‖. 
When trends expand over a generation (e.g. climate change) they can be 
considered mega-trends; 
 drivers of change (also referred to as factors of change) are ―those 
forces, factors and uncertainties that are accessible by stakeholders and 
create or drive change within one‘s business or institutional environment; 
these (…) have real leverage on one‘s future flexibility and outcomes – 
i.e. if a driver goes one way or the opposite way the real divergence 
occurs and change patterns evolve differently‖ (e.g.: policy or regulatory 
changes); 
 wild cards/shocks are ―those surprise events and situations which can 
happen but usually have a low probability of doing so – but if they do 
their impact is very high. These situations tend to alter the fundamentals, 
and create new trajectories which can then create a new basis for 
additional challenges and opportunities that most stakeholders may not 
have previously considered or prepared for‖ (e.g. nuclear bomb). Another 
expression that often arises is black swans, which is seemingly close to 
wild cards but refers to ―extremely rare events that have never been 
encountered before (to the best of the observer‘s knowledge) and in 
principle, cannot be anticipated‖ (Paté-Cornell, 2012). 
 discontinuities refer to ―rapid and significant shifts in trajectories without 
the aspect of being mostly unanticipated or deeply surprising (…) and 
fundamentally alters the previous pathways or expected direction of 
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policies, events and planning regimes‖ (e.g.: abrupt breakdown and 
decrease in an historical growing demand);  
 weak signals are ―the early signs of possible but not confirmed changes 
that may later become more significant indicators of critical forces for 
development, threats, business and technical innovation. They represent 
the first signs of paradigm shifts, or future trends, drivers or 
discontinuities‖ (e.g. in the 1980s the first mention was made of global 
warming and climate change).  
There have been many attempts to define a typology that facilitates the 
overview of the different structured methodologies for scenario development. In 
fact, typologies help in establishing a common language among researchers, 
which, in turn, improves the communication, the understanding, the comparison 
and the development of methods (Börjeson et al., 2006). Despite all the 
attempts, consensus has not been reached (Börjeson et al., 2006) and there 
are presently so many typologies that some authors describe it as 
‗methodological chaos‘ (Martelli, 2001 and Bradfield et al., 2005 in Amer et al., 
2013) or ―scenarios fuzziness‖ (Goeminne and Mutombo, 2007), which is 
reflected in the large number of different and at times conflicting definitions, 
characteristics, principles and methodological ideas about scenarios (Bradfield 
et al., 2005) – see Table 2-1. This might perhaps explain the emergence, in 
recent years, of a number of academic reviews and surveys describing the 
current status of the body of literature and knowledge on scenario planning (e.g. 
Bradfield et al., 2005; Börjeson et al., 2006; Varum and Melo, 2010; Kuosa, 
2011; Saritas and Nugroho, 2012; Amer et al., 2013). 
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Table 2-1 – Examples of scenario planning typologies  
Typology Author Source 
Habermas‘ technical, 
hermeneutic/practical and 
emancipatory. 
Sandberg, 1976; 
Mannermaa,1986; and 
Slaughter, 1988 
(Börjeson et al., 2006) 
Possible, probable and preferred. Amara, 1981 (Kuosa, 2011; Börjeson 
et al., 2006) 
Predictive, interpretive, critical and 
action learning. 
Inayatullah, 1990 (Kuosa, 2011) 
Colonizing and decolonizing. Sardar, 1993 (Kuosa, 2011) 
Extrapolation, utopian and vision. Masini, 1993 (Börjeson et al., 2006) 
Individual vs social and external vs 
internal 
Wilber, 1995 (Amer et al., 2013) 
Possible, realizable and desirable Godet and Roubelat, 
1996 
(Goeminne and 
Mutombo, 2007) 
Continued growth, collapse, steady 
state and transformation. 
Dator, 2002 (Amer et al., 2013) 
Identifying present trends, panoramic 
view and questioning all the others. 
Marien, 2002 (Börjeson et al., 2006) 
Comtean positivism, optimistic 
humanism, pluralistic humanism, polling 
democracy, critical pragmatism, 
relativistic pragmatism and democratic 
anarchism. 
Tapio and Hietanen, 
2002 
(Börjeson et al., 2006) 
Process goal (why?) - explorative or 
decision support, process design 
(how?) - intuitive or formal and scenario 
content (what?) - complex or simple 
van Notten et al., 2003 (Börjeson et al., 2006) 
Creation of future images and visions; 
ability to support planning and decision 
making; to solve the great global 
questions of all humankind. 
Borg, 2003  (Kuosa, 2011) 
Predictive, eventualities and visionary. Dreborg, 2004 (Börjeson et al., 2006) 
Subjectivist, realist and critical. Bell, 2005 (Kuosa, 2011; Börjeson 
et al., 2006)) 
Technical, organizational and personal. Linstone, 2007 (Kuosa, 2011) 
Preferred, disowned, integrated and 
outlier. 
Inayatullah, 2008 (Amer et al., 2013; 
Börjeson et al., 2006) 
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Regardless of the number of existing typologies, it is worth noting they all share 
a common sequence of steps for scenario building. Though the number of steps 
varies from author to author (e.g. O‘Brian, 2004, Ogilvy and Schwartz, 2004 in 
Goeminne and Mutombo, 2007; Gausemeier et al., 1998 in Saritas and 
Nugroho, 2012), due to differences in the respective detail, they may be 
synthesized as follows: 
i. Identification of a focal issue or decision to be taken (Amer et al., 2013; 
Goeminne and Mutombo, 2007; Brummell and MacGillivray, 2008): 
―What are the central concerns and key issues of the users of the 
scenarios?‖ 
ii. Scenario development. This includes gathering and analysing 
information about what is important for an organisation to understand 
future uncertainties; and developing a consistent and plausible set of 
descriptions of possible futures, or scenarios, through the use of a 
structured methodology.  
iii. Evaluation of the implications of the scenarios for the organisation, i.e., 
the scenario transfer to the decision-field (O‘Brian, 2004; Saritas and 
Nugroho, 2012). 
Taking up van Notten et al. (2003), the literature review will now proceed by 
framing it around the three questions: ―why?‖, ―how?‖ and ―what?‖.  
The ―why-question‖ is related to the purpose of the scenario building exercise – 
and hence, with the focal question. The typology proposed by Börjeson et al. 
(2006) is considered by several authors as one of the most prevalent for 
scenarios categorizing (Varum and Melo, 2010). Establishing a rough 
correspondence with Amara‘s ―probable, possible and preferred‖, Godet‘s 
―realizable, possible and desirable‖, or Dreborg‘s ―predictive, eventualities and 
visionary‖, Börjeson et al. (2006) classified scenarios as predictive, explorative 
and normative, respectively, which, in turn, sub-divide into two categories each 
(Figure 2-3).   
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Figure 2-3 – Scenario typology proposed by Börjeson et al. (2006) 
The predictive mode of thinking attempts to anticipate what will happen by trying 
to find the most likely development in the future, in order to be better prepared, 
and usually lies on historical trends, extrapolating them into the future under 
probable (forecasts) or not so likely (what-if) circumstances (Börjeson et al., 
2006).  The explorative mode of thinking is based on the assumption that it is 
impossible to predict what will actually happen. As such, it considers several 
possible external (trends or mega-trends) and/or strategic (internal drivers of 
change) events which will convey a set of scenarios corresponding to different 
developments, being most useful for mid and long-term strategic planning 
(Börjeson et al., 2006). Finally, the normative mode of thinking is intended to 
devise a new, better way for society or some sector or activity to function in the 
future – the main challenge will be discerning how the transition from the 
present should be made in order to achieve that desirable future, either 
preserving or transforming the normative starting points (Börjeson et al., 2006).  
Although this topology provides a basis for structuring scenarios approaches, 
there is a tendency for actual studies to become compound or ‗hybrids‘, 
combining the three modes of thinking in different degrees (Robison, 2003 in 
Börjeson et al., 2006; Goeminne and Mutombo, 2007), the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, 
SRES (2007), being a paradigmatic example. 
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The ―how-question‖ addresses the tools and techniques that can be used in 
scenario development. Three schools stand out as being widely recognized, two 
of them Anglophonic - ―intuitive logics‖ and ―probabilistic modified trends (PMT)‖ 
– and the other French – ―La prospective‖ (Bradfield et al., 2005; Varum and 
Melo, 2010; Amer et al., 2013). According to Bradfield et al. (2005), ―intuitive 
logics‖ is the dominant school in the USA and many other countries. It assumes 
that business decisions are based on a complex set of relationships among the 
external factors (political, economic, social, etc.), and scenarios are drawn upon 
a hypothetical sequence of events, based on qualitative methods (Amer et al., 
2013). ―PMT‖ builds on the assumptions that traditional trend analysis does not 
incorporate unprecedented future events and, on the other hand, that it is 
unrealistic to forecast an event in isolation without considering occurrence of 
other key impacting events (Bradfield et al., 2005). Hence, it uses two different 
matrix based techniques, disseminated by a range of proprietary 
methodologies: the Trend Impact Analysis, TIA, and the Cross Impact Analysis, 
CIA, in order to probabilistically modify the extrapolated trends (Bradfield et al., 
2005). ―La Prospective‖ is a French school initially assuming that the future can 
be deliberately created and modelled, thus giving way to normative, visionary 
scenarios. Later on, the concept was expanded to make this school suitable for 
―strategic scenario building‖, using not only qualitative but also quantitative 
methods, including morphological analysis for scenario building, and a range of 
computer programs were developed for identifying key variables, analysing 
actors‘ strategies and determining the probability of scenarios (Bradfield et al., 
2005).  As a result, Bradfield et al. (2005) describe this school as a blend of 
both intuitive logics and PMT‘ methodologies.    
Table 2-2 presents a comparison between the main features of each of the 
three schools (Bradfield et al., 2005). 
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Table 2-2 - Comparison of the salient features of the three schools of scenario 
techniques (Bradfield et al., 2005) 
 
 29 
 
As mentioned above and is patent in Table 2-2, existing techniques range from 
qualitative, to semi-quantitative and quantitative.  
Quantitative methods are considered useful for narrowly focused projects 
having a short time horizon (Figure 2-4), and there is also a limited number of 
most frequent scenario planning approaches, namely Cross Impact Simulation, 
Interactive Future Simulations, Trend Impact Analysis and Fuzzy Cognitive 
Mapping (Amer et al., 2013). On the contrary, qualitative methods are 
considered appropriate for projects having a large scope and long time horizon, 
and a wide dispersion of methods exists, like surveys, workshops and Delphi for 
data generation (Börjeson et al., 2006) – some even argue that ―there are 
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almost as many ways of developing scenarios as there are practitioners in the 
field‖ (Bradfield et al., 2005). Despite these differences, both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches can be complementary and, when used together, 
strengthen each other (Amer et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 2-4 - Time horizons for qualitative versus quantitative scenario analysis 
(Pillkahn, 2008 in Amer et al., 2013) 
Finally, the ―what-question‖ refers to the content of the scenarios, namely 
whether these are complex or simple, what is the appropriate number of 
scenarios to be built and how these can be validated. 
The complexity of a scenario framework is associated with the number of 
driving forces to be considered, based on which Pillkahn (2008 in Amer et al., 
2013) suggests three approaches: minimal, standard and maximum (Table 2-3). 
Table 2-3 - Three approaches to drafting the scenario framework (Pillkahn, 2008) 
 Minimal 
Approach 
Standard 
Approach 
Maximum 
Approach 
Number of 
Uncertainties 
2 Around 3 to 8 >8 
Deployed 
Tools and 
Methods 
Four-quadrants 
(Axis of 
Uncertainty) 
matrix. 
Wilson matrix, 
morphological analysis. 
Wilson matrix 
morphological analysis, 
cross-impact analysis, 
consistency analysis. 
Application Simple 
description of 
the enquiry. 
Description of the inquiry 
with a manageable number 
of uncertainties and 
elements. 
Complex subjects with 
many degrees of freedom 
and unknown variables. 
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Given the inherent uncertainty of the future, developing multiple scenarios is a 
common practice, especially in the field of strategic development so that 
strategies or plans can be tested in terms of their robustness against a set of 
possible futures (O‘Brien, 2004). As there are an infinite number of stories about 
the future, the challenge is to focus on those stories that are important (Saritas 
and Nugroho, 2012), and the appropriate number should be neither too small 
(less than three), so that no important situation is left out from the analysis, nor 
too big, otherwise the process dissipates (Amer et al., 2013). Thereby, Amer et 
al. (2013) examined the recommended number of scenarios by several authors 
and concluded that considering three to five future scenarios is appropriate for a 
scenario project. 
As in many other fields, scenario development should be subject to validation at 
the end of the process. Despite some scenario evaluation criteria already being 
highlighted in Table 2-2, it is worth noting that Amer et al. (2013) analysed the 
scenario validation criteria proposed by different authors, which led to the 
conclusion that consistency and plausibility are the decisive conditions for 
assessing scenarios as credible and valid.  
2.3.3 Using scenarios for strategic planning in water utilities 
Future scenarios have been used to inform strategic planning in water utilities 
mostly in isolation, i.e., focusing on a single specific issue - e.g.: demography, 
consumption habits, water quality at sources, behaviour of infrastructures, 
climate change - and, not rarely, based on extrapolation of past trends (Means 
et al., 2010; Cosgrove, 2013). Whilst trend extrapolation may be used for the 
short-term, it has been recognized that this method does not apply for the long-
term (Figure 2-4), because of both the effects of unprecedented future events 
and the high levels of uncertainty around the evolutionary trends and drivers of 
change (Means et al., 2010; Bradfield et al., 2005). 
Global scenarios for climate change have been developed in recent years 
(IPCC, 2007), thus enabling water utilities to delineate long-term adaptation 
strategies. In fact, any significant change in precipitation and temperature 
patterns will impact the dynamics of the existing systems, and many water 
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utilities are now addressing the challenge of adapting themselves to the effects 
of climate change. The basis of these scenarios‘ uncertainty is threefold: (i) the 
unknown future concentrations of greenhouse gases and other anthropogenic 
or natural forcing agents (e.g. injections of stratospheric aerosol from explosive 
volcanic eruptions); (ii) the unknown natural (unforced) climate variations; and 
(iii) the errors associated with the predictive models (Collins et al., 2006). To 
overcome these problems, modellers tend to use a wide array of climate 
change scenarios that will then bind a range in the precipitation and 
temperature patterns. Having obtained the results of the climate change 
scenarios, the correspondent vulnerability of water supply systems is 
subsequently assessed, using either quantitative techniques, such as 
precipitation-runoff models, water quality modelling, etc., or qualitative and less 
formal approaches. As each meteorological variable presents its own impacts to 
the system, considering the synergetic effect of the simultaneous change in all 
the variables represents a challenge for water utilities. Conversely, adaptation 
measures (e.g.: water sources diversification, water reuse, changes in the 
operation, etc.) are often embedded among other objectives rather than climate 
change adaptation, such as improving water efficiency or the overall resilience 
of the system. 
While territorial plans and measures may dictate the course of land use and 
demography for the short term, when it comes to the long term, it is not possible 
to anticipate what will happen (Environment Agency, 2009; Environment 
Agency, 2011; Aguiar and Santos, 2007), so the usual approach consists of 
setting a series of scenarios to describe possible futures. As land use and 
demography are generally only two of the variables that contribute to setting 
consistent futures of the global environment, they are integrated in most of the 
major global scenarios studies, such as IPCC (2007) SRES, the Global 
Environment Outlook and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Vuuren et 
al., 2007). Land use surveys at a national scale, based on satellite images, such 
as Corine Land Cover (European Environment Agency, 2006), and local 
demographic statistics and projections, based on census data and migration 
flows, provide a local input to which the global scenarios‘ trends may be 
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applied. Alternatively, local scenarios may be specifically developed, as it is the 
case of the work carried out by the Environment Agency for England and Wales 
(Environment Agency, 2009; Environment Agency, 2011). These scenarios are 
then used by water utilities, as, on the one hand, land use changes are mostly 
associated with perturbations of the raw water quality and availability 
(Weatherhead and Howden, 2009); on the other hand, demographic changes 
represent a pressure not only on the water sources‘ quantity, but also on water 
sources‘ quality, due to an increase in point source pollution. Adaptation and 
mitigation measures include reinforcement of the treatment schemes, the re-
utilisation of water, the setting or increasing of demand management policies (in 
contrast with resource development) and the reinforcement of the agriculture 
and forestry practices monitoring (Weatherhead and Howden, 2009). 
Perhaps because of the aforementioned global environmental scenarios, Kuosa 
(2011) believes that ―environmental futures studies have been evolving in their 
own path for years, and it will be considered as an ‗‗independent field‘‘ in 
coming years, or it will be adopted to some formal discipline (…). I guess, it will 
not end up to be a part of the third paradigm of futures studies, as almost all of 
its ontology, epistemology, argumentation and objectives base on different type 
of thinking. It is merely a future-oriented extension to Management thinking‖.  
2.4 Linking Risk and Futures 
2.4.1 Overview 
As outlined in the previous chapter, both strategic risk management and future 
scenarios are aimed at supporting strategic planning, the respective use being 
taped by the extent of knowledge about likelihood and consequences. Figure 
2-5 shows that scenarios concentrate only on projected consequences, thus 
missing the link with risk management in the future due to the unaccounted 
perspective of the projected likelihood. 
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Figure 2-5 - Categorising incertitude within environmental decision making 
(redrawn from Stirling, 2001, in Pollard et al., 2008) 
Nonetheless, these two areas of research share many commonalities, as 
pointed out by Koivisto et al. (2009): 
 they consider similar development phases: problem formulation / focal 
question; risk evaluation / scenario building; risk acceptation and options 
appraisal / implications of the scenarios for the organization and strategic 
actions appraisal; 
 they stem from a knowledge making process, which means a common 
theoretical ground – both approaches organise the knowledge making 
from personal and proprietary to common sense and public, making the 
developed knowledge more than the sum of its elements. 
Therefore, these two research traditions are somehow interrelated, but in 
practice the respective research projects have separated and are seldom linked 
(Koivisto et al., 2009).   
2.4.2 Attempts to link risk and futures 
Linking strategic risk and futures‘ assessments may have mutual advantages. In 
fact, strategic risks should be assessed within a more holistic approach like the 
ones in futures‘ assessments, while the latter would benefit from the systemic 
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framework that is usually associated with the former (Koivisto et al., 2009). 
Based on these assumptions, Koivisto et al. (2009) developed the only research 
known so far aiming at identifying possible synergies between risk and future 
assessments, which is focused on technological development. From the 
analysis of three different projects, they came to the following conclusions: 
 the INNORISK project2 is the one where integration of futures and risk 
assessment traditions will be profitable, or, at least, easier to carry on, 
since it focuses on corporate strategic decision making, thus sharing 
longer time frames  - whereas for the other projects, the narrow time 
horizon of risk analysis contrasted with the large scale of futures 
development; 
 due to the need to develop more holistic risk management processes 
responding to the continuous change, the future risk assessment shows 
up as a methodology that should increasingly adapt supplementary 
elements from many different approaches; 
 the two main benefits in integrating risk and futures approaches are: the 
openness to new future possibilities by changing mind-sets, building 
trust among actors and developing better preparedness for the change; 
and the generation of knowledge, by creating an understanding and 
sharing it in networks of people.  
Koivisto et al. (2009) end up saying that in practice, ―to succeed to build the 
solid bridge between the foresight and risk analysis methods new case studies 
would be needed‖. 
2.5 Summary, insights and gap analysis 
It is clear that SRA constitutes a challenge for water utilities. From an 
organizational context, most companies have not yet reached their highest level 
                                            
2
 The focus of the INNORISK project is on the opportunity recognition and management of 
future uncertainties and risks in companies that are giving rise to new business, by introducing 
existing technologies into new markets, development of new technologies for existing markets, 
or creation of new technologies in new markets. The INNORISK project includes three stages: 
opportunity recognition, conceptualisation and commercialisation. Foresight and risk 
assessment are essential parts of each stage. 
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of maturity, where they would be capable of learning and adapting continuously, 
hence building a risk culture within organizations is still required. In particular, 
implementing the right mechanisms for information to flow across business units 
is seen as fundamental for preventing risk from being managed in silos. From a 
methodological point of view, the need for current ERM approaches to assess 
risks in a more integrated way – either by addressing both environmental and 
business risks or by capturing their interconnections – has been recognized. 
The importance of long-term evaluation of strategic risks has also been noted, 
though there is little evidence that this has been done before in an integrated 
way.  
Future scenarios are actually a very fragmented field of research. 
Notwithstanding this, a broad alignment between three blocks, expressed in 
Table 2-4, is suggested by the literature review herein undertaken, though there 
is a growing tendency for these to become ―hybrid‖.  
Table 2-4 – Alignment of scenario planning features 
 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 
Purpose  Predictive Explorative Normative 
School  Probabilistic modified 
trends 
La prospective Intuitive logics 
Type of methods Quantitative Semi-quantitative Qualitative 
 
Scenario planning has been used as a strategic tool, just like ERM, but in water 
utilities they generally focus on one single issue and often develop from 
extrapolations of past trends, which were shown to be unsuitable for long-term 
analysis.  
Risk management and scenario planning evidence many commonalities: 
besides the ones already pointed out by Koivisto et al. (2009) – considering 
similar development phases and stemming from a knowledge making process – 
the literature review shows that, additionally,  
 they both support long-term planning; 
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 national frameworks for both SRA and Futures have been developed, 
with the UK and the Netherlands in leading positions in both fields; 
 both use quantitative, semi-quantitative or qualitative methods, and 
usually assessments comprise a mix of existing techniques; 
 they both contribute to opening ―mental maps‖ of managers and to 
initiate new conversations among the different actors; 
 in the water business, the majority of both approaches lack the integrated 
perspective underlying the complexity of water supply systems‘ 
management. 
Despite these similarities, risk and futures research have run in parallel, and 
only one attempt to link them has been found, though not in the water context. 
In short, current limitations of SRA and scenario planning in water utilities are 
mainly related to the need to evolve to a more integrated approach (in terms of 
the risks and drivers considered as well as of the respective interconnections) 
and to establish a culture of knowledge sharing and generation within 
organizations. Even though strategic risks are long-term changing risks, and 
despite the similarities between strategic risk management and future scenario 
planning, the link between these two areas of research has seldom been 
established, and no attempt has been found for the water sector.  
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3 RESEARCH QUESTION, AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The research question is based on the premise that a holistic approach linking 
strategic risk analysis with future scenario planning in water utilities would fill the 
gaps identified in the state-of-the-art of strategic risk management. The 
assumption is that such approach would lead to more efficient corporate 
management, unveiling tacit knowledge and allowing strategic objectives to be 
proactively managed. Thus, the research question asks: 
How can a holistic approach linking strategic risks assessment and future 
scenario planning in water utilities be set up?    
The overarching aim of this study is therefore to develop and test a novel 
approach that allows the Board of water utilities to appraise strategic risks and 
to gain a long term perspective on this baseline set of risks, while stimulating 
the pervasiveness of a risk culture within the organization.  
In order to achieve this aim, a number of objectives need to be reached: 
• To examine the existing methodologies for SRA in order to detect the 
gaps to be filled and the benefits to be expanded; 
• To investigate how the company's team (members of the Board, risk 
experts and risk managers) shall be assembled and involved 
throughout the process so that they gain ownership over it; 
• To explore how strategic objectives shall be identified; 
• To construct a holistic, systemic model to assess strategic risks in the 
present (baseline); 
• To investigate how the futures' science can be interconnected with 
SRA; 
• To undertake the construction of future scenarios and to reassess 
strategic risks in the future; 
• To develop a way of presenting baseline risks assessment as well as 
the way risks will change in the future to the Board. 
 41 
 
4 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
4.1 Research paradigm 
4.1.1 Overview 
This thesis is governed by the philosophical approach of action-centred 
research, which draws on the critical realism theory. In this type of research, a 
hypothesis and theory are not developed prior to the research, but rather arise 
during the course of the analysis. In the end, the aim is for analytic 
generalization, rather than statistic generalization (as it would be the case of 
positivism). 
To make sense of the data and to generate new theory, reasoning is made 
through combinations of inductive and deductive thinking, throughout the 
different stages of the research. Particularly, as the research question can be 
broken down into two sequential questions:  
(i) how can an integrated strategic risk assessment be set up? 
(ii) is it possible to reassess baseline risks within the context of future 
scenarios? how? 
several methods have been applied, namely brainstorming, expert 
elicitation/workshops, interviews and document analysis, semi-quantitative risk 
matrices, cognitive mapping and morphological analysis – these will be further 
detailed in chapter 6. Underlying each of these methods, different analytical and 
synthetic strategies have been followed, such as memoing, drawing of 
integrative diagrams and writing of narratives. 
4.1.2 Critical realism 
The term ―critical realism‖ was introduced in 1975 by Roy Bhaskar, building on 
earlier work in realist philosophy of science, particularly that of Rom Harré 
(Sayer, 2000). ―Critical realism‖ is one of the three main traditions in the 
philosophical foundations of warranted knowledge or theory (Table 4-1), 
following a subjectivist epistemology (how we come to know social reality), 
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similar to the hermeneutic tradition, but an objectivist ontology (the nature of 
social reality), like the positivists (Johnson and Duberley, 2000).  
Table 4-1 – Philosophical foundations of research traditions (Coghlan and 
Brannick, 2005) 
 
Neuman (2003) described critical realism as ―a critical process of inquiry that 
goes beyond surface illusions to uncover the real structures in the material 
world in order to help people change conditions and build a better world for 
themselves‖. The implications implicit in this description are three-fold. 
First, this ontological perspective is built around the ―real‖ – the structure and 
causal powers of the object; the ―actual‖ - what happens if and when those 
powers are activated; and the ―empiric‖ - the domain of experience, in the sense 
that powers may exist unexercised, and hence that what has happened or been 
known to have happened does not exhaust what could happen or have 
happened (Bhaskar, 1975 in Sayer, 2000). This notably applies to the strategic 
risk management and scenario planning fields, wherein, on the one hand, 
quantitative methods (used by positivists) are generally criticized for relying on 
past trends that do not take into account possible events that did not happen in 
the past; and, on the other hand, risk evaluation has more to do with the 
actual/empiric perception of risk (Renn, 2008b; Slovic, 1987) rather than with 
the real risk. 
Secondly, realist ontology also acknowledges the dimension of change, since 
the nature of the real objects is seen as capable of enabling what can happen 
whilst not pre-determining what will happen – making it possible, therefore, to 
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understand how objects could be or become things which currently they are not 
(Sayer, 2000). Commitment to change and democratic engagement are the 
principles that guide self-reflexivity, which leads to emancipation (Sayer, 2000).  
Finally, the analysis of causation appears as one of the most distinctive features 
of realism (Sayer, 2000), which should not be understood as the model of 
regular successions of events, where the proof would be made by gathering 
data on regularities or repeated occurrences – ―what causes something to 
happen has nothing to do with the number of times we have observed it 
happening‖ (Sayer, 2000); but, instead, as identifying causal mechanisms and 
how they work, and discovering if they have been activated and under what 
conditions (Sayer, 2000). 
4.1.3 Action research 
Action research is founded in the work of Kurt Lewin, who describes the 
scientific approach as a ―collaborative cyclical process of diagnosing a change 
situation or a problem, planning, gathering data, taking action, and then fact-
finding about the results of that action in order to plan and take further action‖ 
(Lewin, 1946 and Dickens and Watkins, 1999 in Coghlan and Brannick, 2005). 
It has been used in education, business organizations and health contexts in 
particular (Wisker, 2008), involves a relationship between researcher and 
client/colleagues and is aimed at both solving a problem and generating new 
knowledge (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005) – a description that directly applies to 
this research work, as explained in chapter 1.2. Gummesson (2000, in Coghlan 
and Brannick, 2005) further details this definition, by enumerating the following 
characteristics of action research:  
(i) Action researchers take action; 
(ii) Action research always involves two goals: solve a problem and 
contribute to science; 
(iii) Action research is interactive, requiring cooperation with client 
/colleagues; 
(iv) Action research is aimed at developing holistic understanding during a 
project and recognizing complexity - action researchers need to have 
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a broad view of how the system works and be able to move between 
formal structural and technical and informal people subsystems; 
(v) Action research is fundamentally about change; 
(vi) Action research requires an understanding of the ethical framework, 
values and norms within which it is used in a particular context; 
(vii) Action research can include all types of data gathering methods, 
namely qualitative and quantitative; 
(viii) Action research requires a breadth of pre-understanding of the 
corporate or organizational environment, the conditions of business or 
service delivery, the structure and dynamics of operating systems and 
the theoretical underpinnings of such systems; 
(ix) Action research should be conducted in real time - a live case study 
being written as it unfolds -, though retrospective action research is 
also acceptable; 
(x) The action research paradigm requires its own quality criteria. 
These characteristics allow an understanding of why action research is different 
from other scientific researches. Action researchers are actively involved with 
the subject of research, unlike traditional research.  A distinction between theory 
and action is not postulated - ‗there is nothing so practical as a good theory‘ 
(Lewin, 1951), though action research goes beyond the notion that theory can 
inform practice, to a recognition that theory can and should be generated 
through practice. Action research requires cooperation between the researchers 
and the client personnel, which involves three ―voices‖ or ―three persons‖ 
(Reason and Bradbury, 2001) corresponding to Reason and Marshall‘s three 
audiences of research: first-person is undertaken by individuals (―for me‖); 
second-person is the involvement of the first with teams and between teams in 
interdepartmental groups (―for us‖); and third-person is impersonal, referring to 
organizations (―for them‖). The action researcher is expected to bring 
knowledge to the research project - as such,  he is distinguished from 
researchers who, for example, think that all they have to do to develop 
grounded theory is just to go out into the field. Finally, action research should be 
judged by its quality and rigour, according to the criteria patent in Table 4-2, or, 
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more shortly, conferring to three main elements: ―a good story; rigorous 
reflection on that story; and an extrapolation of usable knowledge or theory from 
the reflection on the story‖ (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005). 
Table 4-2 – Criteria to assess quality and rigour of action research projects 
QUALITY (Reason and Bradbury, 2001) RIGOUR (Reason, 2003 in Coghlan and 
Brannick, 2005) 
Is the action research explicit in developing a 
praxis of relational participation? 
In other words how well does the action 
research reflect the cooperation between the 
action researcher and the members of the 
organization? 
How you engaged in the steps of multiple and 
repetitious action research cycles 
(diagnosing, planning, taking action and 
evaluating were done), and how these were 
recorded to reflect that they are a true 
representation of what was studied. 
Is action research guided by a reflexive 
concern for practical outcomes? Is the action 
project governed by constant and iterative 
reflection as part of the process of 
organizational change or improvement? 
How you challenged and tested your own 
assumptions and interpretations of what was 
happening continuously through the project, 
by means of content, process and premise 
reflection, so that your familiarity with and 
closeness to the issues are exposed to 
critique. 
Does action research include a plurality of 
knowing which ensures conceptual-theoretical 
integrity, extends our ways of knowing and 
has a methodological appropriateness? 
How you accessed different views of what 
was happening which probably produced both 
confirming and contradictory interpretations. 
Does action research engage in significant 
work? The significance of the project is an 
important quality in action research. 
How your interpretations and diagnoses are 
grounded in scholarly theory, rigorously 
applied, and how project outcomes are 
challenged, supported or disconfirmed in 
terms of the theories underpinning those 
interpretations and diagnoses. 
Does the action research result in new and 
enduring infrastructures? In other words, does 
sustainable change come out of the project? 
 
 
Having seen why action research differs from other scientific approaches, it is 
worth bringing up why it is different, as well, from regular practice – a point that 
may give rise to criticisms. Wisker (2008) advocates that, despite being based 
on practice, action research requires a more sustainable and explicit 
examination of decisions, relationships, evidences, data and learning that can 
be derived from practice. Knowledge generation results from the encounter 
between local insights and the understanding that the outsider brings to the 
table, in a Hegelian dialectic: an affirmation from one of the parties (the thesis) 
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is brought forward and is met with demanding and challenging questions and 
counterpropositions (antithesis), and out of this friendly encounter of points of 
view (synthesis) will gradually evolve (Greenwood and Levin, 1988). In short, 
on-going critical analysis is the distinctive feature from just a mere new 
business process implementation (Wisker, 2008).     
Main benefits of action research, as an alternative approach to traditional 
research, are related to the fact that it is practical, participative, emancipatory, 
interpretative and critical (Wisker, 2008). But perhaps the most important 
advantage is that pointed out by Zubber-Skerrit (1992 in Wisker, 2008) referring 
to higher education, but also applicable to other areas of research: it is a more 
effective and immediate way of improving practice while advancing knowledge – 
or, in other words, the fact that it avoids the need for the results to be 
implemented later. 
From all of the above, it stands out that the relation of action research with the 
case-study approach is straightforward: the former is ―the most demanding and 
far-reaching method of doing case study research‖ (Gummesson, 2000 in 
Coghlan and Brannick, 2005). This research focuses on one single in-depth 
case study (Yin, 2009), giving way to analytic rather than statistic 
generalization, as the adequacy of an analysis of a single case need have 
nothing to do with how many other such cases there are (Sayer, 2000).  
4.2 Research design 
The general outfit of the research design is that of an intensive research design 
(Table 4-3): it is strong on causal explanation and interpreting meanings in 
context, but as it tends to be very time-consuming, only one case was studied 
in-depth, in line with a practitioner action research.  
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Table 4-3 - Intensive and extensive research: a summary from Sayer (1992) in 
Sayer (2000) 
 
Research design was modelled throughout the research, as it is typical of action 
research (Figure 4-1). In fact, despite main milestones having been set out in 
advance in a ―general plan of action‖ (Wisker, 2008), many of the intermediate 
steps have been guided from the outcomes of the experimentation at EPAL, 
which led to new, subsequent reframing of the research design. 
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Figure 4-1 - Spiral of action research cycles (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005) 
Referring back to the two parts into which the main research question may be 
divided, namely: 
(i) how can an integrated strategic risk assessment be set up? 
(ii) is it possible to reassess baseline risks within the context of future 
scenarios? how? 
answering question (i) followed a similar approach to Prpich et al. (2011), which 
was based on a deliberative process through the following steps: 
i. Assembly of the team (at EPAL) that would participate in the case-
study; 
ii. Identification of EPAL's strategic objectives; 
iii. Analysis of strategic risks and presentation of the results.   
Since action research is based on a collaborative process where ―three 
persons‖ are involved, assembly of the team corresponds to setting out the 
―second-person‖. This poses an important challenge as to who is involved in the 
research and how, because the quality of ―second-person‖ inquiry and action is 
central to action research, given its collaborative and democratic characteristics 
(Coghlan and Brannick, 2005). Identification of EPAL‘s strategic objectives 
 49 
corresponds to the ―problem formulation‖ phase in risk analysis – ―risk of what, 
to whom‖. Finally, assessing strategic risks differs from the approach followed 
by Prpich et al. (2011), since cognitive mapping arose as the best way to build a 
systemic model of strategic risks, capturing the respective interactions. 
Question (ii) involved the following additional steps:   
iv. Gathering knowledge about mega-trends that will influence the future 
(climate change, land-use and demographic changes, natural 
deterioration of critical infrastructures, etc.) of EPAL‘s business; 
v. Construction of future scenarios; 
vi. Systemic re-analysis of strategic risks in each scenario. 
In fact, since one of the aims of this research is linking SRA and futures, the 
research design would have to include the construction of future scenarios, to 
which the knowledge of mega-trends is an important contribution. The objective 
of assessing baseline risks in future scenarios is to have a long-term 
perspective of their evolution under certain circumstances, which would support 
a better and more efficient strategic planning - the challenge here is to expand 
knowledge as to how this could be achieved.  
Having completed and validated each of these steps, the response to the 
research question will be accomplished: the novel holistic approach linking 
strategic risks assessment and futures will be derived, as a whole, from the 
outcomes of each step; on the other hand, the engagement with and the 
pervasiveness of a risk management culture within the organization results, as 
a whole, from the process in itself.  
4.3 Ethical considerations 
Action research poses many ethical challenges to the researcher.  
As a collaborative process, it challenges power relationships with hierarchies 
and personal relationships and assumptions with colleagues (Wisker, 2008). In 
fact, it is recognized that, ideally, those in power will support the research and 
embrace its outcomes (Wisker, 2008), but one potential problem that may arise 
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is to what extent ―support‖ can be understood as ―interference‖. In this work, the 
Board of EPAL was fully collaborative whilst not intrusive, thus facilitating the 
research. As for the colleagues, especially during the semi-structured 
interviews, care was taken to ensure the researcher was not compromising 
them when revealing information about their practices or views to the rest of the 
organization. Furthermore, a conscious attempt was made to direct the previous 
experience and insights of the researcher to the data gathering and the choice 
of the right questions, rather than to influence or bias the colleagues‘ opinions. 
A different issue has to do with the presentation of the results, which may 
include sensitive matters for the company. In order to deal with this problem, it 
was agreed that all the results would be expressed in the dissertation, as it is 
not subject to a ―mass media‖ means of dissemination, but oral presentations or 
journal publications should express only carefully examined and selected 
information.    
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5 CASE STUDY CONTEXT 
5.1 EPAL – Empresa Portuguesa das Águas Livres  
5.1.1 Brief description and key figures 
EPAL – Empresa Portuguesa das Águas Livres, SA, is the oldest and largest 
water supply company in Portugal, constituting the reference company within 
the water sector in Portugal. Founded in 1868 as CAL - Companhia das Águas 
de Lisboa, a privately owned concession to supply water to Lisbon, it became a 
state owned company in 1974, named EPAL. Since 1991, EPAL has been a 
public limited company, fully owned by Águas de Portugal group. 
EPAL supplies wholesale quality water to approximately three million people 
(more than one-quarter of the Portuguese population) in 35 municipalities north 
of the River Tagus, corresponding to a total supply area of 7,090 km², as well as 
retail water to approximately 500 thousand inhabitants in Lisbon. With 
approximately 700 staff, EPAL has assets with a net fixed value of around 900 
million EUR and a capital expenditure program of approximately 100 million 
EUR planned for the period 2014-2016. Over the last few years, EPAL has 
been generating profits of around 40 million EUR. 
5.1.2 Water supply system 
All the water sources are located in the Tagus River Basin, which is shared with 
Spain (see red and brown dots in Figure 5-1). About 90 per cent of the supply 
comes from Castelo do Bode reservoir, which, despite being situated in the 
totally Portuguese Zêzere river sub-basin, is shared with EDP (the Portuguese 
Company of Electricity) which owns the dam. Within this sub-system, water is 
treated at Asseiceira water treatment plant, WTP, through a scheme comprising 
mineralization coagulation/flocculation, flotation, oxidation (ozone), filtration and 
final disinfection (chlorine); built in 1987 with the capacity to treat 500,000 
m3/day, this WTP was enlarged and modified in 2007 to treat 625,000 m3/day 
and to introduce flotation and ozonation into the treatment process. The second 
largest water source is the River Tagus, with abstraction undertaken at Valada. 
This water is pumped to Vale da Pedra WTP, which has a nominal capacity of 
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240,000 m3/day and a treatment scheme comprising pre-chlorination, 
coagulation/flocculation, decantation, filtration and final disinfection (chlorine). 
Presently, an overall refurbishment of this WTP is being undertaken. The 
remaining sources are underground water sources: wells of Ota and Alenquer, 
located on a limestone massif; and boreholes of Lezírias, where the water is 
abstracted from the biggest aquifer in the Iberian Peninsula (Tejo-Sado aquifer) 
at depths of 250 m and 500 m. 
 
Figure 5-1 – Location of EPAL’s water sources 
Due to the enlargement of the system in 2007 and to the concomitant turn over 
observed in the historical increasing demand, the water supply system now 
evidences an overcapacity of drinking water production and transport.  
The water supply system includes more than 2.100 kilometres of water mains, 
37 pumping stations, 41 water tanks, 25 chlorination points and around 88.000 
service connections (Figure 5-2). 
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Figure 5-2 – EPAL’s water supply system 
5.1.3 Governance 
Governance is assured by the following management bodies: (i) general 
council, whose only member is the holding company Águas de Portugal, that 
has the roles of evaluating and voting on the reports and the annual accounts, 
electing the members of the management bodies, deliberating on the statutes 
and capital increases, authorizing the acquisition and alienation of capital as 
well as the realization of investments worth more than 20% of the share capital; 
(ii) board of directors, composed of three members who are elected by the 
general council and are appointed for a three-year period, that may be renewed; 
(iii) supervision authority, which supervises the company and legally certifies the 
accounts; (iv) remuneration committee, which establishes the remuneration of 
the members of the management bodies; and (v) advisory council for the 
sustainable development, which sets out recommendations regarding the 
environmental sustainability of the company‘s activities. 
Figure 5-3 presents the organizational structure of EPAL. 
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Figure 5-3 – Organizational structure of EPAL 
Economic regulation is carried out by DGAE, a directorate of the Ministry of 
Economy that annually celebrates a convention with EPAL for setting the tariffs, 
based on the following principles: (i) to assure an adequate remuneration of the 
capital invested; (ii) to assure adequate levels of self-financing; and (iii) to fully 
cover operational costs. Quality of service provided by EPAL is regulated and 
benchmarked by ERSAR, the National Water and Waste Regulator; in case any 
non-compliance with legislated parametric values of water quality is detected, it 
is reported to the Regional Health Administration (ARS-LVT) as well.  
5.2 Assembled team 
Following Prpich et al. (2011), the case-study team encompassed a risk co-
ordinator / risk facilitator (the researcher), the management board, (senior) risk 
managers and risk experts – Figure 5-4.  
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Figure 5-4 - Main actors and respective roles in the process (Prpich et al., 2011) 
Assembling the team commenced with a meeting with the Board in which the 
overall methodology was presented and the strategic/corporate objectives were 
identified (chapter 6.1). Acknowledging the strategic objectives allowed the 
appointing of the respective risk managers – the risk of not meeting those 
objectives (HM Treasury, 2004). A workshop was then held with the 
participation of the Board and of risk managers, so that the project was 
explained and discussed in broad terms. Then, a series of 14 meetings was 
carried out with each risk manager (heads of department)3, individually, in order 
to present a first draft of the systemic model of the strategic risks that had been 
developed in the meantime (chapter 6.2) and to ask them (i) for their feed-back; 
(ii) to nominate the risk experts in their departments4.  
The team from EPAL appointed to participate in this research project is 
presented in Appendix A. 
                                            
3 DGA (Asset Management), PCG (Planning and Control Management), DAF 
(Administrative and Financial Department), DRC (Customers Relations), DRH (Human 
Resources), DIR (Infrastructures Maintenance), DOP (Operations), LAB (Water Quality 
Control), LOG (Logistics), JUR (Legal compliance), DGO (Design and Works), DSO 
(Organizational Development), DSI (Information Systems) and SG (General 
Secretariat). 
4 The number of Risk Experts nominated by each Risk Manager ranged from one to 
three. 
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Engagement of the team was leveraged by the following factors: 
 Top management (the Board) buy-in;  
 The whole project was explained to all players, thus each of them 
understood the global picture and realized the importance of their own 
contribution; 
 The whole team was invited to attend the workshop where the results 
were presented, discussed and validated – this allowed them to verify 
that their contributions had been incorporated and also to learn more 
about the risks they manage and their respective interdependencies with 
others‘ risks; 
 A training session about futures science was offered to risk experts, 
which constituted an enriching opportunity to broaden their knowledge. 
A deep engagement of the team was achieved, which is expressed in their 
contribution to the baseline risk assessment phase (construction of the systemic 
model based on a bottom-up approach, strategic risks‘ evaluation, validation) 
and also to the futures‘ phase (identification of the key-drivers‘ projections, 
cross-consistency analysis and validation).  
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6 DEVELOPMENT OF A HOLISTIC APPROACH LINKING 
RISKS AND FUTURES 
6.1 Strategic risks identification 
6.1.1 Methods 
Strategic risks are the risks associated with the non-accomplishing of the 
strategic objectives, which, in turn, are a reflex of the decision-makers‘ values. 
As such, strategic risks identification is entwined not only with the company's 
vision and mission but also with the respective values, thus requiring the 
involvement of the top management of utilities. Keeney (1992) defines 
―objective‖ as a statement of something that one desires to achieve, 
characterized by a decision context, an object and a direction of preference, 
and points out that there are different types of objectives (Figure 6-1):  
 means objectives – act as a means to achieve the fundamental 
objectives; 
 fundamental objectives – characterize an essential reason for interest in 
the decision situation; 
 strategic objectives – represent the decision makers‘ ultimate end 
objectives, providing common guidance to all decisions; strategic 
objectives do not vary from day to day, but rather should be stable over 
years. 
  
Figure 6-1 – The decision frame based on value-focused thinking: a) base 
framework; b) with indication of the flow of information (Keeney, 1992) 
 58 
Although properly structuring strategic objectives represents a powerful 
opportunity for organizations, as it establishes a ―sound basis for decision-
making that can be repeatedly used‖, providing a ―stable reference point for 
even the most turbulent of decision situations‖ (Keeney, 1992), this potential 
has been disregarded by many companies, which define their strategic 
objectives through vague statements that everyone would agree with, thus 
providing minimal guidance and permitting taking ad-hoc decisions that will not 
make sense in the broader context of the organization (Keeney, 1992). Keeney 
(1992) advocates that one of the reasons for this to happen is the lack of 
existing guidance, and suggests the following approach in order to help 
identifying (steps i. to iii.) and structuring (steps iv. to v.) strategic objectives: 
(i) to enlist a facilitator to guide the process; 
(ii) the facilitator should have the decision context or some objectives 
roughly outlined prior to engaging in a discussion about the decision 
situation; 
(iii) to elicit the strategic objectives from the decision-maker, following the 
principle that a specific decision context is part of a larger one, which, in 
turn, is part of a still larger one, until the strategic decision context is 
reached; 
(iv) to identify the fundamental objectives associated with the strategic 
objectives, which must lie somewhere between the decision context (as 
they should be controllable) and the strategic objectives (as they should 
be essential for the accomplishment of the strategic objectives); 
(v) to structure the fundamental objectives, by constructing either a 
hierarchy based on value judgements or a means-ends network based 
on causal judgments about facts, or a combination of both.  
The steps concerning the structuring of strategic objectives will be recalled in 
chapter 6.2.1. In this research, strategic objectives were identified by the 
facilitator in a meeting with the chairman of the board, where the heads of the 
Planning and Management Control and the Asset Management departments 
also participated.  
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6.1.2 Results 
The strategic objectives identified for EPAL are the following: 
 To guarantee the economic and financial Sustainability of the business, 
in the long term.  
Failing to meet this objective will mainly affect the shareholder.  
 To guarantee adequate levels of business Profitability, each year.  
Failing to meet this objective will mainly affect the customers and the 
shareholder. 
 To supply water with adequate Quality, i.e., that it will not harm 
customers‘ health. 
Failing to meet this objective will mainly affect the customers. 
 To supply water in adequate Quantity, i.e., meeting every customer‘s 
needs (regardless of the reliability of supply or the water quality). 
Failing to meet this objective will mainly affect the customers. 
 To supply water with adequate Reliability, i.e., ensuring the continuity of 
the supply (regardless of the water quality or quantity).  
Failing to meet this objective will mainly affect the customers. 
 To ensure the Trust from the customers as well as the Reputation among 
other national or international water utilities.  
Failing to meet this objective will mainly affect the shareholder. 
6.2 Systemic analysis of strategic risks 
6.2.1 Methods  
6.2.1.1 Construction of a systemic model: the influence diagram 
At strategic level, risk assessments should integrate the different risks as a 
whole, as well as capture the respective interdependencies (Schiller and Prpich, 
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2013; ISO 31000, 2009). Nevertheless, the way these principles may be 
operationalized is hardly known.  
In this research, a systemic model of strategic risks was constructed, mainly 
based on two different, yet convergent and complementary, approaches. The 
first one consisted of identifying and trying to structure the fundamental 
objectives related to the strategic objectives – steps (iv) and (v) mentioned in 
6.1.1. The second approach was to draw an event-exposure-harm diagram 
(Gormley et al., 2011). Despite the fact that the former is focused on the 
objectives to be attained whilst the latter is focused on what can happen that 
poses a threat to the objectives, they both stem from the identification of causal 
relationships and can be combined to form a holistic model of strategic risks, as 
these are understood as the risk of not meeting the objectives. In fact, ―harm‖ is 
related to the consequences of failing to meet each of the ―fundamental 
objectives‖.  The overall result is a cognitive map, also referred to as ―influence 
diagram‖, which allows the identifying of the interdependencies between risks, 
because when mapping the exposures to the events it soon became clear that 
similar events led to different exposures which, in turn, may be associated with 
different harms to strategic risks.  
Since strategic objectives are too broad for most decision situations, 
fundamental objectives help narrowing the decision context, permitting a better 
control over the consequences (Keeney, 1992). Therefore, identifying the 
fundamental objectives related to each of the strategic objectives becomes 
critical, and two ways may be followed in order to do it: (i) bottom-up - the 
means objectives are repeatedly questioned – e.g. ―why is this objective 
important in the decision context?‖ – until the answer indicates direct implication 
on a strategic objective, thus letting the fundamental objectives emerge; or (ii) 
top-down - working back from the strategic objectives and challenging them to 
make fundamental objectives arise – e.g. ―what are the immediate causes for  
meeting this strategic objective?‖ (Keeney, 1992; Waal and Ritchey, 2007). 
Usually, this is an iterative process, as it is often necessary to move back and 
forward until the fundamental objectives are stabilized (Keeney, 1992). Then, 
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with both strategic and fundamental objectives well defined, Keeney (1992) 
advocates that constructing a means-ends objectives network is one of the 
possible ways to structure objectives, where ―the lower-level objective is a 
means (that is, a causal factor) to the higher-level objective‖. Although this 
process clearly resembles that of influence diagrams used in decision-analysis, 
a distinction between the two of them is that a means-ends objectives network 
may not include all the causal factors, as these may not be important within the 
decision context (Howard and Matheson, 1984 and Schachter, 1986 in Keeney, 
1992). In this research, therefore, fundamental objectives were no further 
structured – instead, they were used to form the basis for a different approach: 
the events – exposures – harms model, where ―harms‖ are associated with the 
consequences of failing to meet the fundamental objectives. Taking on this 
premise, events (definable root cause activities that pose a threat to the 
fundamental objectives) and correspondent exposures (resulting from a 
progressive challenge from a source of a hazard) were identified and mapped in 
an influence diagram – a cognitive map of cause-effect relationships between 
factors in the situation under debate (Warren, 1995), where the components or 
states are interconnected by directed graphs consisting of nodes and arrows 
(Kosko, 1986 in Amer et al., 2013). Such diagram may be built by asking risk 
experts the following questions (Waal and Ritchey, 2007): 
(i) What are the variables and variable values? 
(ii) What does the graphical (e.g. causal) structure look like – i.e. between 
which variables are there dependencies and what are their causal 
directions? 
(iii) What are the strengths of these dependencies, as depicted in the 
graphical structure? 
The facilitator then compiles all the answers and combines them into one single 
diagram. This tool allows the capturing of diverse mental perspectives and 
presents them in an intuitive visual way that facilitates an understanding of 
interdependencies and promotes discussion among risk experts and managers 
(Waal and Ritchey, 2007; Amer et al., 2013). One of the main advantages of 
this technique is that the final diagram does not represent the mental map of a 
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single person but rather it reflects the mental map of the organization, 
incorporating all the contributions from the risk experts, thus backing their buy-in 
(Warren, 1995). However, building such a diagram may take considerable time, 
requiring adequate facilitation (Warren, 1995) and care should be taken so that 
the degree of detail of the influence diagram should not lead to too large and 
complex models (Warren, 1995; Amer et al., 2013). Recently, the concept of 
―Fuzzy cognitive mapping‖ gained popularity (Aguilar, 1995 in Amer et al., 2013) 
– it can be considered an extension of the traditional cognitive maps through the 
incorporation of weighted causal links, which may be useful when a certain 
state is influenced by an equal number of negative and positive ingoing arrows 
(Hans-Horst and Jetter, 2003 in Amer et al., 2013).       
Recent advice is that hazardous events – events that present very low 
likelihood but catastrophic consequences – should not be combined into the 
same analysis as others (US-NRC, 2010; Cox, 2012), given their peculiar 
characteristics: 
 they may affect all strategic objectives; 
 they are probable (usually low likelihood) but unpredictable (Cox, 2012; 
Renn, 2008b); 
 their consequences are known to be ―catastrophic‖, but these can be far 
more devastating that one can imagine (Vlek, 2013); 
 there are no control barriers robust enough to prevent exposures to 
these events from occurring, thus the corresponding risk management 
strategies differ from the non-hazardous events‘ ones (Kleink and Renn, 
2002) by mainly addressed contingency plans to assure business 
continuity (HM Treasury, 2004; Pollard et al., 2004). 
In this approach, the solution found was to depict these events (earthquakes, 
tornados, flooding and terrorism) by vertical bars spanning all strategic risks, 
prior to the remaining events. 
Barriers in place along each pathway (that is, existing mechanisms to control 
risks) were identified and characterized in terms of the respective effectiveness, 
as they may contribute to lowering the likelihood and consequences of risks; in 
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fact, keeping those barriers robust is the essence of risk management (Carter, 
2012). The influence diagram - with and without the control barriers – was 
intentionally fitted in one A4 sheet, to allow decision-makers to have a global 
picture of the pathways to risks. However, this did not allow the depicting of a 
full characterization of each of the components of the influence diagram, so a 
complementing database was created, registering all the relevant information 
associated with each event, exposure or harm. 
6.2.1.2 Likelihood and consequences evaluation 
Besides allowing a holistic comprehension of the strategic risks and their 
interdependencies, the systemic model was also intended to support the 
classification of the likelihood and consequences of strategic risks. For this 
purpose, semi-quantitative scales were employed, due to the multi-dimensional 
nature of risks, which make it difficult to use a quantitative approach (Altenbach, 
1995; Andrews et al., 2003; FAO/WHO, 2009).  
A logarithmic scale was used to characterise the likelihood of identified events 
occurring in the following 18 months (starting in 2012). Assessing each of the 
events, exposures and harms‘ likelihood was based on the existing studies at 
EPAL as well as on empirical and expert knowledge (Wall and Ritchey, 2007), 
captured in semi-structured interviews with risk experts, and the result was 
made conditional on the outcome of earlier steps in the diagram (Wall and 
Ritchey, 2007; Gormley et al., 2011) taking into consideration the efficacy of 
existing barriers, as well (Pollino and Hart, 2008). 
The definition of the consequences‘ scale requires value judgments that are 
specific to the organization (Keeney, 1992; Renn, 2008a). Moreover, choosing a 
set of attributes that comprehensively describe hazards‘ impacts while keeping 
the list short enough to be cognitively tractable, i.e., to find the right compromise 
to balance totality and usability, constitutes a major challenge (Willis et al., 
2004; Pollard et al., 2004; Prpich et al., 2011). In this work, consequences were 
described by their type, extension (magnitude) and duration (including 
irreversibility) – ―TED‖. Thresholds for the different classes of consequences 
were defined taking into account real possible situations (e.g.- for reliability of 
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supply: what would be the worst case of a critical infrastructure failure? Could it 
be considered ―catastrophic‖?), as well as the reaction time – also known as 
―risk clockspeed window‖ (Caldwell, 2012). For example, the threshold of ―six 
months‖ regarding the consequences of not having enough water at sources to 
supply, took into account the estimated time to implement new abstractions or 
transfers from other water sources or transport systems. Finally, it became 
necessary to find the best correspondence of each class‘ significance across all 
the consequence categories. In order to do so, two ways were analysed: 
(i) classifying all consequences on a Likert scale (Likert, 1932) of 1 to 5 and 
then ranking the relative (pairwise) importance of the objectives, assigning 
weights and recalculating the value of each class; or (ii) reflecting the relative 
significance of consequences on a matrix or risk ―heat-map‖ and constructing a 
narrative for each strategic risk (Prpich et al., 2013). Following practical 
examples of some ―best in class‖ utilities (e.g. E.On), the second approach was 
adopted, since it makes it easier for the decision makers, risk experts and risk 
managers to understand it. 
The scale for consequences evaluation was then applied to the harms 
associated with each strategic risk. The work done in EPAL confirmed that the 
order in which likelihood and consequence were assessed is not 
interchangeable (MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008): ranking order of impacts 
should be done first, so that potential major risks are not dismissed prematurely 
(Caldwell, 2012). Each of the classes of consequence for a given risk may be 
associated with its own class of likelihood, so every pair of 
consequence/likelihood was carefully analysed in order to determine what the 
final evaluation of the risk would be.  
―Heat-maps‖ (map positioning risks in 2D schematics presenting likelihood and 
consequence scales on the vertical and horizontal axes) are a practical and 
intuitive way to support discussions with decision-makers, who ―desire a 
structured and supportable basis for acting on the risks posed by a policy area 
over a given future‖ (Prpich et al., 2013), as they condense a large body of 
evidence captured from experts and literature. Nevertheless, these should not 
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be used in isolation, since the complexity of policy-level risk cannot be fully 
captured in the ―heat-maps‖ (Prpich et al., 2013). As such, each strategic risk 
was represented by an ellipse, indicating a central tendency and a span of 
uncertainty along the vertical and horizontal dimensions, and these were further 
characterized by a narrative on risk character, including existing control 
mechanisms. 
Offering a systematic treatment of uncertainty in order to improve the 
management of uncertainty in decision making processes is neither simple nor 
consensual (Krayer von Krauss et al., 2006; Patt, 2007; Pollard et al., 2008). 
While the elliptic shape of risks in the ―heat-map‖ reflect the aleatory uncertainty 
- through the size of the horizontal and vertical axes - epistemic and decision-
making uncertainties are more difficult to characterise here. Nevertheless, and 
because it is important for a decision-maker to know how confident experts 
were when evaluating the likelihood of a given risk, in this research such type of 
uncertainty was recorded in the database, according to the following criteria: 
 ―Low‖ – there is empirical  or scientific evidence; 
 ―Medium‖ – there is no empirical or scientific evidence, but there is a high 
level of agreement among experts; 
 ―High‖ – there is no empirical or scientific evidence and there is a low 
level of agreement among experts. 
6.2.1.3 Semi-structured interviews and validation workshop 
Delivering all of the above involved the risk facilitator, the risk experts and the 
risk managers.  
Brainstorming is considered a useful method to collect a broad set of ideas (ISO 
31000:2009). Building on the results of a previous brainstorming exercise at 
EPAL where risk experts and risk managers addressed the question ―what do 
you consider to be the strategic risks of EPAL?‖, the answers were reframed by 
the risk facilitator into the different categories related to the strategic objectives, 
allowing the drawing of a first sketch of pathways of threats to strategic 
objectives, incorporating events, exposures and harms. The barriers in place 
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along each pathway - to lower the likelihood and consequences - were also pre-
identified by the risk co-ordinator who, at a second stage, enriched the influence 
diagram with inputs from several studies related to one or more strategic risks 
that had been carried out in the company (Appendix B).  
Face-to-face semi-structured interviews with individual or small groups 
(maximum three participants) of risk experts were conducted (n=12, c. two 
hours duration), usually in their offices. Following Robson‘s (2002) 
recommendations, sequenced questions included5: (i) an introduction by the 
researcher; (ii) main body of the interview, including how they addressed the 
draft influence diagram – ―is that correct?‖; ―what could be added – why?‖; ―what 
should be removed – why?‖, (iii) closure – outlining the importance of their 
contribution. This procedure allowed the influence diagram to be progressively 
enhanced by adding (and, sometimes, removing) events, exposures and harms 
as well as the respective interactions and control barriers. Experts were also 
asked to comment on the definition of the consequences‘ scale and on the 
likelihood of the events, exposures and harms. Tape recording or handwriting 
the outcomes of the interviews in a notebook were considered two alternative 
options. Whilst the former assures the accuracy of the registers, it also may 
make the interviewees (risk experts) feel uncomfortable and unwilling to share 
everything they knew, which is exactly the opposite of what is intended – an 
interviewer should try and get interviewees to talk freely and openly (Robson, 
2002).  Therefore, and following a discussion with the head of the Human 
Resources department about this issue, the second option was chosen: 
answers and observations were recorded in a notebook during the interviews, 
and then incorporated in the above mentioned database. This allowed (i) the 
registering of the different inputs; (ii) the subsequent detecting of 
inconsistencies between different experts‘ views; (iii) the statistical analysis of 
the control barriers (e.g. which barrier is the most frequent?); and (iv) the 
automatic production of forms / individual records for each of the events, 
                                            
5 ‗Warm up‘ questions to establish rapport were not necessary, since in this action 
research framework risk experts were colleagues well-known to the researcher. 
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exposures and harms of the diagram (n=65), using the ―mail merge‖ tool of MS 
Word.  
Validation of the influence diagrams and of the likelihood/consequences 
classification of the risks was made through the series of meetings with risk 
experts and, in a second stage, during a one-day workshop with risk managers 
as well. Although carrying out the semi-structured interviews in individual 
meetings with risk experts made it more difficult for the risk co-ordinator to keep 
the focus on the relevant items and to analyse the conclusions, these allowed 
risk experts to bring up items that had not been considered a piori, thus 
enriching the outputs of the meetings. Conversely, in the workshop an effort 
was made so that an open discussion about the conclusions drawn by the risk 
experts would not happen, in order to avoid the discussion coming to ―ground 
zero‖ again, because unlike the meetings with the risk experts, the workshop 
constituted a ―one-shot‖ opportunity. Therefore, triangulation of the results of the 
interviews was done prior to the workshop, and conflict solving was made by a 
―second-round‖ of selected interviews with risk experts (Warren, 1995). 
Nevertheless, final validation was achieved in the workshop. To avoid bias, five 
groups with 8 to 10 people were formed, integrating the relevant risk managers 
and experts from different departments related to each of the six strategic risks 
(―guaranteeing business sustainability‖ and ―guaranteeing business profitability‖ 
were discussed in the same group). To support the discussion, all groups were 
given: (i) an A1 size plot of the influence diagram coloured according to the 
likelihood of events, exposures and harms; (ii) a set of individual records where 
all the information that supported a specific event, exposure or harm was 
registered. Discussion was facilitated by specialists from Cranfield University 
(one per group) and, besides reaching consensus about the influence diagram 
and the likelihood and consequences‘ estimation, risk managers and experts 
focused their attention on carefully analysing the strength of the control barriers, 
answering the following questions: 
 Have I missed any existing barriers? Where? 
 How effective are these barriers at achieving strategic objectives? 
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 Which barrier(s) are most critical? 
 Which barrier(s) are most vulnerable (irrespective of their effectiveness)? 
 Should there be additional barriers in the system? 
The method followed – having individual interviews first and then a workshop - 
has the advantage of promoting thinking from all the experts (Keeney, 1992; 
Warren, 1995), whereas engaging in a workshop directly would make it easier 
for some experts to anchor on the ideas presented by the first speakers, no 
matter how good the facilitation might be (Keeney, 1992). 
6.2.1.4 Summary 
Table 6-1 synthetizes the methodology employed to evaluate strategic risks in 
the present. 
Table 6-1 - Actions to build systemic model of strategic risks 
Step # Action Basis of the action 
1 
Identification of the events, exposures and harms 
associated with each of the strategic objectives 
(influence diagram). 
Knowledge of the 
system; Existing 
studies
6
; Literature 
review. 
2 
Identification of the interconnections between the 
events, exposures and harms of different objectives 
(influence diagram). 
Knowledge of the 
system; Existing studies; 
Literature review. 
3 
Pre-definition of the scales to assess the likelihood and 
consequences' magnitude. 
Knowledge of the 
system; Literature 
review. 
4 
Meetings with the risk experts, in order to: 
• Discuss the influence diagram; 
• Discuss the likelihood and consequences' scales; 
• Evaluate the likelihood of each risk. 
Expert knowledge. 
5 
Compilation of the information gathered during the 
meetings with the risk experts and identification of 
inconsistencies or gaps (Appendix E). 
Evaluation of the consequences associated with the 
strategic risks. 
Information gathered in 
step 4. 
                                            
6 The existing studies are listed in Appendix B. 
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Step # Action Basis of the action 
6 
Workshop with risk managers and risk experts in order 
to
7
: 
 Validate the influence diagram; 
 Validate the likelihood and consequences evaluation; 
 Discuss the completeness and the robustness of the 
existing barriers. 
Information gathered in 
the previous steps. 
7 
Elaboration of the final documents, including: 
 Narratives (one per risk); 
 Influence diagram (final version); 
 Risk "heat-map".  
Outcome of the 
workshop. 
Despite the methods employed already being known, the novelty here was to 
combine them in such a way that it allows the holistic assessment of strategic 
risks, linking operational to financial and other strategic goals; the identification 
of the respective interdependencies; the bottom-up, deep engagement of the 
risk experts and managers of the company; the unveiling of tacit knowledge; 
and the degree of validation achieved. 
6.2.2 Results 
The information gathered during the meetings with risk experts is presented in 
Appendix E. The materials handed-out during the validation workshop can be 
found in Appendix F, namely the influence diagram and the records that further 
detail the "boxes" in the influence diagram. This appendix also includes 
information about the arrangements made for the workshop (participants, 
venue, date, etc.). Figure 6-3 represents the influence diagram that resulted 
from all the inputs, discussion and validation with risk experts and risk 
managers - previous versions that were prepared and challenged to discussion 
are presented in Appendix C, being evident the evolution (both in appearance 
and content) of the influence diagram. Figure 6-4 shows the influence diagram 
with the existing barriers along the pathway. The other final outputs of the 
baseline risk assessment, namely narratives and the influence diagram‘s 
records, can be found in Appendix G. 
                                            
7 The workshop also included a second part dedicated to "Futures Scenarios"  
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Likelihood logarithmic scale was defined in terms of ―occurrence / no. years‖, as 
shown in Table 6-2.   
Table 6-2 – Likelihood classification 
Likelihood classification 
Certain 1/1 
High 1/10 – 1/1 
Moderate 1/100 – 1/10 
Low 1/1000 – 1/100 
Very low 1/10000 – 1/1000 
The definition of the consequences‘ scale involved the need to ―specifically 
refer‖ to EPAL‘s water supply system (Table 6-3). Consequences ranged from 
minor to catastrophic, and assigning meaning to these classes in each of the 
strategic objectives was done by answering the question ―what could be the 
worst possible case in this strategic risk? Is it catastrophic? What are the 
consequences in quantitative terms?‖. The analysis that supported the answers 
to these questions is presented in Appendix D. Finally, an evaluation across all 
strategic objectives was made, in order to have the same significance between 
them. It was found that not all strategic objectives had the same importance, 
thus worst cases were not always ―catastrophic‖.  
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Table 6-3 – Consequences classification 
 Quality Reliability Quantity Sustainability Profitability Reputation 
Catastrophic 50 or more customers will 
present non-reversible 
health problems, including 
the possibility of death 
2.0 million or more 
customers will not 
be supplied at all 
during 4 days or 
more 
50% or more of the 
daily average flow 
will not be supplied 
during 6 months or 
more 
The company will not be 
able to accomplish its 
mission in the next 10 
years 
  
Very bad Less than 50 customers 
will present non-reversible 
health problems, including 
the possibility of death OR 
more than 5000 customers 
will present reversible 
health problems 
0.1-2.0 million 
customers will not 
be supplied at all 
OR 2,0 million or 
more customers 
will be partially 
supplied during 4 
days or more 
50% or more of the 
daily average flow 
will not be supplied 
during 1-6 months 
The company will not be 
able to accomplish its 
mission in the next 20 
years 
The company 
will be in 
deficit 
One breaking news  OR 
more than one non 
breaking news per year 
defaming the quality of 
the water supplied 
Bad Less than 5000 and more 
than 500 customers will 
present reversible health 
problems 
0.1 million or less 
customers will not 
be supplied at all 
OR 0.5-2.0 million 
customers will be 
partially supplied 
during 4 days or 
more 
25%-50% of the daily 
average flow will not 
be supplied during 6 
months or more 
The company will be able 
to accomplish its mission 
in the next 20 years but 
will struggle with high 
economic or financial 
constraints 
The company 
will decrease 
its profits by 
more than 
75% up to 
100% 
One breaking news  OR 
more than one non 
breaking news per year 
related to 3rd party or 
H&S injuries 
Moderate Less than 500 and more 
than 50 customers will 
present reversible health 
problems 
0.1-0.5 million 
customers will be 
partially supplied 
during 4 days or 
more 
25%-50% of the daily 
average flow will not 
be supplied during 1-
6 months 
The company will be able 
to accomplish its mission 
in the next 20 years with 
moderate economic or 
financial constraints 
The company 
will decrease 
its profits by 
more than 
25% and less 
than 75% 
One breaking news  OR 
more than one non 
breaking news per year 
defaming the reliability of 
the water supplied 
Minor Less than 50 customers 
will present reversible 
health problems 
0.1 million or less 
customers will be 
partially supplied 
during 4 days or 
more 
Less than 25% of 
the daily average 
flow will not be 
supplied during 
more than 1 month 
The company will be able 
to accomplish its mission 
in the next 20 years with 
minor economic or 
financial constraints 
The company 
will decrease 
its profits by 
less than 25% 
One breaking news  OR 
more than one non 
breaking news per year 
defaming the governance 
of the company  
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When mapping the events, it became clear that many of them were subject to 
contributing factors that may alter the respective likelihood (Hokstad and Steiro, 
2006; ISO 31000, 2009), namely: (i) inadequate data / information; (ii) legal 
non-compliance; (iii) lack of communication; (iv) poor human resources 
management; and (v) inadequate governance. Their likelihood of occurrence 
was assessed using the same scale presented in Table 6-2, and the results are 
shown in Figure 6-2. 
 
Figure 6-2 - Likelihood of risk factors  
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Figure 6-3 - Influence diagram of events, exposures and harms to strategic risks
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Figure 6-4 - Influence diagram of events, exposures and harms to strategic risks with barriers along the pathway
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Figure 6-5 shows the influence diagram coloured according to likelihood of the 
events, exposures and harms, which allows (i) the identification of interactions 
between risks; (ii) the understanding of whether a risk has a naturally low likely 
of happening or if this is low due to existing barriers (see water quality vs water 
quantity); (iii) the showing of the existing barriers and their efficacy. 
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Figure 6-5 - Influence diagram for strategic risks at EPAL, coloured according to the likelihood of risks  
 77 
The ―heat-map‖ that resulted from likelihood and consequence assessments is 
presented in Figure 6-6.  
 
Figure 6-6 – “Heat-map” comparison with positioning of strategic risks 
6.3 Futures and long-term strategic risk 
6.3.1 Methods 
6.3.1.1 “Given” mega-trends 
Adaptaclima-EPAL is a three-year project promoted by EPAL, developed from 
October 2010 till November 2013, with the aims of (i) assessing the impacts of 
climate, demographic and land-use changes on EPAL's water supply system; 
and (ii) proposing adaptation measures to reduce EPAL's vulnerability. The 
global supervision of the project was committed to the present researcher, as 
Head of the Group for Climate Change study at EPAL. Scientific coordination 
was assured by Prof. Filipe Duarte Santos, from the Sciences Faculty of Lisbon 
University.  
Climate change modelling focused on changes in precipitation as well as on 
maximum and minimum temperature until the end of the century, downscaled 
for EPAL‘s region, using statistical downscaling techniques, from Global 
Circulation Model HadCM3 for IPCC scenarios A2 and B2. Data from European 
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Climate Assessment & Dataset with a regular grid of 25 x 25 km2 was used to 
obtain observed data for these three variables within the study area, consisting 
of 52 points in the dataset. The downscaled model was duly calibrated and 
validated (Grosso et al., 2012). 
Demographic changes took on from the SRES and the Center for International 
Earth Science Information Network, CIESIN, scenarios for Portugal, which were 
then linear downscaled assuming the National Statistical Institute (Portuguese) 
data as starting points (Jacinto et al., 2013).   
Land-use changes took on SRES scenarios as well, regionalized for Europe 
and Portugal, and baseline data were obtained from Corine Land Cover 2000 
survey (Jacinto et al., 2013).  
Thereby, the conclusions from the modelling of each of these three mega-
trends (Jacinto et al., 2013; Grosso et al., 2012) were used in this PhD as 
―givens‖ - factors for which the possible future developments were assumed 
across all scenarios (CERF, 2012).  
6.3.1.2 Future scenarios 
Future scenarios were drawn for a 30-years horizon, using the morphological 
analysis, MA, since it is one that best fits a context that depends on a high 
number of uncertainties (Table 2-3), as is the case of water utilities. Using the 
four quadrants matrix method, for example, would have had the advantage of 
being very much simpler to model, but it would turn out to be inappropriate, 
because it could not capture the entire complexity associated with EPAL‘s 
context. Moreover, it has the disadvantage of requiring the researcher to 
choose two 'main' drivers to form the axis of uncertainty which, in effect, might 
not be the case in the future, when other drivers may become more important.  
Morphological analysis is ―a method for rigorously structuring and investigating 
the total set of relationships in inherently non-quantifiable socio-technical 
problem complexes‖, based on the identification of internal consistent 
relationships between states of parameters that describe the system (Ritchey, 
2009). Its explicit use dates from the 18th century, but it was in the 1940s that 
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the Swiss-born astrophysicist and aerospace scientist Fritz Zwicky, working in 
the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), developed a generalized form of 
morphological analysis which was employed in the USA and in Europe by a 
number of engineers, operational researchers and policy analysts for structuring 
complex engineering problems, developing scenarios and studying security 
policy options until the early 1990s (Ritchey, 2009; Ritchey, 2011). In 1995, 
Ritchey and his colleagues from the Swedish Defence Research Agency 
developed advanced computer software in order to reach the full potential of 
morphological analysis, namely allowing varying initial conditions, defining 
drivers and generating solutions or decision paths (Ritchey, 2009).  
MA permits the overcoming of several methodological difficulties traditionally 
associated with modelling complex problems, namely (i) unlike quantitative 
techniques such as causal modelling or simulation, it enables the consideration 
of non-quantifiable and highly uncertain variables such as the ones associated 
with socio-political drivers; (ii) it makes it possible to audit or trace the process, 
even though it relies on judgmental processes; (iii) there are no formal 
constraints to mixing and comparing issues of a very different nature – instead, 
this is encouraged in order to fully characterize the problem (Ritchey, 2011). 
This happens because MA is a form of non-quantified modelling that relies on 
judgmental processes and internal consistency, rather than causality - though 
causality may be used as an aid to judgment (Ritchey, 2011).  
The process begins with the identification of the key-drivers of change (Ritchey, 
2011), bearing in mind the purpose of the scenarios‘ analysis, i.e. the focal 
question. In this research, the focal question was: ―what are the plausible 
scenarios that provide a wide range of situations to test my risks against?‖. 
Taking into account the diversity of key-drivers that may shape the future, two 
approaches to help selecting the relevant ones are often followed: PESTLE 
(Politics, Economics, Society, Technology, Legislation and Environment) or 
STEEP-V (Society, Technology, Economics, Ecology, Political, Values) (Defra, 
2008). Thereafter, each parameter should be assigned a range of relevant 
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values or conditions (Ritchey, 2011), that is, the projections or ―states‖ that each 
key-driver may assume.  
In the present case-study, key-drivers were subject to a pre-selection by the 
researcher using the PESTLE approach, since ―Legislation‖ and ―Environment‖ 
are very important drivers for water utilities. Then, a one and a half day 
workshop took place (Appendix F), where experts from different areas in the 
company (n=23) and from Cranfield University (n=4) were gathered in three 
groups, each of which was moderated by specialists from Cranfield University, 
who guaranteed appropriate group dynamics (Johnson and Johnson, 2000). 
The role of the moderators was very important, because futures work naturally 
calls for broad representation and competing voices, and this heterogeneity 
always generates a certain amount of discord and misunderstanding (Defra, 
2008). This is in line with what Ritchey (2009) advocates: MA should be carried 
out in small subject specialist groups of six to eight participants, excluding 
facilitators, and have the strong facilitation of practised morphologists. The 
workshop was shaped to address three main goals: (i) validation of the pre-
identified key-drivers; (ii) characterization of the key-drivers; and (iii) 
identification of projections for each key-driver. After being introduced to the 
theme by specialists from Cranfield University, experts were asked to validate 
the pre-identified key-drivers. The corresponding characterization was then 
enhanced by the experts, who answered the following questions: 
 ―Summarise the main elements for the risks associated with international 
water utilities relevant to this key-driver.‖ 
 ―What are the dimensions to be considered for this key-driver?‖ 
To guide the identification of projections for each key-driver, experts were asked 
the following question: 
 ―What are alternative plausible developments in the field of each key-
driver?‖ 
Experts were also asked to point out ―wild-cards‖, i.e., low probability, high 
impact events that were they to occur, would severely impact the human 
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condition (Petersen, 2000). These are not mega-trends, but the awareness of 
the abrupt changes caused by them helps improving organisations‘ ability to 
adapt and function during those periods (Saritas and Smith, 2011). During the 
characterization of the key-drivers, comments from the experts were recorded 
on post-it notes and then stuck up on A1 sheets containing three key-drivers 
each. In a plenary session, facilitators presented the comments for each of 
―their‖ key-drivers to the whole group. As a whole group, experts discussed the 
items under each factor in turn, editing or adding comments, whenever 
required. The same procedure was adopted for the identification of the key-
drivers‘ projections. 
The results of the workshop enabled the construction of a ―morphological box‖, 
by setting the parameters against each other in an n-dimensional matrix 
(Ritchey, 2011). The subsequent step in MA is the performance of a cross-
consistency analysis, CCA, between each pair of projections: an iterative 
analysis-synthesis process to reduce the total set of formally possible 
configurations in the total problem space to a smaller set of internally consistent 
configurations, representing a ―solution space‖, using Zwicky‘s principle of 
contradiction and reduction (Ritchey, 2011) which states that the pairs of 
conditions in the morphological box that are mutually incompatible should be 
excluded from the solution space. In this research, CCA - the pairwise 
comparison between every projection, where a judgment is made about 
whether that pair can co-exist, i.e., represent a consistent relationship – was 
executed by the researcher with the involvement of some of the risk experts, 
using CarmaTM software, which was made freely available by the Swedish 
Society of Morphological Analysis (Swemorph). According to Swemorph 
guidelines, each pair of projections was classified as ―Good fit, or best fit, or 
optimal pair (-)‖; ―Possible, could work, but not optimal (K)‖; and ―Impossible or 
very bad idea (X)‖. These associations were then analysed-synthesized by the 
software, which enabled the detection of consistent relations (states that could 
happen at the same time) by ―freezing‖ each of the projections under each key-
driver and observing how the rest of the projections reacted. When the detected 
relations revealed to be coherent – corresponding to optimal or sub-optimal 
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solutions –, then a set of consistent key-drivers‘ projections were identified, thus 
permitting the forming of a scenario. 
The final step of MA for scenario building is the selection of scenarios, based on 
the results of the CCA (Ritchey, 2011). There are an infinite number of stories 
about the future, so the challenge is to focus on those stories that are important 
(Saritas and Nugroho, 2012). In this research, the selection of scenarios was 
guided by the focal question: ―does this scenario provide a wide range of 
situations to test my risks against?‖, from where four configurations 
representing important situations (new possibilities or confirmations of earlier 
expected results) for the risk analysis context were chosen - literature review 
shows that creation of three to five future scenarios is appropriate for a scenario 
project (Amer et al., 2013). In the end, a short narrative was written for each 
scenario.  
6.3.1.3 Long-term risk assessment 
Once the scenarios for the futures were established, current strategic risks were 
reviewed. To explore how these baseline risks would change under each of the 
selected scenarios, the first step consisted of verifying if the influence diagram 
would still be valid. Next, likelihood and consequences associated with each 
risk were reassessed considering the context associated with each scenario. 
Finally, for each scenario, a narrative of the evolution of baseline risks was also 
written, and the graphic visualization of the corresponding ―heat-maps‖, side-by-
side, was presented.  
6.3.1.4 Summary 
Table 6-4 synthetizes the methodology followed to evaluate how baseline 
strategic risks evolved under given future scenarios. 
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Table 6-4 - Steps involved in the re-assessment of baseline risks in the future 
Step # Action Basis of the action 
1 
Literature review, learning and discussion with 
Principal Research Fellow on "building futures" 
(in Cranfield University). 
Literature review; Lecture and 
discussion with Futures‘ Expert. 
2 
Pre-selection of the key-drivers. Identification 
of ―givens‖. 
Knowledge of the system and of 
existing studies; Discussion with 
Futures‘ Expert. 
3 
Workshop with Risk Experts in order to: 
 Validate the key-drivers; 
 Estimate the projections associated to 
each of the key-drivers. 
Expert knowledge. 
4 
Compilation of the information gathered during 
the workshop. 
Information gathered in step 3. 
5 
Analysis of consistencies between key-drivers, 
using proper software. 
Information gathered in the 
previous steps; expert knowledge. 
6 
Construction of futures' scenarios and writing 
up narratives. 
Results of the cross-consistency 
analysis. 
7 
Re-assessment of baseline risks under each 
future scenario 
Re-evaluation of likelihood and 
consequence associated with 
each risk. 
8 
Comparison of strategic risks in the present 
and in the future 
Side-by-side portraying of ―heat-
maps‖ in the present and in each 
future scenario. 
 
Main tools and techniques applied were MA informed by expert elicitation. 
Similar to what was pointed out in 6.2.1.4, though these are not new, the 
novelty in this research consisted of applying them for the construction of future 
scenarios with a focal question centred on risk analysis – something that has 
never been done before. 
6.3.2 Results 
6.3.2.1 Key-drivers’ Selection 
Key-drivers selection was based on the PESTLE approach – Political, 
Economic, Social, Technological, Legal and Environmental.  
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The 12 drivers pre-selected by the researcher were: 
 P – Organisational change 
 ECO - Economic development/state of the economy 
 ECO - Energy prices 
 S - Population size / demographics** 
 S - Consumption patterns and environmental behaviour 
 T - Infrastructure development 
 T - Technology development 
 L – Regulation and legislation (EU and national) 
 ENV - Climate change** 
 ENV - Land use change** 
 ENV - Water quality 
 ENV - Water availability  
Key-drivers marked with ** were considered to be ―givens‖, resulting from the 
mega-trends analysed separately within the framework of Adaptaclima-EPAL. 
Conclusions of this project are that (i) no significant impacts are foreseen in 
terms of global demand for water as a result of socio-economic changes; (ii) in 
spite of the expected decrease of run-off  to the main water sources, abstraction 
needs will still be available, except in periods of extreme droughts in Valada-
Tejo and of consecutive years of extreme droughts in Castelo do Bode reservoir 
(the main water source); (iii) a precautionary protocol for the joint management 
of the reservoir shall be made between EPAL and EDP (the electricity company 
that uses the reservoir for hydro-power generation), to be followed especially in 
dry years; (iv) an increase of phosphorous loads is expected in Castelo do Bode 
reservoir, though it may not compromise the quality of treated water. 
Following the respective validation at the workshop, two of these key-drivers 
were split into two, thus totalling 14, as is shown in Table 6-5. The splitting of 
―Organizational change‖ into two key-drivers, namely ―External organizational 
change‖ and ―Internal organizational change‖ is related to the characteristics of 
the current developments in the sector in Portugal, where merging and 
acquisitions between water companies are foreseen to occur in the short to mid-
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term. The splitting of ―Legislation and regulation‖ into two key-drivers, namely 
―Environmental legislation‖ and ―Economic regulation‖, was justified by the fact 
that the projections for each of these drivers are different in nature, and they 
might impact differently on the strategic decisions of the company. 
Table 6-5 – Key-drivers selected 
Key-driver Description 
External organizational change EPAL‘s developing organizational arrangements with 
other companies in the sector. 
Internal organizational change EPAL‘s internal organizational re-arrangement. 
Economic development/state of 
the economy 
The size and future development of Portugal‘s economic 
output, expressed in terms of real Gross Domestic 
Product, average annual growth, and origin (expenditure 
approach). 
Energy prices The development in the cost of energy in all forms (gas, 
electricity, etc.) used in sourcing, treating and providing 
water resources. 
Consumption patterns and 
environmental behaviour 
The consumption decisions and lifestyles of individuals 
and their attitudes towards the environment. 
Infrastructure development The development of new infrastructure and how they deal 
with the issue of asset ageing. 
Technology development The potential opportunities and risks presented by 
technological development and its implications in the 
management of water delivery. 
Environmental legislation (EU 
and national) 
The characteristics of National and European laws, 
directives and agreements that drive and influence 
policies regulating water utilities. Such legislation defines 
the responsibilities within water utilities regarding the 
effects of water production to human health and 
ecosystems. 
Economic Regulation The way the Regulator may influence corporate strategy, 
in terms of Incentives to Quality of Service, Knowledge 
and Innovation. 
Water quality The changes in water composition and sediment 
associated with pollutant load. 
Water quantity The changes in average water flow available in 
catchments for use by water utilities. 
 
6.3.2.2 Key-drivers’ Projections and “Wildcards” 
Projections for each key-driver (the alternative plausible developments in the 
field of each key-driver) discussed and selected during the workshop by the 
different risk experts are shown in Table 6-7.  
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The identified ―wildcards‖ (low probability, high impact events) affecting EPAL 
are presented in Table 6-6. These are intended to complement the narratives, 
as they should be part of the testing of the actions to be put in place to minimize 
strategic risks under each scenario. 
Table 6-6 – “Wildcards” identified for EPAL 
Spain affects flow 
upstream.  
Cheap de-
salinization 
technology 
discovered. 
Influenza pandemic 
affecting lots of 
workers. 
Multi-utilities becomes a 
reality. 
Loss of power 
supply  
Finding new sources 
of ground water. 
Climate change 
refugees, increasing 
water demand. 
Supply chain lost 
(chemicals, equipment). 
Aeroplane crash 
into dam or tower. 
Act of terrorism or 
civil unrest. 
Conflict between EPAL 
and EDP 
Economic crisis 
bankrupts all external 
workforces making 
operations impossible. 
Wild fires. Land slide that 
ruptures dam. 
Pipe burst along 
supply system 
Fuel crisis due to 
conflict. 
Workers' strike. Disaster in Almaraz 
nuclear station. 
China buys everything. 
Foreign capital 
interest. 
Earthquake. 
Tsunami. Tornados affecting 
energy availability. 
Salinization. Brine 
intrusion. 
Accidental 
contamination of the 
reservoir. 
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Table 6-7 – Key-drivers’ projections 
External 
organizational 
change 
Internal 
organizational 
change 
Economic 
development
/state of the 
economy 
Energy 
prices 
Consumption 
patterns and 
environmental 
behaviour 
Infrastructure 
development 
Technology 
development 
Environmental 
legislation (EU 
and national) 
Economic 
Regulation 
Water 
quality 
Water 
quantity 
Status quo Status quo Growth Significant 
increase 
Consumption 
slight decrease 
Resource 
scarcity: min. 
for 
Maintenance 
and min. for 
Capex 
Low degree of 
automation; no 
global vision of 
system 
Compliance 
driven by EU 
Weak 
regulation - 
State 
Significant 
improvement 
C.Bode 
reservoir 
level>121,5
m or Tagus 
>+8m 
Bulk merger Cooperation Stagnation Slight 
increase or 
decrease 
Consumption 
significant 
decrease 
"Normal":  
Increase 
Maintenance 
and Decrease 
Capex 
Developed 
degree of 
automation; 
global view of 
system 
Compliance 
driven by 
National Law 
Strong 
regulation - 
State 
Slight 
improvement 
C.Bode 
reservoir 
level>100m 
or 
+4m<Tagus
<+6m  
Verticalisation Matrix 
management 
Department / 
Geography 
Fluctuation Remains the 
same 
Consumption 
remains stable 
Resource 
abundance: 
Decrease 
Mainten. and 
Increase 
Capex 
Best in class. 
Imports / 
Develops and 
exports own 
tech. 
Compliance 
driven by self-
regulation 
Strong 
regulation - 
Private 
Remains the 
same 
C.Bode 
reservoir 
level<100m 
or              -
1m<Tagus<
+4m 
Concession / 
Privatization 
 Recession Fluctuation Consumption 
slight increase 
  Compliance 
driven by lobby 
groups 
 Slight 
degradation 
C.Bode 
reservoir 
level <89m 
or Tagus< -
2m 
Multi-utilities   Significant 
decrease 
Consumption 
significant 
increase 
    Significant 
degradation 
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6.3.2.3 Cross-consistency analysis 
CarmaTM software, made available by the Swedish Society of Morphological 
Analysis for cross-consistency analysis to be performed in this research, allows 
the inclusion of a maximum of eight key-drivers. Therefore, the list of the 
selected 14 key-drivers for CCA had to be shortened, since even excluding the 
three ―givens‖ from the analysis, there were 11 key-drivers remaining.  
The ―external‖ and ―internal‖ organizational changes key-drivers were excluded 
from the analysis, because, ultimately, they may be considered as a state that 
will change in the near future rather than pervasively causing change, which, 
according to Saritas and Smith (2011), is the distinctive feature of trends. 
―Economic regulation‖ and ―environmental legislation‖ were merged again, 
through the combination of the respective projections – this required the 
analysis of the pairwise comparison between each projection of each of these 
key-drivers with every other one of the remaining key-drivers, and observing 
which combination would lead to the same cross-consistency results. 
Identified pairwise inconsistencies in the CCA (Figure 6-7) were mainly due to 
empirical constraints (high improbability or implausibility on empirical grounds), 
which is one of the three types of inconsistencies pointed out by Ritchey (2011) 
– the others are ―logical contradictions‖ and ―normative constraints‖. The results 
of CCA evidenced only one optimal configuration, which corresponds to the 
reference case (present situation), but other suboptimal solutions were found. 
Appendix H presents some comments regarding the assumptions made during 
the cross-consistency analysis. 
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Figure 6-7 - Cross-consistency analysis
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6.3.2.4 Selection of scenarios 
The scenarios chosen are represented in Figure 6-8. The chosen scenarios 
meet what Bezold (2010 in Amer et al., 2013) considers the most likely 
(expectable) – Reference scenario – , challenging (what could go wrong) – 
Water or Financial Scarcity – and visionary (surprisingly successful) – Strong 
Economic growth –  possibilities, which also can be associated with Schwab et 
al. (2003 in Amer et al., 2013) recommendations: to develop three scenarios – 
trend extrapolation, best-case and worst-case scenario. 
 
Figure 6-8 – Selected scenarios: Scenario 0 (black) - Reference scenario; 
Scenario 1 (red) – Water scarcity; Scenario 2 (green) – Financial resources’ 
scarcity; Scenario 3 (blue) – Strong economic growth  
 
 Reference scenario 
As Portugal has just exited an economic recession, the state of the 
economy is becoming stagnant. Energy prices register slight positive or 
negative fluctuations, and consumption patterns evidence a slight 
decrease. Both water quality and water availability at source remain at 
good levels. Water supplied complies with national standards and 
economic regulation is becoming gradually stronger. Infrastructure 
developments return to their ―normal‖ configuration, i.e., increasing 
maintenance and reducing capital investment, thus optimizing assets‘ life 
State of the 
economy
Energy prices
Consumption 
patterns&enviro
nmental 
behaviour
Water quality
Water 
availability
Regulation and 
legislation
Infrastructure 
development
Technology 
development
Growth
Significant 
increase
Consumption 
slight decrease
Significant 
improvement
C.Bode reservoir 
level>121,5m or 
Tagus >+8m
Compliance driven 
by EU
Resource scarcity: 
min. for Maintenance 
and min. for Capex
Low degree of 
automation; no 
global vision of 
system
Stagnation
Slight increase or 
decrease
Consumption 
significant 
decrease
Slight 
improvement
C.Bode reservoir 
level>100m or 
+4m<Tagus<+6m 
Compliance driven 
by National Law or 
Strong regulation - 
State
"Normal":  Increase 
Maintenance and 
Decrease Capex
Developed 
degree of 
automation; 
global view of 
system
Fluctuation
Remains the 
same
Consumption 
remains stable
Remains the 
same
C.Bode reservoir 
level<100m or              
-1m<Tagus<+4m
Compliance driven 
by self-regulation or 
Weak regulation - 
State
Resource 
abundance: 
Decrease Mainten. 
and Increase Capex
Best in class. 
Import / Develops 
and exports own 
tech.
Recession Fluctuation
Consumption 
slight increase
Slight 
degradation
C.Bode reservoir 
level <89m or 
Tagus< -2m
Compliance driven 
by lobby groups or 
Strong regulation - 
Private
Significant 
decrease
Consumption 
significant 
increase
Significant 
degradation
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without compromising the agreed levels of service to the clients. The 
company maintains a developed degree of automation, allowing a global 
view of the system and its centralized operation. 
 
 Scenario 1 – Water scarcity 
Downscaled climate change scenarios indicate that severe drought 
periods are expected to occur in the next 40 years. During these periods, 
that may extend over one year or more, there may be a fluctuation in the 
prices of energy, as energy production is also affected by droughts, as 
well as a fluctuation in the state of the economy. Consumptions will 
decrease due to restrictions imposed by EPAL and the regulator. Water 
quality at sources will also decrease, due to the reduction in flows in the 
water bodies, which augments the concentration of pollutants. This 
decrease of water quality may become significant if compliance with 
environmental standards is self-regulated and economic regulation is 
weak. In order to cope with the increased water treatment operational 
costs and the costs associated with the implementation of adaptation 
measures to water scarcity, along with the reduction in revenue due to a 
decrease in consumption, tariffs will be gradually increased. EPAL will 
decrease the regular investment costs, thus increasing maintenance 
expenditure, and will maintain a developed degree of automation, since 
having a global view of the system is shown to be crucial for its operation 
in this scenario. 
 
 Scenario 2 – Financial resources’ scarcity  
In a prolonged global economic recession context, water quality at 
sources gets worse, since industries and municipalities cannot afford 
adequate treatment of the wastewater they produce and, on the other 
hand, farmers tend to use non-approved pesticides. EPAL faces a 
significant decrease in consumption, which lowers annual revenue. Both 
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capital and operational expenditures are constrained, and part of the 
installed automation system may begin to fail. EPAL moves from a 
preventive attitude in asset management towards a reactive one. 
Economic regulation is weak, since regulators know that water utilities 
have no financial resources either to put measures in place to 
accomplish the established levels of service or to pay any fines. 
Development of new solutions or technology may occur, due to the need 
to find cheaper ways to operate the water supply system. 
 
 Scenario 3 – Strong economic growth 
Significant improvement in water quality happens in a context of strong 
economic growth. Although existing industries in the watershed increase 
their activity and new ones arise, they comply with EU water quality 
legislation and treat all the wastewater before it is discharged into the 
rivers or the sewage network. Farmers also use permitted pesticides 
only, complying with the Nitrates Directive. Municipalities‘ wastewater 
treatment is of secondary or tertiary levels. There is a slight increase in 
water consumption. This context of strong economic growth makes way 
to an increase in Capex, targeting trunk mains‘ rehabilitation because of 
their ageing process, and also enables the company to adopt or develop 
new technology, becoming ―best in class‖. For example, EPAL augments 
its own power generation capacity, through the production of solar, wind 
and micro-hydric energy. As a result of all these factors, EPAL faces a 
reduction in Operational Expenditure, due to reduced costs with energy 
and chemicals, as well as to an increase in the revenue from the clients. 
Since these scenarios were considered to be consistent stories of plausible and 
possible futures, the option of testing this approach with different software (due 
to the above mentioned limitations of the software that led the number of the 
key-drivers to be reduced from 14 to 11) was not considered.  
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6.3.2.5 Mid and Long-term Strategic Risks Assessment 
Taking the influence diagram again as a basis, the likelihood and consequences 
of the strategic risks were reassessed for each scenario (except the Reference 
Scenario, which constitutes the base case). Changes occurred mainly due to 
alterations in the events‘ likelihood, as well as to the fact that some of the 
existing barriers along the pathway changed their robustness - criticality and 
vulnerability of some of the barriers also changed under the selected scenarios. 
The results of these analyses are presented in Appendix I, as well as in Figure 
6-9, Figure 6-10 and Figure 6-11. The main conclusions are as follows: 
 Scenario 1 – Water scarcity 
  
Figure 6-9 – Strategic risks: Reference scenario vs Scenario 1 – Water scarcity 
Likelihood of not guaranteeing business sustainability remains ―moderate 
to high‖, due to difficulties in raising self-capital. However, the likelihood 
of reducing market share becomes ―low‖, since in a context of drought 
municipal clients‘ own water sources will become dry sooner than the 
ones managed by EPAL. Likelihood of business profitability being 
compromised increases from ―moderate to high‖ to ―high‖, mainly 
because of the rise in operational costs. The existing Water Treatment 
Plant, WTP, which presently accounts for c. 90% of the water production, 
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should be able to cope with the potential degradation in water quality 
caused by more frequent and more intense forest fires in the 
surroundings of Castelo do Bode reservoir and by a higher concentration 
of pollutants. However, the other WTP and the chlorination points 
associated with the underground sources may not be able to deal with 
the expected decrease in water quality in the respective sources. Since 
supplying water with adequate quality remains a priority, there may be a 
temporary suspension of these water sources and, unless new 
interconnections between sub-systems or reinforcement of existing 
treatment are made, the reliability of local supplies may be affected. This 
is why, under this scenario, the likelihood of disruption in the supply 
increases to ―moderate to high‖. Nonetheless, the sense of responsibility 
and national cohesion in a context of extreme drought will lower the 
likelihood of strikes and, consequently, of having insufficient human 
resources available to operate the system. In terms of water quantity, 
Castelo do Bode reservoir will still have enough capacity to keep the 
overall supply/demand balance positive, providing there is a solid relation 
with the electricity company. However, local supplies associated with the 
Tagus river intake and with underground sources may be affected. 
Therefore, the likelihood of lacking adequate quantity supplied changes 
from low to moderate. Finally, the likelihood of reputation being affected 
will increase, as a result of the increased likelihood of ―reliability of 
supply‖ and ―water quantity‖, even if they are caused by a natural 
phenomenon like extreme droughts. However, this risk may be turned 
into an opportunity if EPAL takes timely adaptation measures and 
communicates them.      
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 Scenario 2 – Financial resources‘ scarcity 
  
Figure 6-10 – Strategic risks: Reference Scenario vs Scenario 2 - Financial 
resources’ scarcity 
Due to recession, non-revenue from municipal clients starts happening more 
often, making it difficult for EPAL to cope with high fixed costs and thus, to 
raise self-capital. Investments may be delayed because economic situation 
jeopardizes international investors‘ confidence to finance EPAL. Business 
sustainability keeps its likelihood of being compromised as ―moderate to 
high‖, due to EPAL‘s capacity of self-financing. Along with the non-revenue 
from direct and municipal clients, the significant decrease in the 
consumption leads business profitability to have a ―high‖ likelihood of being 
compromised. Likelihood of disruption in water supply becomes ―high‖, due 
to the lack of investment and to the change from a preventative to a reactive 
way of operating the system, which increases the likelihood of assets‘ 
failures. Moreover, recession also increases the frequency of strikes, which 
may lead to the unavailability of people to operate the system. There is a 
―moderate to high‖ likelihood that water losses increase, thus raising the 
water demand. Nonetheless, the supply/demand balance will still be 
positive. Reputation and trust have ―moderate to high‖ likelihood to become 
compromised, because of the frequent disruptions in the supply.   
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 Scenario 3 – Strong economic growth    
  
Figure 6-11 – Strategic risks: Reference Scenario vs Scenario 3 – Strong 
economic growth 
In this scenario, the likelihood of not guaranteeing business sustainability 
lowers to ―low to moderate‖, since it will become easy to raise self-capital 
as well as to meet investment and maintenance needs. As EPAL invests 
in producing its own energy, energy costs will decrease and, therefore, 
business profitability has a ―low to moderate‖ likelihood of being 
compromised. Water quality at sources will improve, since people 
responsible for point source pollution will invest in adequate treatment 
facilities. EPAL will spend the necessary resources to rehab existing 
transport assets, as well as to reinforce on-line monitoring of water 
quality from source to delivery points, thus making it even safer than it is 
in the reference scenario. Along with the absence of major water quality 
problems, assets will become more reliable due to a focus on 
preventative management, and no strikes are expected to occur, since 
the company can reward the employees adequately. Therefore, 
likelihood of having a disruption in the supply becomes ―low‖. Supply / 
demand balance remains positive. As for reputation and trust, the 
likelihood of compromising it is ―low‖, although there may be ―low to 
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moderate‖ likelihood that public opinion is damaged, depending on the 
way EPAL manages its profits. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results presented in the previous chapter in relation 
to prior art and seeks to offer claims for the novelty and significance of the 
research presented in this thesis. This research provides a systemic analysis of 
operational, programme-level and corporate risk for water utilities. It adopts a 
bottom-up, expert led analysis, capturing risk interdependencies across utilities 
- addressing aspects as diverse as people, skills and succession planning, the 
reliability of the asset base, human resources policies and governance 
structures. Such analysis represents the basis for long-term, strategic planning 
using future scenarios, built on changing economic, demographic, consumer 
behaviours, land-use, climate, technologic, legal, regulatory and asset 
management conditions.  
Consequently, research insights addressed include those relating to 
interconnecting operational, tactical and strategic risk; influence diagrams as a 
systemic model for strategic risks; risk ―heat-maps‖ as a basis for discussions 
with a Board; representing uncertainty; the development of future scenarios to 
represent the evolving character of strategic risks; the deliberative approach, 
enhancing organizational risk culture and avoiding bias; and potential 
generalization for other utilities. 
These insights will guide the discussion on how the approach adopted 
addressed and overcame the limitations reported in literature about the 
implementation of enterprise risk assessments, namely: (i) the challenge of 
dealing with a high number of risk dimensions, requiring multi-disciplinary 
knowledge; (ii) the difficulty of capturing risks interconnections; (iii) the need to 
establish cross-departmental communication, which may represent a big effort 
for large utilities; (iv) the high degrees of uncertainty involved, due to spatial and 
temporal variability and (v) the need to account for long-term risks. Taking into 
account these limitations and, on the other hand, the fact that having in place 
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robust ERM processes is deemed critical for utilities to manage risk proactively, 
ensuring the delivery of safe, reliable, wholesome and affordable drinking water 
whilst guaranteeing business sustainability, the central research question 
addressed in this thesis was formulated as: 
How can a holistic approach linking strategic risks assessment and future 
scenario planning in water utilities be set up? 
Answering this question embodies contributions to knowledge, which will be 
further explored in the next chapters. In order to enable a better understanding 
of where these contributions fit in the context of risk analysis, it is worth 
recapping the development of this field, particularly in what concerns 
comparative risk assessments.  
Looking back at the evolution of comparative risk assessments, these emerged 
as a formal tool in the USA in the late 1980s, where USEPA played an 
important role in developing risk rankings based on numerical scores using a 
common quantifiable or monetisable measure of consequences. This first 
generation of comparative risk analysis carried out by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) in 1987 (USEPA, 1987) and the application of its 
techniques to a plethora of different policy problems, raised awareness of some 
shortcomings, namely the use of spurious precision in comparative risk rankings 
and the call for normative approaches when they were rarely applied in practice 
(Andrews et al., 2004). The New Jersey Comparative Risk Project (NJDEP, 
2003) represented a landmark, because after considerable analysis and 
interrogation of data by multiple expert panels, the conclusion was that the 
analytical ‗constructed aggregation‘ methodology adopted threw little light on 
the multiplicity of these risks (Andrews et al., 2004). Further conclusions were 
that a ranked list of priorities has only limited value when the science is not in 
place to support such a list, and also that, for future exercises, emphasis should 
be on gathering evidence. This led to an evolution to the second generation of 
comparative risks assessments‘ tools, which emphasized the need to 
understand the nature of risks, categorizing them and describing the respective 
dimensions of harm with attributes.  
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In parallel, the idea that a broader range of stakeholders should be involved in 
strategic decisions on environmental risk came to the forefront of the agenda 
during the 2000s, first in the USA (Fischer, 2000), and a few years later in the 
UK. The companion papers produced by Florig et al. (2001) and Morgan et al. 
(2001) discuss the value of deliberation itself within a group. However, within 
the context of environmental risk ranking, the difficulty of characterizing and 
representing the multiplicity of environmental harm for stakeholder input was 
noted (Willis et al., 2004), especially at the strategic level, due to the extent of 
information and time needed to engage others in those diffuse, long-term 
strategic risk issues. Considerable research was undertaken by the 
Environment Agency of England and Wales to support its reporting to Ministers 
on the state of the environment (Pollard et al., 2004), revealing a number of 
barriers to implementation, mainly related to a suite of communication 
shortcomings (Prpich et al., 2011). Meanwhile, despite several important 
references about the notion of the social perception of risks had been 
acknowledged since the late 80s (Slovic, 1987; Kasperson et al. 1988), this 
concept gained popularity in the mid-2000s (Kasperson et al., 2003; Renn, 
2008a; Renn, 2008b), perhaps because the character of environmental harms 
allied to the inclusion of stakeholders‘ participation in risk assessments claimed 
a values‘ judgment behind the consequences scoring. Renn (2008b) called 
attention to the social construct of risks, besides its technical nature, and the 
dangers of amplification of risks. Also, the process of collating and synthesising 
the multiple dimensions of environmental harm was seen as needing to 
improve, as until then, the schematics in the work on harm characterisation 
(Environment Agency, 2002) were difficult to interpret. 
In response, the emergence of third generation SRA tools occurred in the 
2010s, seeking a methodological compromise to balance totality and usability in 
the attributes‘ selection, providing a more realistic approach about what can be 
achieved as well as concentrating on the communication and visualization of 
strategic risks with a principal objective of stimulating rich discussions on risk 
rather than delivering a ‗top ten‘ of residual risks to address (Prpich et al., 
2011). The policy level framework intended to support strategic decision 
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processes concerning environmental risks within the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) constitutes a good example of 
these third generation tools. 
Despite the journey from the first to the third generation of SRA tools, the need 
to move to a more integrated approach between environmental, regulatory and 
financial risks has been noticed. In the water sector, global water governance 
emerged in the late 90s as a concept whereby water utilities are part of a wider 
system including the system‘s river basin, thus calling for the need to share the 
physical, regulatory and reputational risks with other stakeholders and agents 
outside the company (Morrison and Gleick, 2004).  At the enterprise level, 
frameworks like COSO (2004), for corporate risk management have been 
developed and disseminated, though often based on risk rankings. Despite the 
denomination of COSO (2004) as an Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated 
Framework, the ―integration‖ still misses capturing the interconnections between 
risks and the long-term perspective of strategic risks. 
Looking back at the growing research agenda that has developed around 
comparative risk assessments at strategic level (Figure 7-1), one that straddles 
the engineering, decision and social sciences, we can affirm that this thesis (i) 
builds on prior art, by grounding on the character of harms, addressing 
communication between different levels of the organization in a participatory 
fashion and presenting the results through visual schematics; and (ii) represents 
a step forward in the field, by holistically assessing environmental, business and 
reputational risks, capturing their interconnections and cutting across 
operational, tactical and strategic levels; and by extending the assessment of 
risks to the long-term, through the novel linkage between the risk and the 
futures‘ sciences. 
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Figure 7-1 – Evolution of SRA frameworks for water utilities 
7.2 Connecting operational, tactical and strategic risk 
Relationships between operational, tactical and strategic risk tend to be 
disjointed and the interfaces between these risk types poorly informed (Strategy 
Unit, 2002). On the one hand, many of the existing risk based approaches are 
developed only at tactical (e.g. asset management (Wijnia and Herder, 2009)) 
and operational levels (e.g. water safety plans), not reaching the strategic level 
at all. Conversely, many strategic risk assessments are provided by external 
advisors who elicit strategic risk appraisals from internal audiences, resulting in 
cursory analyses or siloed assessments coordinated by the external party alone 
in isolation from deep organisational knowledge (Schiller and Prpich, 2013).  
In this thesis, we methodically employed a ―top-down‖ / ―bottom-up‖ approach to 
assess corporate risks. The novelty of this approach is clear, because though 
the need to interconnect risk management at the three different levels has been 
widely acknowledged in literature (Pollard et al., 2004), references to ―how‖ this 
can be achieved are scarce. This thesis provides a methodology and illustration 
of how this can be achieved. 
The ―top-down‖ process initiated with the identification of the strategic objectives 
of the company in the hearth of this case study (chapter 6.1). The contribution 
and novelty embedded in this step are best described with regard to risk 
management frameworks which adopt an organization-wide focus. For 
example, the prominent COSO framework (COSO, 2004) states that ―many 
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organizations start by obtaining a top-down view of the most important risk 
exposures from key executives across the organization. This is typically 
accomplished by starting with a discussion of the organization‘s business 
strategy and its components and then identifying the principal risks that would 
impede its ability to achieve its strategic objectives. An alternative is to discuss 
the strategies and risks of each of its major business units. To aid in these 
discussions, some organizations prepare a list of major risk categories, such as 
operational, financial, legal, market and then discuss exposures to that risk 
category for the business overall or each significant business unit‖ (Frigo and 
Anderson, 2011). Despite the apparent practical tone of this guidance, a gap 
exists concerning what is meant by ―strategic objectives‖. This is an important 
issue, because, on the one hand, all the subsequent risk analysis depends on 
the identification of these objectives and, on the other hand, the semantics of 
―strategic‖ gives way to very different interpretations, such as ―critical for the 
business mission‖ or ―critical for accomplishing the strategies in place‖, even 
though ―strategic risks‖ and ―risks to the strategy‖ do not have the same 
meaning. We believe this is one of the root causes for many enterprise risk 
assessments to miss the strategic focus of the organization, leading to 
underlying commensuration problems and to an indiscriminate inclusion of risks, 
including secondary ones, in the portfolio (Schiller and Prpich, 2013). Similarly 
to Frigo and Anderson (2011), in this research we considered strategic risks as 
those associated with impeding an organization to achieve its strategic 
objectives (chapter 6.1.1). However, drawing on literature from decision theory, 
we further detailed the meaning of a ‗strategic objective‘ – ―the decision makers’ 
ultimate end objectives, which should be stable over years, providing common 
guidance to all decisions”, and distinguished it from a ‗fundamental objective‘ - 
an essential reason for interest in the decision situation, and from ‗means 
objective‘ - a means to achieve the fundamental objectives (Figure 6-1).   
After the establishment of the corporate objectives by the Board of EPAL, the 
―top-down‖ process progressed with the identification and structuring of the 
fundamental objectives related to the strategic objectives, working back from 
the strategic objectives and challenging them to make fundamental objectives 
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arise: ―what are the immediate causes for guaranteeing this strategic 
objective?‖ (Keeney, 1992; Waal and Ritchey, 2007). We then combined the 
methods for structuring objectives with that of constructing influence diagrams 
in order to develop a systemic model incorporating the events, exposures and 
harms to those strategic objectives (Figure 6-3), where ―harms‖ are associated 
with the consequences of failing to meet the fundamental objectives. The 
novelty here is found in the combined use of those methods. This research 
demonstrates that despite the fact that identifying and structuring objectives is 
focused on the objectives to be attained whilst the influence diagram is focused 
on what can happen that poses a threat to the objectives, both methods stem 
from the identification of causal relationships and can be combined to form a 
holistic model of strategic risks, as these are understood as the risk of not 
meeting the objectives. 
Building the systemic model was an iterative process, moving back and forward 
until it was stabilized (Appendix C). This process was primarily informed by risk 
experts and risk managers, through brainstorming, semi-structured interviews 
and a validation workshop (Table 6-1), and it represents the point where we 
moved down from a strategic to an operational level of analysis. In fact, the 
systemic model was subsequently complemented with the identification of the 
existing control barriers along the pathways from the events to harms (Figure 
6-4) and, furthermore, with the characterization of the respective effectiveness, 
criticality and vulnerability (Figure 6-5 and Appendix G). To our knowledge, no 
such approach has been implemented before. By exploring the development of 
a holistic model for strategic risk assessments in water utilities, we discovered a 
way to link operational to strategic risks, which, as mentioned before, usually 
are either appraised separately, by different teams and as if they pertained to 
two distinct realities within the company, or appraised all at the same level, in a 
miscellaneous assessment within an ERM framework, for example.   
The process then moved up to a strategic level again, through the evaluation of 
likelihood and consequence of the risks. While the analysis of the likelihood 
associated with the events, exposures and harms was based on existing 
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studies and on operational knowledge of the system (including the effectiveness 
of the existing barriers and the results of risk analyses held for specific business 
functions), the consequence scale (Table 6-3) reflected the strategic character 
of the risk assessment. Two main insights arise from this observation. Firstly, 
the consequence scale constitutes a critical issue in the linkage between 
strategic and operational levels, because ―harms‖ may happen several times 
without affecting strategic risks at all. For example, pipe bursts happen every 
week in the city of Lisbon, but that does not compromise the objective ―reliability 
of supply‖ from a strategic point of view – where consequences are expected to 
be much higher. Therefore, when assessing the likelihood of events, exposures 
and harms, risk experts were asked to keep in mind they were referring to 
events that have a given magnitude of consequences. Secondly, we turn to the 
controversial issue raised by MacGillivray and Pollard (2008), regarding 
whether risk analysis should be viewed as an over-arching discipline, 
normalised across the organization to fit a common format as advocated by the 
ERM concept, or, instead, it should be function-specific, fit for purpose. In light 
of that mentioned above, we argue the approach here represents a high-level, 
overarching risk analysis methodology, in the sense that it spans across all 
corporate objectives. However, it does not claim to replace the function-specific 
approaches (e.g. engineering; drinking water quality management; asset 
management; emergency management; occupational health and safety; 
financial analysis) that should be held at operational or tactical levels, but rather 
to bring the respective outcomes to a higher, strategic level of analysis. 
Critically however, this research illustrates how it is possible to assemble a 
systemic analysis from the business functions of a utility to inform a strategic 
analysis of risk (Figure 6-5 and Appendix G); and then project these forward in 
time (Appendix I). 
Figure 7-2 illustrates the steps comprising the ―top-down‖ / ―bottom-up‖ process 
described above. Implementing this process, engaging both the Board and risk 
experts, building the systemic model with identification and characterization of 
the existing barriers along the pathway and developing an appropriate scale of 
consequences for the strategic level to guide the risk assessment, can be 
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considered key to addressing the challenge of connecting strategic with tactical 
and operational levels of risk management. The contribution of the approach 
employed in this assessment to knowledge is significant, as it demonstrates 
how a ‗golden thread‘ connecting operational and strategic risk in organisations 
may be achieved (Figure 7-2). Furthermore, this process improves 
communication between experts, managers and the Board and contributes to 
the pervasiveness of a risk management culture, which are crucial factors in 
implementing risk management in organizations (MacGillivray and Pollard, 
2008; Summerill et al., 2010; Allan et al., 2013). 
 
  
Figure 7-2 – The “top-down” / “bottom-up” approach interconnecting operational 
and strategic risks 
  
7.3 Influence diagram as a systemic model of strategic risks 
Strategic risks identified in this case study consist of compromising the 
economic and financial sustainability of the business, compromising adequate 
levels of business profitability, supplying water with inadequate quality, quantity 
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or reliability, and compromising the trust from the customers as well as the 
reputation among other national or international water utilities (chapter 6.1.2). 
These are in line with the financial, regulatory, physical and reputational water 
risks drawn from Orr et al. (2011), Pegram (2010) and Levinson et al. (2008).  
At strategic level, risks are best assessed across a whole system, rather than 
separately in siloes, with their interactions ignored (International Standards 
Organisation, 2009).  However, strategic risks have been appraised in isolation, 
leading to a growing recognition of the need to integrate and harmonize these 
analyses (Means et al., 2010; Hamilton et al., 2006; Renn, 2008b; Larson et al., 
2009; ISO 31000, 2009; Prpich et al., 2011). Attempts to relate physical or 
environmental risks like water quality, supply and resource have existed for over 
a decade (Bouwer, 2000; Hamilton et al., 2006; Pollard et al., 2004; Powers et 
al., 2012), but a step change is still required to further integrate physical water 
risks with regulatory, financial and reputational risks (Frigo and Anderson, 
2012). Despite the limited scientific literature on these water risks as a 
corporate concept (Schiller and Prpich, 2013; Pegram et al., 2009; Orr et al., 
2011), the ERM concept is gaining popularity (Hoffman, 2008; Schiller and 
Prpich, 2013), even though its practical implementation presents some 
weaknesses, particularly as it does not take into account that most risks are 
interdependent (Beasley and Frigo, 2007 in Schiller and Prpich, 2013; Caldwell, 
2012). Schiller and Prpich (2013) suggest the depth of advocacy required to 
fully achieve integrated enterprise risk management has not emerged.  
Again, we observe that existing literature states there are interdependencies 
among corporate risks and that these should be taken into account in risk 
assessments, but a gap exists regarding ―how‖ it can be done.  Recent 
developments in the COSO framework already point out that ―understanding 
risk interactions and then managing them requires breaking down silos‖ (Curtis 
and Carey, 2012). These authors suggest that ―a simple way to consider risk 
interactions is to group related risks into a broad risk area (…) and then (…) 
three explicit ways to capture risk interactions (…) are risk interaction maps, 
correlation matrices, and bow-tie diagrams‖. When applied to a broad risk area, 
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typically in the field of engineering, these methods are effective ways to capture 
interactions between events, allowing the implementation of detailed 
probabilistic (quantitative) risk assessments (Lindhe et al., 2009; Lindhe et al., 
2012). However, at corporate level, interactions occur between several ―broad 
risk areas‖, including the ones related to business and reputational risks, 
making the application of these techniques difficult for the global analysis. In 
this regard, the holistic approach developed in this thesis gives a contribution to 
knowledge, through the foundation of the strategic risk appraisal on a systemic 
model where interactions between physical, financial and reputational risks are 
captured and analysed (Figure 6-3) using semi-quantitative methods.  For 
example, ‗inadequate long-term planning‘ was found to influence business 
sustainability (leading to poor resource allocation), business profitability (by 
making it difficult to secure returns on investments in case of asset 
overcapacity), water quality (in case of asset overcapacity) and water quantity 
(in case of asset under capacity).  
Capturing the interactions between risks and establishing a multi-barrier 
approach to risk management is a tenet of good utility management in the water 
sector, since incidents are frequently characterised by multi-causality and 
interdependence in their effects (Pollard et al., 2009; Hrudey and Hrudey, 
2004). However, establishing a multi-barrier approach is usually developed at 
operational levels and, to our knowledge, no such approach has been 
developed before at corporate level. Existing methodologies, like COSO (2004), 
seek to identify controls for risk reduction, but these are appraised in isolation, 
not taking into account risks interdependencies. Here, we expand knowledge by 
developing and validating a way of identifying existing control barriers and risks 
interdependencies expressed in the influence diagram (Figure 6-4 and 
Appendix G). Furthermore, a deep characterization of these barriers was 
deemed essential, because keeping them robust is the essence of risk 
management (Carter, 2012). MacGillivray and Pollard (2008) advocated that 
control evaluation should address both criticality and the respective 
effectiveness, i.e., adequacy of design, management and operation. In this 
research, besides characterizing the control barriers in terms of their 
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effectiveness and criticality, we also described them with respect to their 
vulnerability, because it also constitutes a powerful input to devise risk 
management strategies and priorities, supporting decisions from risk managers 
and the Board about which barriers should be reinforced, maintained and 
relaxed. This data was gathered from risk experts and, besides being 
graphically illustrated in the influence diagrams, it was registered in a database 
(Appendix G).  
Though initially being developed with the purpose of recording the outputs of 
the semi-structured interviews, the database constitutes a powerful tool for risk 
management, in that it allows (i) the registering of the different inputs; (ii) the 
detection of inconsistencies between different experts‘ views; (iii) the statistical 
analysis of the control barriers (e.g. which barrier is the most frequent?); and 
(iv) the automatic production of forms / individual records for each of the events, 
exposures and harms of the diagram (n=65). Ultimately, the database enables 
the comparison and extraction of information out of the data – thus, generating 
traceable corporate knowledge. For example, querying the supporting database 
(Table 7-1) shows a number of critical barriers at EPAL that are not performing 
at their highest efficiency and that are highly vulnerable, such as increasing the 
water supply system flexibility, having readily available alternatives in case of a 
failure in the supply of chemicals and other materials, having robust 
contingency plans, etc., hence suggesting that management strategies should 
address these issues. Table 7-1 shows that keeping a good relationship with 
the media, maintaining the robustness of online monitoring (SCADA) and 
keeping water treatment plants efficient are the most effective, critical and less 
vulnerable barriers. 
Table 7-1 - Example of queries in the database supporting the systemic model 
 
 
E (1best) V (1less) C (C/NC)
- AM (asset management) best practices 1 5 C
- Business continuity -contigency plans 3 5 C
- C.Bode reservoir management commission 3 5 C
- Increase system's flexibility 3 5 C
- Ready available alternatives 5 5 C
- Relation with EDP 3 5 C
E (1best) V (1less) C (C/NC)
- Media relationship 1 1 C
- Online monitoring 1 1 C
- WTPs' efficiency 1 1 C
 111 
 
By reference to existing methodologies, Vlek (2013) pointed out the need for a 
transactional model, where risks are not appraised in a static way, but rather in 
a dynamic relation with internal controls. We claim the approach developed in 
this thesis meets Vlek‘s call for such a model, because though the influence 
diagram should remain stable for many years – since strategic objectives are 
set for the long term – the systematic revisiting of existing barriers provides the 
intrinsic dynamism, countering complacency which is one of the major causes 
for incidents to occur (Pollard, 2008; MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008; Carter, 
2012). This innovation provides a novel solution to the well-recognised 
fragmentation between operational and strategic risk appraisal in organisations.   
We also highlight the inclusion of risk factors in the analysis, i.e. contributing 
factors that may alter the respective likelihood (Hokstad and Steiro, 2006; ISO 
31000, 2009) - Figure 6-2. Whilst not novel, the fact that these were assessed 
separately from the events, exposures and harms represents a different 
approach from the ones embedded in ERM frameworks, which allow for 
secondary risks to be added directly in the analysis (Schiller and Prpich, 2013). 
The reason for our distinctive approach is simple. We realized these risk factors 
(e.g. inadequate data/information management, legal non-compliance, lack of 
communication within and between departments as well as outside the 
company, poor human resources management and inadequate governance) 
could not be considered as initiating events that pose harm to strategic risks, 
but rather they act as ―meta-risks‖, affecting the robustness of existing barriers 
and, consequently, the likelihood of events, exposures and harms. For example, 
keeping abreast of asset management best practice is seen as highly 
vulnerable due to the fact that 200 out of the 700 employees (approximately) 
are aged 55 or more, thus being expected to retire within the next ten years, 
and no transmission of knowledge to new employees is foreseen, due to 
legislative measures that impede state owned companies recruiting new staff 
(Appendix E) – thus, giving way to potential human reliability flaws (Pollard, 
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2008; Wu et al., 2009) that may have an impact on diverse exposures and 
harms to strategic risks. 
Another insight from this research is related to the role of the influence diagram 
in estimating the likelihood of strategic risks, as presented in Figure 6-5. The 
novelty and significance of this is best illustrated by its comparison with existing 
risk management frameworks. First, in the use of causality between events, 
exposures and harms - as well as the characterization of existing barriers and 
risk factors - to inform likelihood of risks (Figure 6-5). Existing strategic risk 
management frameworks tend to focus directly on the likelihood of harms 
regardless the underlying processes or pathways, which impede risk reduction 
measures to be targeted at their root causes (MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008). 
Secondly, novelty in visualising the influence diagram coloured allows risks with 
a natural low likelihood – e.g. ―Water Quantity‖ – to be distinguished from those 
where the likelihood is low due to the existence of control barriers – e.g. ―Water 
Quality‖ - Figure 6-5. This is an important observation, in that focusing only on 
the likelihood of risks – as often preconized by existing frameworks - might lead 
the Board to become comfortable with risks having a low likelihood, even 
though some are naturally low likely to happen whilst others may be highly 
dependent of control barriers – and thus, requiring particular attention on the 
maintenance of those barriers.    
A further innovation of the influence diagram, and the interdependencies it 
records, is that by allowing a broad overview of the interactions between risks to 
corporate objectives, as well as of the existing control barriers along the 
pathways, it constitutes a natural starting point for discussion between the 
Board and risk managers. This is significant because communication 
shortcomings between these actors were found to be among the main causes 
for second generation methodologies of strategic risks comparison to fail 
(Prpich et al., 2011). On the other hand, current methods to aggregate risk 
within ERM are semi-quantitative, using ordinal assessments of risk in a risk 
matrix (Schiller and Prpich, 2013) which, despite their potential to be used as a 
basis to enrich discussions about the risks, may be opaque in revealing the 
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underlying connection between operational and strategic information. Though 
recent methodologies advise the writing up of narratives to complement the 
interpretation of risk matrices (Prpich et al., 2011), we can still argue that the 
influence diagram developed in this research is a stronger piece for the purpose 
of promoting discussions between all the parties in terms of the likelihood of 
risks, because of the huge amount of information that is provided in one single 
sheet (Figure 6-5). Ultimately, the influence diagram is used to inform a Board, 
who are not expected to perform a detailed analysis of enterprise risk but rather 
to oversee what drives strategic risk and ensure these drivers are managed –  
which is often the most challenging and important aspect of risk oversight 
(Caldwell, 2012).  
Finally, the influence diagram enables the process to be transparent and 
repeatable under the same basis of analysis, which is a proxy for its credibility 
(Wiedemann et al., 2013; FAO/WHO, 2009; ISO 31000, 2009; Hokstad and 
Steiro, 2006). Actually, the process was repeated in this own research, as the 
influence diagram was used to test EPAL‘s strategic risks against plausible 
future scenarios (Appendix I). The novelty here is found by reference to other 
ERM frameworks, where the results of likelihood and consequence are 
frequently processed in a ―black-box‖, not allowing the respective trace back 
and, therefore, jeopardizing the discussions with the Board.  
7.4 Risk “heat-maps” as a basis for discussions with the Board 
Despite the strengths of the influence diagram highlighted in the previous 
chapter, it does not show the consequences associated to risks. Hence, there is 
still a need to construct a risk diagram, or ―heat-map‖, presenting the evaluation 
of likelihood and impact of each strategic risk. In this thesis, the results of such 
evaluation were expressed by the central position of an ellipse, where the 
length of the vertical and horizontal axes reflects the uncertainty in the 
respective assessment (Figure 6-6). The use of risk matrices where risk would 
be tightly classified as ―high‖, ―medium‖, ―low‖ or similar, was deliberately 
avoided here because of the variety of data and the respective range of 
uncertainty the nature of this SRA embodies (Cox, 2008). Instead, the ―heat-
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map‖ can be regarded as a high-level risk diagram that enables the Board to 
compare the relative positioning (and sizing) of the risk ellipses, and to promote 
rich discussions, which should be supported by narratives on the character of 
the risk and on current risk management strategies - Appendix G (Prpich et al., 
2013). For example, the ―heat-map‖ shows a moderate to high likelihood that 
business sustainability is highly compromised, i.e., that the company will be 
able to accomplish its mission in the next 20 years but struggling with high 
economic or financial constraints – this may be due to lack of financing, to 
difficulties in raising self-capital and to the uncertainty in the sector, as 
referenced in the narrative.     
Significant probability heuristics and biases especially operate under limited 
information conditions (Vlek, 2013), so in the current approach an effort was 
made to obtain as much information as possible (Slovic, 1987), drawing on data 
originating from  different grounds: scientific information, past data, fault-tree or 
scenarios models and empirical knowledge.  As an externality, this enabled the 
destroying of some ―myths‖ in the company. For example, it was a current 
thought at EPAL that the two free-surface flow trunk mains presented a very 
high likelihood of contamination. Instead of classifying the likelihood of this 
exposure based on that assumption, water quality risk experts were urged to 
investigate the results of the lab analysis made over recent years to the water 
quality on these trunk mains, having come to the conclusion that the number of 
non-compliances with legal requirements found in those trunk mains was 
negligible. In order to achieve a high degree of transparency, the reasons 
behind the likelihood estimation of each event, exposure or harm, were 
recorded in the database (Appendix E).    
Impact evaluation evidenced a strategic objectives‘ values hierarchy (Vlek, 
2013). For example, in this research compromising ―reputation and trust‖ does 
not present ―catastrophic‖ consequences when compared to other objectives 
(Table 6-3). Thresholds for the different classes of consequences were defined 
taking into account that this exercise was being held at strategic level, despite 
being fed by operational and tactical data. Hence, plausible worse case 
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situations as well as the reaction time – also known as risk clock speed 
(Caldwell, 2012) - were addressed.  Taking the reliability of supply as example, 
the questions posed were: ―what would be the worst case of a critical 
infrastructure failure? Could it be considered ‗catastrophic‘?‖. For the 
consequences of not having enough water quantity to supply, a threshold of six 
months was considered, taking into account the estimated time to implement 
new abstractions or transfers from other water sources or transport systems. 
This is important because, as mentioned above, the same event may occur with 
less significant consequences at operational or tactical levels. Hence, we can 
infer that the construction of the consequence scale is a possible way to 
differentiate risks at the three levels.  
On the other hand, consequences‘ criteria (or attributes) were chosen for each 
objective envisaging the balance between totality and usability (Willis et al., 
2004; Prpich et al., 2011; Curtis and Carey, 2012), which is often challenging. In 
this work (Table 6-3), consequences were described by their type, extension 
(magnitude) and duration (including irreversibility) – we named this approach as 
―TED‖.  Here, we turned again to decision theory. Keeney (1992) distinguishes 
three types of attributes to measure objectives: (i) natural attributes, i.e., those 
that have a common interpretation to everyone and arise naturally from the 
objective – for example, if the objective is ―minimize cost‖, a natural attribute 
would be ―cost measured in euros‖; (ii) constructed attributes, used to 
characterize objectives to which it is difficult to come up with natural attributes,  
like ―improve the image of the corporation‖; in these cases, attributes play a 
double important role, as besides providing a way to measure the objective, 
they essentially define what is meant by the objective and, therefore, should be 
developed specifically for a given decision context; and (iii) proxy attributes, 
indirect attributes used when it is very difficult to identify natural or constructed 
attributes. In this research, given the overarching definition of the strategic 
objectives, we used constructed attributes (Table 6-3).  
Though the use of attributes to describe the character of harms is not new, the 
insights from this research are: the ―TED‖ approach to balance simplicity and 
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comprehensiveness; the linkage with decision theory to generate constructed 
attributes; and the clear need to make consequence scales specific for the 
organization (Table 6-3).    
On the whole, we argue the ―heat-map‖ mirror the likelihoods assessed through 
the systemic model in combination with the associated consequences of 
strategic risks, providing an intuitive way to compare them (Figure 6-6). 
Nonetheless, beneath each risk ellipse there is a golden tread of data and 
information  resulting from an analytic-deliberative approach (Appendix G) that 
encompasses a synthesis of scientific expertise and value orientations (Kleink 
and Renn, 2002; Willis et al., 2010). To our knowledge, this is the first such 
analysis, performed in a water utility, which has informed strategic risk appraisal 
in this way. 
7.5 Representing uncertainty 
As with most SRA tools, this approach is subject to uncertainty. Ascough et al. 
(2008) introduce four types of uncertainty: aleatory, epistemic, decision-making 
and linguistic. In our approach, the inherent variability of the events constitutes 
an aleatory uncertainty. Gaps in the knowledge of risk experts and risk 
managers to correctly identify the relations in the influence diagram or to 
estimate the corresponding likelihood and consequences are expressions of 
epistemic uncertainty, the same applying to the construction of the model itself, 
which is only a representation of reality. The subjectivity inherent in the value 
judgement for choosing the strategic objectives as well as the consequence 
scale may be associated with decision-making uncertainty. Due to the role of 
the risk co-ordinator, which contributed to deriding vagueness and ambiguity 
during the semi-structured interviews and the workshops, linguistic uncertainty 
was expunged.  
The elliptic shape of risks in the ―heat-map‖ reflect the aleatory uncertainty  
through the size of the horizontal and vertical axes, and Figure 6-6 evidences 
this is far higher for consequences than for the correspondent likelihood. It also 
evidences that ―compromising business sustainability‖, ―compromising reliability 
of supply‖ and ―compromising business profitability‖ are the risks with a higher 
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aleatory uncertainty in terms of their likelihood of occurrence. This may be due 
to the number of events over which the company does not have much control 
and that are difficult to predict. For example, the lack of stability in legislation 
and economic regulation often does not provide the stability needed for the 
investment (Hecht et al., 2012) and may exacerbate social, environmental, 
economic or business risks (Morrison et al., 2010).  
Epistemic and decision-making uncertainties were registered in the database 
(Appendix G) and classified as ―low‖ – if there was scientific or empirical 
evidence; ―medium‖ – if there was no empirical or scientific evidence, but a high 
level of agreement among experts existed; and ―high‖ – when there was no 
empirical or scientific evidence and a low level of agreement among experts. 
Classes of ―High‖ and ―Moderate‖ uncertainty were mainly associated with 
financial, regulatory and reputational risks, which may be explained by the fact 
that, for technical risks, there is more scientific or empirical evidence available 
(e.g. metering, climate information, water quality assessments, etc.) than for 
social risks (Renn, 2008a; Mason, 2013). Overall, the results show that the 
degree of epistemic and decision-making uncertainty behind this assessment is 
―low‖, which is not surprising, given the: 
 global ―high‖ level of weight of empiric and scientific evidences (Pollard et 
al., 2008) covering the events, exposures and harms to strategic risks in 
the company - Appendix B; 
 experience, background and day-to-day work of the selected risk 
managers and experts (Appendix A). In fact, citing Rosness (1998), 
MacGillivray and Pollard (2008) advocate that ―the legitimacy of risk 
analysis depends largely on the capacity of staff to critically evaluate 
available information and to supplement it with their own knowledge‖; 
 rationale for the way in which the groups in the workshop were formed 
(e.g. gathering experts whose knowledge covered the whole set of 
events, exposures and harms associated with a given strategic risk) and 
moderated (Appendix F) by specialists from Cranfield University. 
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These items are also pointed out by Wiedemann et al. (2013) as providing 
credibility of risk assessments. 
Capturing and communicating the degree of uncertainty implicit in risk 
assessments is important, because the final decision-makers (the Board) need 
to acknowledge to what extent they can rely on the results, based on which a 
range of strategies will be addressed, probably involving significant costs. 
Although uncertainty is intrinsic to risk, ideally it should be kept as low as 
possible. However, offering a systematic treatment of uncertainty in order to 
improve the management of uncertainty in decision making processes is neither 
simple nor consensual (Krayer von Krauss et al., 2006; Patt, 2007; Pollard et 
al., 2008). Despite not being focused on addressing this challenge, the 
approach developed in this research succeeded in capturing, communicating 
and keeping epistemic and decision-making uncertainty low, given the 
aforementioned reasons.   
7.6 Development of future scenarios to cope with the evolving 
character of strategic risks 
Strategic objectives do not vary from day-to-day. Instead, they should be stable 
over years (Keeney, 1992). Strategic risk management should therefore be 
aimed at the mid and long-term - particularly in the water sector, where assets 
are designed to last 25 to 50 years. However, there is little evidence that this 
has been done before in an integrated way, and the outcomes of strategic risk 
analysis tend to represent a ―snap-shot‖ in time, regardless the fact that 
strategic objectives are set for the long-term. On the other hand, scenario 
planning has been used to inform strategic planning in utilities, most of the 
times regarding a specific issue – e.g. climate change –, but it misses the link 
with risk management due to the unaccounted perspective of the projected 
likelihood. As pointed out by Koivisto et al. (2009) and further developed in 
chapter 2.5, risk and futures assessments are in many ways parallel, but in 
practice these two areas of research are seldom linked.  
The approach developed under this case-study represents a significant step 
forward in the integration of the two research fields and evidences the 
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complementarity between them. Though future scenarios were developed using 
the well-known morphological analysis technique and risks were re-assessed 
using the systemic model again as a basis, the touching points between risk 
and futures were (i) the focal question (6.3.1.2) - ―what are the plausible 
scenarios that provide a wide range of situations to test my risks against?‖; 
(ii) the scale to evaluate consequences (Table 6-3) – its aptitude to assess risks 
both in the present and in the future results from the fact that it is related to the 
strategic objectives (and hence, with the values behind them), which are set for 
the long-term (Keeney, 1992); and (iii) the dynamic evolution of strategic risks 
forward in time (Figure 6-9, Figure 6-10 and Figure 6-11).  
Besides the most obvious one – enabling the reassessment of baseline risks 
under given future scenarios – the developed approach offers four specific 
innovations:  
1) As the morphological analysis was carried out involving the risk experts 
(Appendix F), it constituted an opportunity to provide them with training 
on this subject in particular and on futures science in general, leading to 
a change in the current mind-set – which was focused on planning the 
future using projections from past trends. 
2) The linkage between risks and futures was shown to be an effective 
vehicle to integrate the conclusions of existing studies already carried out 
by EPAL into strategic risk management (e.g. climate, demographic and 
land use changes). This holistic perspective contrasts with the current 
practices where adaptation measures are proposed and managed in 
siloes, as a response to events triggered by only one single driver, 
despite being related to other drivers as well – a difficulty noted by Adger 
et al. (2005) regarding climate change. For example, this case study 
shows that under the ―Water scarcity‖ scenario, most of EPAL‘s strategic 
risks will increase: besides, of course, compromising supply with 
adequate ―water quantity‖, ―business profitability‖ will decrease due to a 
reduction in sales; ―reliability of supply‖ will be affected because local 
abstractions may be suspended due to shortage of water or water quality 
problems (this shows how risks are interdependent); and ―reputation‖ 
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may be affected if customers do not get the service levels they are used 
to and adequate measures are not adopted in a timely way (Figure 6-9). 
3) It enables the unveiling of opportunities that arise from each scenario, 
which should be accounted for by the Board (Defra, 2008), alongside the 
threats associated with risks (Koivisto et al., 2009). For example, in this 
case study some of the opportunities that arose from the water scarcity 
scenario (Figure 6-9 and Appendix I) are that the likelihood of having 
competition in water supply by municipal clients of EPAL will decrease, 
since their water sources are far less resilient to climate change than the 
ones of EPAL; and the image and reputation of EPAL can improve, if the 
company takes timely adaptation measures and communicates them 
adequately. 
4) In this approach, long-term planning is not based on pre-defined 
alternatives (for example, ad-hoc ―what-if‖ questions), but sets-off from 
an open base of possibilities, because alternatives, i.e., the chosen 
scenarios, emerge from the morphological analysis (Figure 6-7). This 
means the emphasis is put on ―what can we learn about future impacts 
on our strategic objectives‖ – a value-focused thinking, starting with the 
best potential outcome, though demanding a higher cognitive effort – 
instead of ―what alternative futures with an impact on strategic objectives 
do we want to explore‖ – an alternative-focused thinking, that starts with 
a set of alternatives and then tries to make the best out of it (Keeney, 
1992).  
The results of the analysis proved to be consistent, showing that in the ―financial 
resources‘ scarcity‖ scenario (Figure 6-10), the relative position of strategic risks 
does not change much from the baseline, which is explained by the fact that 
Portugal is already facing an economic crisis at present. Not surprisingly, a 
―strong economic growth‖ scenario (Figure 6-11) will lower all risks. It should be 
noted that, by including Cross Consistency Analysis in the methodology, the 
morphological approach makes it easier to ensure the consistency of the final 
results, unlike other methods for scenario building. 
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The holistic, systemic and long-term perspective adopted in this approach 
significantly contributes to improving water utilities‘ strategic planning, by linking 
two research areas that have been operated separately. One could speculate 
that it meets the emerging third paradigm in futures science – a systems and 
cognition oriented paradigm, enabling a new understanding of dynamic systems 
through an applicable interdisciplinary methodology (Kuosa, 2011). 
7.7 Deliberative approach, enhancing organizational risk culture 
and avoiding bias 
Many authors argue that both in risk management and in futures‘ planning, the 
process is as important, if not more so, than the strategies themselves (Wack, 
1985 in Brummell and Greg MacGillivray, 2008; Amer et al., 2013; Koivisto et 
al., 2009). Although these two aspects overlap, the framework developed here 
provides a holistic, systematic way to manage long-term risks, whereas the 
process affords a transparent and structured means to engage diverse expert 
and stakeholder perspectives in judging the implications of such information 
(Powers et al., 2012). 
This research employed an action-oriented approach, necessarily involving 
various levels of the organization (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005), especially 
because the setting of strategic objectives suggested almost every department 
at EPAL should be involved in the analysis. The value of doing this type of 
research in ‗testing mode‘, unfolds in various ways. 
First, it requires high levels of engagement among the researcher‘s colleagues 
(Coghlan and Brannick, 2005) which, despite being hugely challenging to 
undertake (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005), contributes to raising risk 
management awareness in the company. This research confirmed that the 
involvement of the Board from the beginning, as well as the knowledge the 
researcher had of the organization were crucial to securing the necessary 
commitment from risk experts throughout the process – two of the key-drivers 
for successful ERM implementation presented by Frigo and Anderson (2011). 
The high level of commitment of the team engaged is expressed by their 
contributions in the interviews and the workshop. This is patent in the way the 
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influence diagram evolved from a preliminary categorization of events and 
harms, to the final events, exposures and harms diagram (Appendix C and 
Figure 6-3). For example, in an initial version of the influence diagram, ―critical 
infrastructures‘ unavailability for an extended period‖ was caused only by 
―critical infrastructures‘ failure‖, while in the final version this ―harm‖ was 
associated with ―critical infrastructures‘ failure‖, ―power outage‖, ―failure in the 
supply of chemicals, materials, equipment, contractors‖ as well as ―insufficient 
human resources available to operate the system‖. Somehow, we may infer this 
is a testament to the collegiate culture at EPAL and to the risk management 
maturity of the company. Reviewing the risk management capability maturity 
model presented by MacGillivray and Pollard (2008), EPAL positions itself 
between levels 2 (repeatable) and 3 (defined) processes in risk management 
across business functions, which proved sufficient to implement the 
methodology developed and ensuing outcomes. We speculate that any lower 
maturity would increase the difficulty in reaching consensus, due to a lack of 
common culture (Tavares, 2012). Therefore, we admit the effect of the shared 
organisational culture (Summerill et al., 2010) played a critical role in the 
success of this approach at EPAL.   
Secondly, this approach allowed the unveiling of relevant tacit risk knowledge, 
side-by-side with formal and codified information (Appendix G), contributing to 
knowledge generation. Despite being considered a key challenge by Nonaka 
and colleagues (Schiller and Prpich, 2013), ―stakeholders consultation is a 
golden opportunity to gather insights that can‘t be manufactured and secure 
goodwill that can‘t be bought‖ (Defra, 2008) forming one of the key outputs of 
the risks and futures approaches involving people networking, where the 
developed knowledge is more than the sum of its elements (Koivisto et al., 
2009). Moreover, bringing together experts and practitioners among participants 
provides a diversity of experience that may be considered an asset for an 
institutional exercise (Saritas and Nugroho, 2012). 
Since the management of strategic risks is assured by different organisational 
departments, this approach challenged the perceptions of risk management 
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across organisational siloes, by sitting around the same table engineers, 
financial and image managers. We speculate that, in accordance with critical 
realism, this enables the shortening of the unavoidable gap between the social 
perception and the technical reality of risks. Having the knowledge opened to 
everyone also improves the culture of risk and communication across business 
functions within utilities, ensuring its pervasiveness in the company (Allan et al., 
2013). 
Finally, the approach can provide high levels of political confidence that there is 
a firm understanding (and active management of) strategic risk within the 
company, now and for the future.  This was especially evident in the validation 
workshop among those groups dealing with reputation and business profitability 
issues, who provided highly creative responses on human and organizational 
barriers identification for strategic risk management (Figure 6-4).  
The summary is that the in-house / action-oriented research methodology 
proved an appropriate vehicle for this research project. We anticipate that it 
could not have been undertaken by external parties nor could it have been done 
remotely at distance from EPAL.   
This said, the action research approach may lead to some bias, as well. 
Maxwell (2009) calls attention to the fact that despite the inherent advantages, 
bringing the experience and knowledge of the researcher - Reason and 
Bradbury‘s (2001) ―first voice‖ - into the research may lead to distortions in the 
methods and in the interpreting of the results. On the other hand, the ―second 
voice‖ – here, primary risk managers - were the heads of financial, planning and 
management control, operation, maintenance, asset management, logistics, 
water quality control, human resources, customer relations, design and works, 
information technology and organisational development departments.  Each of 
these managers also appointed technical domain risk experts, so there is also 
the possibility for cognitive bias in the assessment of causal chains, barriers 
and their effectiveness.  Vlek (2013) mentions the dangers of failing to recall 
relevant events, or of misperceiving causal chains.  There is also the possibility 
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of exaggerating or underplaying the likelihood and consequences evaluation 
(Renn, 2008b).   
It has been suggested that risk is an ‗exercise in power‘ (Slovic, 1998), either 
because risk managers know that by augmenting the relevance of their risks, 
they will receive higher budgets to manage them, or because they suppress 
their professional anxieties so not to incur extra costs for the organisation (Vlek, 
2013).  On the other hand, ‗group think‘ may cause less vocal participants to be 
dominated by opinionated leaders (Vlek, 2013; Powers et al., 2012). 
Additionally, while individual interviews reflect consistent and coherent opinions 
(even if deliberately exaggerated), the need to reach consensus in a group may 
cause opinions to become incoherent (Cox, 2012).  
In this methodology, the researcher adopted a ―critical subjectivity‖ attitude 
(Reason, 1988 in Maxwell, 2009), i.e., an awareness in which her primary 
experience was not suppressed nor allowed to overwhelm the research, but 
rather seen as raising consciousness and used as part of the process – e.g. 
drawing the first draft of the influence diagram (Appendix C), evoking the 
existing studies (Appendix B), gathering the right people in the workshop groups 
(Appendix F), etc. Special care was taken during the interviews, so that the 
researcher‘s own point of view did not influence the answers given by her 
colleagues or the process of transcribing them. For example, part of the 
answers was directly registered on the schematics of the influence diagram, 
thus reducing the risk of misinterpretations. As for the ―second voice‘s‖ bias, 
given the interactions among strategic risks, experts from different departments 
critically analysed the same risks.  Each was interviewed separately, and, if 
appropriate, at the end of the conversation they were asked to comment on 
different opinions about identical issues that had been gathered either in 
previous interviews with experts from other departments or in literature or 
existing studies. This process smoothed possible biases.  Triangulation of the 
results was made by writing down the likelihood of events, exposures and 
harms estimated by the different risk experts in the influence diagram, allowing 
detecting inconsistencies, which were mainly solved during a second round of 
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interviews.  Then, transparency (ISO 31000, 2009; Hokstad and Steiro, 2006) 
and validation were assured by joining managers and experts from different 
departments in the same groups (Appendix F), and by providing each group 
with the same influence diagram and set of records characterizing the events, 
exposures and harms associated with the strategic risks.  Positive group 
dynamics (Johnson and Johnson, 2000) was secured by moderators from the 
research team in each group (Appendix F). Given the extent of validation 
achieved through what Maxwell (2009) refers to as intensive, long-term 
involvement of the researcher; gathering ―rich‖ data; validation of responses by 
peers and triangulation; we claim that this approach minimizes the possibility for 
bias - which is also a proxy for the credibility of risk assessments (Wiedemann 
et al., 2013). 
7.8 Generalization to other utilities 
In accordance to an action-research project, the results in this thesis are not 
intended to be statistically generalizable but, instead, analytically generalizable 
(Yin, 1994 in Maxwell, 2009) or transferable (Guba and Lincoln, 1989 in 
Maxwell, 2009). They contribute to the development of a theory that can be 
extended to other cases (Becker, 1991 in Maxwell, 2009).  
The similarity of dynamics and constraints to other situations as well as the 
presumed depth or universality of the phenomenon studied, are two of the 
features that lend credibility to generalizations (Hammersley,1992 and Weiss, 
1994 in Maxwell, 2009). Regarding the validity of the proposed approach for 
other water utilities, or even for other sectors, it is possible to speculate that: 
(i) strategic objectives will not differ much from water utility to water utility; 
recognizing utilities from other sectors may have different strategic objectives; 
(ii) the influence diagram, as well as the definition of the consequences‘ scale, 
is EPAL-specific, although they are easily adaptable to other water utilities; in 
other sectors, relevant events, exposures and harms are expected to 
significantly change, but the base concepts of the approach developed may be 
applied; (iii) the key-drivers for future scenarios will likely be the same for other 
water utilities, and, again, are expected to be partially different for other sectors, 
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although the general philosophy can still be applied.  All this implies that 
although context is crucial, it is possible to generalize the lessons from this case 
study in a wider range of utilities. 
Additionally, and despite the fact that CCA requires the use of software to 
compute the co-existence of projections associated with the different key-
drivers, a further strength of this approach is its transparency for experts and 
the Board, given that the whole process, from the influence diagram to the side-
by-side comparison of strategic risks in each scenario, through the choice of 
key-drivers and even the CCA matrix, is traceable, explainable and subject to 
challenge.  These important issues (Dong et al., 2013; Durance et Godet, 2010) 
emanate from using relatively linear and easy-to-understand methods, such as 
influence diagrams and the morphological analysis.  "Simple is beautiful", as 
stated by François-Serge Lhabitant (Gregorious, 2007) in his set of rules to 
manage risk models, making it easier to replicate this approach in other cases. 
7.9 Summary  
7.9.1 Contributions to knowledge 
This thesis contributes to the theory and field of risk management in a number 
of ways. By addressing the research question ―How can a holistic approach 
linking strategic risks assessment and future scenario planning in water utilities 
be set up?”, three key contributions include:  
1) The development, illustration and validation of a top-down / bottom-up 
approach interconnecting operational, tactical and strategic risks and 
capturing the respective interactions. 
To our knowledge, no such approach has been previously developed. 
Frequently, operational and strategic risk analyses are performed in 
isolation of one another for a host of reasons (e.g. the engineering 
versus a managerial focus), and there is rarely a truly systemic 
approach to assessing the water supply system. For example, 
engineering and asset risk analyses, including the human dimensions of 
managing risk (Wu et al., 2009), rarely appear to inform strategic risk 
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management activity directly. Current methodologies adopted by other 
utilities towards strategic risk include the use of ―Red-Amber-Green‖ 
corporate risk registers, the use of risk ―heat-maps‖, and 5x5 risk 
ranking exercises (Pollard, 2008; ISO 31000, 2009).   
This novel approach is significant because it overcomes the limitations 
found in the (still limited) implementation of risk management at 
strategic / corporate level: the need to improve communication between 
experts, managers and the Board (Summerill et al., 2010; Allan et al., 
2013), in order to secure a correct alignment of risk management 
across operational, tactical and strategic levels; and the need to 
integrate, harmonize and capture the interactions between the analyses 
of the different physical, regulatory and financial risks (Means et al., 
2010; Hamilton et al., 2006; Renn, 2008b; Larson et al., 2009; ISO 
31000, 2009; Prpich et al., 2011; Frigo and Anderson, 2012; Schiller 
and Prpich, 2013). Hence, the interconnection between strategic risk 
and the operational reality of risks in the business shown in the 
developed approach (Figure 7-2) helps safeguarding confidence from 
stakeholders and regulators that corporate risks are being properly 
managed. This methodology expands the prior art by illustrating how a 
systemic analysis of risk can actively inform the corporate priorities set 
by a utility. 
2) Assessing long-term risks.  
To our knowledge, no other approaches have been developed to 
assess risks in the long-term and in a holistic fashion. Scenario 
planning has been used as a strategic tool, separately from risk 
management, generally focusing on one single issue and often 
developing from extrapolations of past trends, which have been shown 
to be unsuitable for long-term analysis.  
The novel approach developed here provides a framework to assess 
risks in the long-term, which is significant because corporate objectives 
are set for the long-term and may change under different conditions of 
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political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental 
drivers. This is especially relevant for capital intensive industries like 
water utilities, where assets are designed to last around 25 to 50 years. 
This novel approach expands prior art because until now, techniques 
for SRA in the mid and long-term were still in their infancy (Prpich et al., 
2013), and the existing SRA or ERM frameworks have not accounted 
for the long-term evolving nature of strategic risks. 
3) Linking risk and futures.  
To our knowledge, there are no approaches in the literature that 
establish the linkage between risk and futures presented in this 
research. Future scenarios have been used to support strategic 
planning, but they concentrate only on projected consequences, thus 
missing the link with risk management due to the unaccounted 
perspective of the projected likelihood. 
Despite risk and futures assessments being parallel in many ways, in 
practice these two areas of research have seldom been linked. The 
approach developed under this case-study represents a significant step 
forward in the integration of the two research fields and evidences the 
complementarity between them.  
7.9.2 Contributions to ERM practice in water utilities 
The critical strengths of this research work for water utilities – and for EPAL, in 
particular, are that (i) it builds a deep understanding of how the key risks are 
interdependent and how they impact, as a whole, on the strategic objectives of 
the company; and (ii) it provides a long-term perspective of the baseline risks, 
by reference to a set of future scenarios that are company-generated.  
This approach constitutes a useful tool for strategic / master planning, which 
may be presented to the Board in a simple and intuitive way, despite the solid 
foundations of the underlying analysis. It also builds on in-house expertise, 
promoting the dissemination and pervasiveness of risk management within the 
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companies and, on the other hand, allowing unveiling of existing knowledge, 
making it explicit and more useful for the organization.   
The process is transparent (auditable) and repeatable, and though the 
development of such an approach is intensive and time-consuming, the 
assembled set of data and analyses shall be reasonably long-lasting. In 
addition, and where possible, it builds on the results of available analyses, thus 
providing a convenient framework within which to scope out and integrate the 
conclusions of the existing studies. It does not claim to replace the function-
specific approaches to risk management (e.g. engineering; drinking water 
quality management; asset management; emergency management; 
occupational health and safety; financial analysis) that are carried out at 
operational or tactical levels, but rather to bring the respective outcomes to a 
higher, strategic level of analysis. Moreover, by including in the analyses 
business and reputational risks, the developed approach may lead to a 
redefinition of the current role of engineering thinking in strategic planning. 
By linking risk and futures, this approach challenges the openness to new future 
possibilities by changing mind-sets, building trust among actors and developing 
better preparedness for the change. It also generates knowledge by creating an 
understanding and sharing it in networks of people (Koivisto et al., 2009). 
Ultimately, and contrasting with the traditional siloed risk management practice, 
this novel approach contributes to increasing overall business efficiency and 
sustainability, by permitting the optimisation of risk-reduction options, i.e. the 
allocation of the right resources to the right risk barriers. It enables the adoption 
of a preventative attitude towards risk whilst being alive to opportunities, thus 
generating trust from the customers, the regulator and the shareholders. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
As presented in chapter 3, the overarching aim of this research was to develop 
and test a novel methodology that allows the Board of water utilities to appraise 
strategic risks and to gain a long term perspective on this baseline set of risks.  
In order to achieve this aim, a number of research objectives were defined: 
 Objective 1: To examine the existing methodologies for SRA in order to 
detect the gaps to be filled and the benefits to be expanded. 
Achievement of objective 1 is described in chapter 2. Main observations 
are that: (i) setting strategic goals is the first step water utilities need to 
take and establishing risk tolerability remains a complex subject (chapter 
2.2.1); (ii) detailing the analysis as much as possible, in order to make it 
defendable, while keeping it simple enough for decision-makers to 
understand is one of the main challenges (chapter 2.2.1); (iii) there is the 
need to improve communication between experts, managers and the 
Board (Summerill et al., 2010; Allan et al., 2013) – chapter 2.2.2; iv) a 
third generation of SRA tools is now emerging, focusing on the delivery 
of a set of visualizations that can provide a base for rich discussions and 
understanding of the risks, instead of delivering a ―top-ten‖ ranking 
(chapter 2.2.3); v) a step change is still required to, like other sectors 
(e.g: electricity), further integrate water risks with business, financial and 
other risks (Frigo and Anderson, 2012) (chapter 2.2.3); and vi) ERM has 
gained increased popularity but existing methodologies are still immature 
(Schiller and Prpich, 2013) (chapter 2.2.3). Chapter two also evidences 
that in respect of futures science (i) systems thinking paradigm is coming 
to an end, giving way to systems and cognition paradigm, aiming to 
―identify structures of network, optional connections, constraints and 
contexts‖ (Snowden, 2010 in Kuosa, 2011), enabling a ―new 
understanding of dynamical systems‖ and developing ―applicable 
interdisciplinary methodology‖ (chapter 2.3.1); ii) the process of building 
futures starts with the identification of a focal question (chapter 2.3.2); 
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and iii) mega-trends such as climate, land use and demographic changes 
are usually analysed separately (chapter 2.3.3) and not connected to risk 
analysis. The literature review allowed the conclusion that risk 
management and scenario planning evidence many commonalities 
(chapter 2.5) but, in practice, these two fields have run in parallel. 
 Objective 2: To investigate how the company's team (members of the 
Board, risk experts and risk managers) shall be assembled and involved 
throughout the process. 
Chapter 5.2 describes the way EPAL‘s team was assembled and 
engaged throughout the project. As identified by fulfilment of Objective 1, 
there are a number of potential organisational cultural barriers to SRA 
implementation, so it is therefore important to understand what positive 
elements supported this SRA implementation at EPAL. The main 
contributing factors for securing the necessary commitment from risk 
experts throughout the process were the involvement of the Board from 
the beginning, as well as the knowledge the researcher had of the 
organization and of the people. Additional motivational factors were the 
explanation of the whole process to risk experts so they understood 
where their contribution fitted in, as well as highlighting these 
contributions in the outcomes of the research during the validation 
workshop. 
 Objective 3: To explore how strategic objectives shall be identified. 
Prior to the construction of the systemic model, it was necessary to 
identify strategic objectives of the company – ―risk of what, to whom‖ 
(Pollard, 2008). Chapter 6.1 evidences the need to properly distinguish 
between strategic, fundamental and means objectives. Strategic 
objectives are ―the decision makers‘ ultimate end objectives, providing 
common guidance to all decisions‖, and ―should be stable over years‖ 
(Keeney, 1992). In this research, these objectives are physical (supplying 
wholesome, safe and reliable water), management (guaranteeing 
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business sustainability and profitability) and reputational (image and 
trust).  
 Objective 4: To construct a holistic, systemic model to assess strategic 
risks in the present (baseline). 
Building the systemic model resulted from an analytical-deliberative 
approach, enriched by risk experts‘ knowledge and information gathered 
in existing studies. Although drawing events, exposures and harms 
pathways is not new, applying at a strategic level and capturing 
interactions between risks constitutes a novelty of this work (chapter 6.2). 
Also, the deep identification and characterization of existing control 
barriers in EPAL‘s system, namely in terms of their effectiveness, 
criticality and vulnerability (Figure 6-5 and Appendix G), constitute a 
powerful input to assess the likelihood of strategic risks. It proved to be a 
way to interconnect operational, tactic and strategic risk analyses, thus 
providing a significant contribution to knowledge. In combination with the 
consequences‘ assessment, the systemic model revealed to be a useful 
tool for managers and the Board, in order to support their decisions about 
which barriers should be reinforced, maintained and relaxed. 
 Objective 5: To investigate how the futures' science can be 
interconnected with SRA. 
The approach developed under this case-study represents a step forward 
in the integration of two research fields – risks and futures – and 
evidences the complementarity between them: future scenarios were 
developed and strategic risks were re-assessed for each scenario. 
Drawing on the conclusions from the literature review (chapter 2.5) and 
having fulfilled research objectives 3 and 4, it was possible to infer that 
the touching points between risk and futures were (i) the focal question 
(chapter 6.3.1.2) - ―what are the plausible scenarios that provide a wide 
range of situations to test my risks against?‖; (ii) the aptitude revealed by 
the scale of consequences evaluation (Table 6-3) to assess risks both in 
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the present and in the future, because this scale is associated with 
strategic objectives, which are set for the long-term (Keeney, 1992).   
 Objective 6: To undertake the construction of future scenarios and to 
reassess strategic risks in the future. 
Chapter 6.3 describes the steps towards the construction of future 
scenarios. Using the morphological analysis, four scenarios were built: 
reference scenario, water scarcity, financial resources‘ scarcity and 
strong economic growth (Figure 6-8). Baseline risks were then re-
assessed by challenging the influence diagram under each scenario 
(Appendix I). This approach enabled the evaluation of both future risks 
and opportunities, permitting the adoption of a preventative attitude 
towards risk management. To our knowledge, no such approach has 
been implemented before.  
 Objective 7: To develop a way of presenting baseline risks assessment 
as well as the way risks will change in the future. 
The visualization of the results plays a very important role, as it is the 
basis for discussion between the different actors. In this approach, the 
outputs of the baseline strategic risks assessment are intentionally 
represented in a simple, concise way, so that it may support rich 
discussions with the Board. These outputs (chapter 6.2) are (i) the 
influence diagram, with and without the control barriers (Figure 6-3 and 
Figure 6-4), allowing a broad overview of strategic risks and their 
interconnections; (ii) the influence diagram coloured from green to amber 
and red, reflecting the likelihood of the events, exposures and harms 
(Figure 6-5); this not only supports the estimation of risks‘ likelihood but 
also permits the distinguishing of the risks with a natural low likelihood 
from the ones where the likelihood is low due to the existence of control 
barriers; and (iii) the ―ellipses‖ diagram, or ―heat-map‖ (Figure 6-6), where 
the axes reflect the aleatory uncertainty of the likelihood or the 
consequences estimation associated with each risk. Nonetheless, and 
because risks should also look at the context (Renn, 2008a), beneath 
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these simple visual outputs, there is a consistent and comprehensive set 
of information, which can be consulted in a database (Appendix G) and is 
synthetized in a narrative for each of the risks, associated with the ―heat-
map‖ (Appendix G). 
An intuitive way to present risks‘ evolution in each future scenario to the 
Board is by making the ellipses in the ―heat-map‖ move dynamically in a 
Microsoft OfficeTM PowerPoint presentation or in similar software. 
Besides the ―heat-maps‖, the changes in the influence diagram coloured 
according to the likelihood of events, exposures and harms (Appendix I) 
are also worth showing, since these allow a better identification of the 
main factors that contributed to the change in the strategic risks 
evaluation. However, to be able to show these changes in a written 
document (such as this thesis), a possible way is to present the ―heat-
maps‖ of each scenario side-by-side with the reference scenario (Figure 
6-9, Figure 6-10 and Figure 6-11), complemented by a short narrative 
(chapter 6.3). 
The novelty and significance of the proposed methodology is marked by the 
discovery of new knowledge (interconnecting operational, tactical and strategic 
risk; developing a holistic systemic model for comparative risk assessment; 
assessing strategic risks in the long-term); the application of existing knowledge 
to new situations (applying future scenarios to risk management); the 
connection of previous unrelated facts (combining the methods for structuring 
objectives with that of constructing influence diagrams; pointing out the parallels 
between risk and futures assessments); the improvement of existing designs 
(detailing the meaning of ―strategic objectives‖ for the purpose of risk analysis; 
characterizing the control barriers in terms of their effectiveness, criticality and 
vulnerability; assessing risk factors separately from events, exposures and 
harms; using constructed attributes to describe the character of harms through 
the ―TED‖ – type, extension and duration – approach).  This has been tested in 
EPAL – the oldest and largest water company in Portugal, which supplies 
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around 2,9 million people – through prolonged and deep engagement with risk 
managers and experts from within EPAL‘s business. 
Taken in concert then, this work represents: 
• the first systemic analysis of operational, programme-level and corporate 
risk for a water utility; 
• a bottom-up, expert led analysis of risk interdependencies across EPAL, 
addressing aspects as diverse as people, skills and succession planning, 
the reliability of the asset base, human resources policies and 
governance structures; 
• the basis for long-term, strategic planning under changing conditions of 
climate, technology, legislation, among other mega-drivers. 
By assessing risks in a systemic and holistic approach and coupling strategic 
risk with long-term scenario analysis, this methodology allows water utilities to 
enhance their strategic planning, better allocate resources, reinforce existing 
risk reduction measures and explore new opportunities in the short, mid and 
long-term. This enables utilities to become more efficient, proactive and 
resilient, with benefits in terms of access to safe and reliable drinking water at 
affordable cost for present and future generations; adequate returns on 
investment and business sustainability for shareholders; and safeguarding a 
good reputation and the confidence of government, citizens and the investment 
community for the Board. 
We believe this research meets the three main elements identified by Coghlan 
and Brannick (2005) as appropriate to judge the quality and rigour of action 
research: ―a good story; rigorous reflection on that story; and an extrapolation of 
usable knowledge or theory from the reflection on the story‖. 
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9 CRITICAL REVIEW AND FUTURE WORK 
Looking back at this research work, it is noticeable that, on the one hand, some 
things might have been done differently; on the other hand, future work may be 
developed in order to further enhance the approach developed.  
For example, the translation of likelihood and consequences of strategic risks 
from the influence diagram to the shape and positioning of the ellipses in the 
―heat-map‖ is not completely explicit. Therefore, developing tools to 
communicate the relations between influence diagrams, likelihood 
assessments, database information and ―heat-maps‖ in a more clear way could 
be subject to further investigation, the main challenge consisting of finding the 
right balance between transparency and simplicity. Such tools would facilitate 
the dissemination and implementation of this approach in other utilities – 
keeping in mind, though, that the roles of human judgement, communication 
and validation are crucial in each step. 
The development of future scenarios was not exempt from limitations, either. 
The number of key-drivers was reduced from 11 to eight (excluding the 
―givens‖) due to restrictions in the CCA software, although there is a rationale 
behind the elimination of the three key-drivers. ―Given‖- climate change was 
based on a single global circulation model, the HadCM3 from Hadley Center, for 
IPCC scenarios A2 and B2, downscaled to EPAL‘s region. The CCA matrix was 
mostly subject to individual judgment, although it was validated by a group of 
experts. Specific time frames for the futures were not identified; the analysis 
was just directed for a 30 year horizon, which corresponds to a specific type of 
scenarios – images of the future (Miles, 2007 in Saritas and Nugroho, 2012) -, 
whereby another possibility would have been to construct future history, i.e., a 
description of a future course of events. Finally, a scenarios validation workshop 
with risk experts did not occur, due to time constraints. Despite all of the above, 
results proved to be consistent and plausible – the decisive conditions for 
assessing credibility of scenarios (Amer et al., 2013). 
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The way uncertainty is accounted for and presented throughout the approach 
developed may constitute a topic for further investigation. Though the sizes of 
risk ellipses in the ―heat-map‖ reflect the aleatory uncertainty of the likelihood 
and consequences, they do not visually transmit the degree of epistemic and 
decision-making uncertainty behind such judgement (which is indicated in the 
Excel database). Therefore, this issue might be further explored. 
Last but not least, it is worth stressing that risk management approaches 
encompass two main phases, as shown in Figure 2-1: the risk evaluation phase 
and the decision-making phase. The research herein undertaken solely focuses 
on the first phase, thus a topic for further investigation would be to explore how 
the results of this analysis linking risks and futures can be incorporated into the 
company‘s long-term strategy – a critical step for utilities to make use of the full 
potential of the developed approach, uncovering its ability to deliver value. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A – EPAL’s team involved 
Risk co-ordinator 
Ana Margarida Luis 
Management Board (the members of the Board changed during the course of the research) 
João Fidalgo A. Bento Franco J. Loureiro J. Manita Vaz 
Rui Godinho José Sardinha M. Rosário Águas Rosário Ventura 
Risk managers 
Infrastructures maintenance – DIR Joaquim Sereno 
Customers relations – DRC Luis Branco 
Asset management - DGA Francisco Serranito 
Organizational development - DSO José Figueira 
System Operation - DOP Mário Maria 
Water quality control - LAB Maria João Benoliel 
Planning and management control-PCG Anita Ferreira 
Logistics - LOG Barnabé Pisco 
Administrative and financial - DAF Marcos Miguel 
Projects and works - DGO Conceição Almeida 
Information Systems - DSI Paulo Rodrigues 
General Secretariat - SG José Zenha 
Juridical affairs - JUR Bruno Lopes 
Human  resources - DRH Carlos Saraiva 
Risk experts 
Nuno Medeiros José Salgueiro Helena Silva Diana Constant 
Cláudia André Francisco Braga Nuno Reis Maria J. Capela 
Marco Santos Helena Saraiva Sérgio Rodrigues Guilherme Hora 
Rui Neves Carneiro Sofia Damião Joaquim Broes Alberto Martins 
António Matos Ana Amélia Ricardo Silva Ivo Joaquim 
Paula Serrinha Vieira Gomes Luis Bucha Paula Rodrigues 
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Appendix B – List of existing studies at EPAL 
 
W-Smart 
Underground sources protection zones (Grandwater) 
Superficial water sources protection zones (protocol with UNL-New Lisbon 
University) 
Contamination of C. Bode reservoir due to Panasqueira landslide (UNL-New 
Lisbon University) 
Biodiversity in the surroundings of C. Bode Reservoir (Geota) 
Seismic vulnerability of water tanks (protocol with IST-Technical University of 
Lisbon) 
Vulnerability of above ground trunk mains (Tetraplano and LEB) 
Analysis and acquisition of diesel generators (EPAL) 
Disposal, refurbishment and renewal of Alviela Aqueduct (EPAL and Coba) 
Pipe bursts‘ group (EPAL) 
Water quality modelling in the distribution network (EPAL) 
Emergency plans (EPAL) 
Marketing campaigns (EPAL) 
PSAT – Technical assets‘ security program (EPAL, EDP, REN, REFER, PT,…) 
Water Safety Plan (EPAL) 
Capital Investment Plan (EPAL) 
Master Plan (EPAL) 
Annual Accountants report 2010 (EPAL) 
Adaptaclima-EPAL (FCUL – Sciences Faculty of Lisbon University) 
Forecasting the failure probability for water mains (Cranfield University) 
Application of COSO framework at EPAL (2011) 
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Appendix C – Preliminary versions of the influence 
diagram 
1. Brainstorming in April 2011 
 
2. Categorizing brainstormed risks 
Category Risk 
Quantity earthquake with dam break                    water unavailability at sources                
Quality pathogen contamination                         
supply chain failure                                 
catchment contamination                        
other water sources contamination         
Reliability Castelo Bode system‘s failure                
water supply failure                                 
supply chain failure                                 
natural hazards (earthquake)                 
major trunk mains burst                          
distribution mains burst                          
loss of primary asset                              
loss of power supply (outage)                
Business 
Sustainability 
non-revenue from municipal clients      
business (un)sustainability                    
loss of financing                                    
change in governance model                 
loss of competitiveness in bulk 
supply   
Image  non-compliance                                     
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3. Influence diagram (1st version) 
 
4. Influence diagram (2nd version, after inputs from COSO at EPAL) 
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5. Influence diagram (3rd version, evidencing events, exposures and harms) 
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6. Influence diagram (4th version, after discussion with risk experts and risk managers) 
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Appendix D – Assigning significance to consequences’ classes 
Class Strategic risk - consequences Justification 
5 – Catastrophic 
 
4 – Very bad 
 
3 – Bad 
 
2 – Moderate 
 
 
1 - Minor 
The company will not be able to accomplish its 
mission in the next 10 years 
The company will not be able to accomplish its 
mission in the next 20 years 
The company will be able to accomplish its 
mission in the next 20 years but struggling with 
high economic or financial constraints 
The company will be able to accomplish its 
mission in the next 20 years with moderate 
economic or financial constraints 
The company will be able to accomplish its 
mission in the next 20 years with minor economic 
or financial constraints 
It would take 10 years to shut EPAL down 
 
A salvation plan might be designed 
 
Sustainability is reachable, despite the difficulties 
 
Sustainability is guaranteed, despite moderate 
difficulties 
 
Sustainability is guaranteed 
5 – Catastrophic 
 
4 – Very bad 
 
3 – Bad 
 
2 – Moderate 
1 - Minor 
The company will be in deficit 
 
The company will decrease its profits by more 
than 75% up to 100% 
The company will decrease its profits by more 
than 25% and less than 75% 
The company will decrease its profits by less than 
25% 
The company will maintain its level of profits 
EPAL has been generating profits for the last 
decades 
EPAL would change from a profitable 
organization to almost in deficit 
This means a reduction of 10 to 30 million EUR 
 
This means a reduction of around 10 million EUR 
  
EPAL will keep its profits around 40 million EUR 
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Class Strategic risk - consequences Justification 
5 – Catastrophic 
 
4 – Very bad 
 
 
3 – Bad 
 
2 – Moderate 
 
1 - Minor 
50 or more customers will present non-reversible 
health problems, including the possibility of death 
Less than 50 customers will present non-
reversible health problems, including the 
possibility of death OR more than 5000 thousand 
customers will present reversible health problems 
Less than 5000 thousand and more than 500 
customers will present reversible health problems 
Less than 500 and more than 50 customers will 
present reversible health problems 
Less than 50 customers will present reversible 
health problems 
Any death is considered ―very bad‖ of 
―catastrophic‖. Given the scale of the supply 
system, a major water quality problem will affect 
more than one customer (if it were only one, it 
would be difficult to prove the cause was water 
quality).  
500 to 5000 customers correspond to a local 
municipal supply. 
50 to 500 customers correspond to direct 
customers in a DMA. 
Up to 50 customers correspond to a building in 
Lisbon or to direct customers on trunk mains   
5 – Catastrophic 
 
4 – Very bad 
 
3 – Bad 
 
2 – Moderate 
 
1 - Minor 
50% or more of the daily average flow will not be 
supplied during 6 months or more 
50% or more of the daily average flow will not be 
supplied during 1-6 months 
25%-50% of the daily average flow will not be 
supplied during 6 months or more 
25%-50% of the daily average flow will not be 
supplied during 1-6 months   
Less than 25% of the daily average flow will not 
be supplied during more than 1 month 
In case water scarcity at sources occurs, EPAL 
will not cut the supply to some customers, but, 
instead, will reduce the amount of water supplied. 
6 months is the time it takes to implement 
adaptation measures (e.g. opening new 
boreholes). 
1-6 months corresponds to the dry season.  
5 – Catastrophic 
 
4 – Very bad 
2,0 million or more customers will not be supplied 
at all during 4 days or more  
0,1-2,0 million customers will not be supplied at 
It corresponds to a major failure in Vila Franca de 
Xira site. 
It corresponds to a failure in Castelo do Bode 
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Class Strategic risk - consequences Justification 
 
 
3 – Bad 
 
 
2 – Moderate 
 
1 - Minor 
all OR 2,0 million or more customers will be 
partially supplied during 4 days or more   
0,1 million or less customers will not be supplied 
at all OR 0,5-2,0 million customers will be partially 
supplied during 4 days or more   
0,1-0,5 million customers will be partially supplied 
during 4 days or more   
0,1 million or less customers will be partially 
supplied during 4 days or more 
system upstream Alcanhões. 
 
It corresponds to a failure in Costa do Sol sub-
system. 
 
It corresponds to failures in other less critical 
points in the system. 
It corresponds to failures in other even less 
critical points in the system. 
5 – Catastrophic 
 
 
4 – Very bad 
 
3 – Bad 
 
 
2 – Moderate 
 
 
1 - Minor 
One breaking news OR more than one non 
breaking news per year defaming the quality of 
the water supplied 
One breaking news OR more than one non 
breaking news per year related with 3rd parties or 
H&S injuries 
One breaking news OR more than one non 
breaking news per year defaming the reliability of 
the water supplied 
One breaking news OR more than one non 
breaking news per year defaming the governance 
of the company 
One breaking news OR more than one non 
breaking news per year related with the quality of 
service but where harms cannot be directly 
imputable to EPAL (due diligence) 
Water quality is the major contributor to loss of 
confidence from customers on drinking water. 
 
Employees‘ injuries or damages caused to 3rd 
parties negatively affect image, but not as much 
as water quality. 
Disruption in supply due to asset failure can be 
explained by their natural ageing. 
Defaming news about governance may affect the 
Board, but does not affect customers‘ trust on 
drinking water. 
 
Image can be less affected if the causes of failure 
in the quality of service are not directly imputed to 
EPAL (e.g.: drought). 
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Appendix E - Information gathered during the meetings with Risk Experts 
No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
1 Competition in 
water supply 
Event Experience with 
AdO 
Municipalities may start 
producing their own water (in 
case the price of water gets 
too high for them, for 
example). 
DRC: 1/10 - 1/100 
PCG: 1/10 - 1/100 
- 
2 Non-revenue 
from municipal 
clients 
Event Already 
happening 
(Torres Novas) 
Municipal clients do not pay 
their water bills either because 
they cannot afford them or 
because they do not want to 
(litigation). 
PCG/DAF: 1/100 - 1/1000 
DGA: 1/10 - 1/100 (present 
economic context) 
DRC: 1/1 - 1/10 (already 
happening) 
Taking into account the 
economic and financial 
situation of Portugal. 
3 Inadequate 
long-term 
planning 
Event  Long-term planning does not 
anticipate assets' needs or 
demand evolution, leading to 
bad resource allocation 
(maintenance, rehabilitation) or 
inadequate assets' design 
(over or under capacity of the 
assets). 
DRC: 1/10 - 1/100 ("til when 
will the consumption continue 
decreasing") 
PCG/DAF: 1/100-1/1000 
(part of the existing Master 
Plan deficiencies is being 
compensated by a better 
knowledge of the assets; 
planning is adjustable) 
DIR: 1/100000 (for the 
strategic objective) 
DGA: 1/10 - 1/100 ("existing 
Master Plan is being 
followed, but limitations in the 
investments may cause 
problems") 
The existing Master 
Plan may not be perfect 
("How far will the 
decrease in the 
consumption go?"), but 
it might be compensated 
by the increase in the 
knowledge about the 
assets that has been 
occurring. The planning 
is not rigid, and to a 
certain extent it can be 
adjusted in face of 
reality. 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
4 Inadequate 
relationship with 
banks 
Event  Due to a bad reputation or to a 
bad financial health of EPAL, 
banks do not trust in EPAL's 
capacity to pay for the loans. 
PCG/DAF: 1/10000 - 
1/100000 ("EPAL has a very 
good relationship with EIB") 
"EPAL has a very good 
relationship with EIB". 
5 Changes in 
politics/economy 
Event  There is a lack of stability in 
politics/economy that may 
adversely impact the financing 
capacity as well as the 
operational costs of EPAL. 
Uncertainty about the future is 
high. 
PCG/DAF: 1/10 - 1/100 
JUR: 1/1 - 1/10 ("lack of 
stability; change in politics 
imply changes in laws) 
DGA: 1/1 - 1/10 ("EPAL is a 
Portuguese company -> 
reduced trust in the markets") 
LOG: 1/1 - 1/10 ("local --> 
global") 
DIR: 1/1 - 1/10 
 
6 Loss of 
monopoly 
Exposure   Due to the strength of the 
barrier (L/M), it inherits 
 P(1 - Competition in water 
supply (Event))=1/10-1/100 
 
7 Inability to cope 
with high fixed 
costs 
Exposure   Due to the strength of the 
barrier (L), it inherits 
 P(2 - Non-revenue from 
municipal clients  (Event)) 
=1/10 - 1/1000 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
8 Bad resource 
allocation 
Exposure  Continuously bad resource 
allocation, so that sustainability 
might be compromised. 
P = 1/10 - 1/1000 (inherit 3) 
It happened once and a while 
in the past and had no effect 
on business sustainability - 
Alviela, Lisbon distribution 
network 
 
9 Lack of 
financing 
Exposure  There is no financing to EPAL, 
due either to a bad relationship 
with banks or to changes in 
Politics/Economy. 
P = 1/1 - 1/10, due to  
P(5 - Changes in 
politics/economy (Event)) 
 
10 Loss of market 
share 
Harm   Due to the strength of the 
barrier (L/M), it inherits 
 P(6 - Loss of monopoly 
(Exposure))=1/10-1/100 
 
11 Difficulties in 
raising self-
capital 
Harm   Due to the strength of the 
barrier (L), it inherits 
 P(2 - Non-revenue from 
municipal clients  (Event)) 
=1/10 - 1/1000 
 
12 Excessive 
rehabilitation / 
maintenance 
needs 
Harm  Assets' condition and 
performance are such that the 
amount of CAPEX and OPEX 
needed for the system to 
operate is so high that might 
compromise business 
sustainability. 
P = 1/10 - 1/1000 (not 
foreseen to happen in the 
next 18 months) 
DSO: P = 1/10 - 1/100  
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
13 Inability to meet 
investment 
needs (AM best 
practices) 
Harm PAI 2013-2015 The capacity to invest in new 
assets or in the renewal of the 
existing ones is not enough to 
cope with all the needs. 
P = 1/10 - 1/100   
14 Increase in the 
price of energy 
Event "Relatório e 
Contas 2011" 
Energy is the highest 
operational cost of the 
company, and its price has 
been increasing over the last 
years. 
DAF/PCG: 1/1 - 1/10 
DGA: 1/1 - 1/10  
 
15 Regulation - 
Lack of rule 
making 
Event  The regulatory model for EPAL 
is explained by rules and 
codes that are not sufficient to 
clarify what is expected from 
EPAL. Consequently, it is not 
clear the way how profitability 
should be evaluated as well as 
the way tariffs are approved by 
the regulator. 
PCG/DAF: P = 1/1 - 1/10  
16 Limitations in 
setting tariffs 
Event  Tariffs cannot be increased 
regardless the surplus that 
may be needed to cope with 
the fixed costs, due to 
regulation constraints. It 
depends upon a political 
decision. 
DGA: 1/1 - 1/10  
PCG/DAF: 1/1 - 1/10 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
17 Consumption 
decrease 
Event  Decrease in consumption of 
the actual customers, due to 
either change of practices, 
economic constraints or to a 
reduction in their water losses 
(for municipal or multi-
municipal clients) 
PCG/DAF: 1/1 - 1/10 
DGA: 1/1 - 1/10  
DRC: 1/1 - 1/10 
 
18 High 
dependence on 
energy supply 
Exposure  The water supply system of 
EPAL is designed in such a 
way that energy is needed not 
only to abstract water from all 
of the current sources 
(superficial and underground) 
but also to deliver it to the 
customers. 
P = P(14 - Increase in the 
price of energy (Event)) = 1/1 
- 1/10 
 
19 Inadequate 
guidance 
regarding 
profitability 
Exposure  The regulatory model for EPAL 
is explained by rules and 
codes that are not sufficient to 
clarify what is expected from 
EPAL. Consequently, it is not 
clear the way how profitability 
should be evaluated as well as 
the way tariffs are approved by 
the regulator. 
P = P(15 - Regulation - Lack 
of rulemaking (Event))  
= 1/1 - 1/10 
 
20 Decrease in 
sales 
Exposure  Decrease in sales for the 
actual clients 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
21 Overcapacity of 
the assets 
Exposure  Assets had been designed 
taking into account an 
estimated level in demand that 
has proven to be excessive in 
the present (due to an 
inadequate planning or to a 
decrease in the consumption). 
P = P(17 - Consumption 
decrease (Event))  
= 1/1 - 1/10 
 
22 OPEX increase Harm "Relatório e 
Contas 2011" 
Operational costs may 
increase due to the increase 
on the different parcels that 
contribute to it, namely 
external supplies and services 
(FSE), including energy. 
P = 1/1000 - 1/10000 
Although all the other costs 
have a positive trend, costs 
with personnel have been 
exceptionally low due to a 
resolution of the 
Government; efficiency has 
been increasing (energy, 
water losses), but it is not 
sufficient to cope with the 
increase in the price of 
energy, for example. 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
23 Bad decisions 
from Regulator 
Harm  The regulatory model for EPAL 
is explained by rules and 
codes that are not sufficient to 
clarify what is expected from 
EPAL. Consequently, it is not 
clear the way how profitability 
should be evaluated as well as 
the way tariffs are approved by 
the regulator. 
P = P(15 - Regulation - Lack 
of rulemaking (Event))  
= 1/1 - 1/10 
 
24 Difficulties in 
obtaining return 
on investments 
Harm  Difficulties result from a 
decrease in sales and from an 
overcapacity of the assets, 
which were designed to supply 
higher levels of demand. It 
should be noted, though, that 
ROI is not always easy to be 
measured. 
P = P(16 - Limitations in 
setting tariffs (Event))  
= 1/1 - 1/10 
 
25 High 
temperatures / 
dry weather 
Event Happened in the 
summer of 2012 
The increase in the number of 
days per year with high 
temperatures (T>30 ⁰C) in dry 
weather may lead to a 
degradation of water quality in 
the superficial water sources 
(considering that pollution 
loads are as usual for that 
season). 
DGA: 1/1 - 1/10  (history) 
LAB: 1/1 - 1/10 (history) 
DIR: 1/1 - 1/10 (2012 history) 
It happened last 
summer in Valada-Tejo. 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
26 Radioactivity 
(Problems at 
Almaraz) 
Event  Problems at Almaraz - nuclear 
power plant is located ≈100 km 
upstream the border 
Portugal/Spain, on the bank of 
Tagus river. If an accident 
occurs, water may be 
contaminated either by 
propagation of the nuclear 
radiation by air or by the river. 
LAB: 1/100-1/1000 or 
1/1000-1/10000 
Note: A study is undergoing 
to know more about this. 
A study is undergoing to 
find out more about this 
subject. 
27 Forest fires Event It usually 
happens in the 
summer, around 
Castelo do Bode 
reservoir  
The land use around C.Bode is 
mostly comprised by forest 
areas, many of which usually 
are set on fire on the summer 
seasons. If the magnitude and 
location of the burnt areas are 
such that ashes get into the 
reservoir (either via 
atmosphere or following heavy 
rain episodes), the raw water 
quality may be affected by 
higher turbidity and HAPC 
(hydro carbonates). 
LAB: 1/10 - 1/100 (not severe 
until now, negative effects 
have not been experienced; 
WTP also can deal with 
HAPC and the intake tower 
has 3-4 levels of abstraction) 
DGA: 1/1 - 1/10  (severe) 
Until now, severity of the 
forest fires has been 
such that did not affect 
the treatment of water at 
Asseiceira. 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
28 Diffuse pollution Event  Diffuse pollution may occur in 
the watershed upstream the 
water sources or along the 
supply system. It may be due 
to agriculture practices 
(pesticides, nitrates, 
phosphates) or to cattle 
(organic matter, crypto, 
giardia). 
LAB: 1/1 - 1/10 
DGA: 1/10 - 1/100 
It is detected in raw 
water. 
29 Point source 
pollution 
Event  Point source pollution may 
occur in the watershed 
upstream water sources or 
along the supply system. It 
may be due to treated or 
untreated wastewater 
discharges, to spillage of 
dangerous substances or to 
the leaking from landfills or 
quarries. In the distribution 
system, it may also be due to 
contamination during 
maintenance actions. 
LAB: 1/1 - 1/10 (historically, it 
is due to wastewater; not 
spills, landfill, quarries or 
maintenance) 
DGA: 1/10 - 1/100 
Wastewater is the major 
contribution. 
30 Vandalism Event  An act of vandalism within 
water supply system that may 
put in danger asset integrity or 
the safety of the delivered 
water quality. 
DSO: P=1/1 - 1/10 (high) It has been occurring in 
the last years 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
31 Reduced water 
quality / 
contamination at 
sources 
Exposure  Water quality at surface or 
underground sources may 
decrease due to natural or 
anthropogenic causes. 
Contaminants may be 
biological, chemical, toxic or 
radioactive. 
P = 1/1 - 1/10 (point source 
or diffuse pollution) at 
Valada, Ota, Alenquer; P = 
1/10 - 1/100 (forest fires) at 
C.Bode; there is a recent 
study that shows that 
Panasqueira mines landfill 
pose no threat to raw water 
quality at C.Bode; P = 1/10 - 
1/100 (natural radioactivity) 
at Lezírias 
Due to the point source 
and diffuse pollution that 
occurs at Valada-Tejo, 
Ota and Alenquer. A 
recent study has shown 
that Panasqueira mines' 
landfill pose no threat to 
raw water quality at 
C.Bode. 
32 Reduced water 
quality / 
contamination in 
the Transport or 
Distribution 
system 
Exposure Analysis to non-
compliances 
made by LAB in 
the Transport 
and Distribution 
system. 
Water quality in the transport 
or distribution system may 
decrease due to contamination 
from the source or directly in 
the supply system. This latter 
is especially relevant in Alviela 
and Tagus aqueducts (free 
surface flow) and mainly at 
Alviela (very bad condition; 
water pressure drains). It may 
also occur due to an 
overcapacity of the mains that 
lead to a decrease in the flow 
velocity. 
P = 1/1 - 1/10 (Tejo - ex.: 
THM) 
P = 1/100 - 1/1000 (other 
trunk mains) 
 
Vale da Pedra WTP is 
not so robust as 
Asseiceira WTP, but the 
mix of waters prove to 
be effective.  
Analysis to samples in 
the Transport or 
Distribution system 
indicates that direct 
contamination is not 
relevant, although 
Alviela aqueduct's 
vulnerability is very high.   
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
33 Presence of 
contaminants in 
the delivery 
points 
(biological, 
chemical, toxic, 
radioactive) 
Harm  Presence of contaminants in 
the delivery points in such a 
way that may affect 
consumers‘ health. 
LAB:  
P = 1/1 - 1/10 -> IVPs + THM 
P = 1/100 - 1/1000 -> large 
scale 
 
34 Inadequate AM 
practices / 
design / 
operation / 
maintenance 
Event "Relatório e 
Contas 2011" 
Inadequate AM practices / 
design / operation / 
maintenance due to poorly 
qualified workers, insufficient 
supervising or other control 
measures, financial or time 
constraints, etc. 
DRH: 1/1- 1/10 future 
DGA: 1/10 - 1/100 
DIR: 1/10- 1/100 
More than 200 
employees are aged 
55+ and there is no HR 
strategic plan. 
Government rules do 
not allow the recruitment 
of new people. 
35 Assets natural 
ageing 
Event Pamraj Patil's 
thesis 
EPAL's water supply system is 
comprised by recent sub-
systems (ex.: C.Bode, 
Circunvalação, V.F.Xira-
Telheiras, significant part of 
Distribution network) but also 
by old systems (Alviela, Tejo, 
part of Distribution network). 
The likelihood of failure of the 
latter is getting higher, 
although these are not the 
most critical infrastructures 
(with exception to V.Pedra 
WTP, which will soon be 
refurbished). 
DIR: 1/100 - 1/1000 (C.Bode, 
…) 
DGA: 1/10 - 1/100 (Tejo, 
V.Pedra) 
MSc thesis "Forecasting 
the failure probability for 
water mains" (Padmraj 
Patil) evidences that 
failures in trunk mains 
will occur within the next 
100 years. 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
36 Tornados, 
floods, 
earthquakes 
Event  Natural catastrophes such as 
tornados, floods and 
earthquakes may destroy 
assets, contaminate water 
and/or affect power production 
and distribution. 
DSO: 1/10 - 1/100 ("a major 
natural catastrophe is due to 
happen in 50 years") 
DGA: 1/10 - 1/100 
DIR: 1/10 - 1/100 ("1/50") 
"Mini-tornados have 
been occurring in recent 
years". 
37 Failure in the 
suppliers' / 
contractors' / 
service 
Event  Suppliers/contractors fail to 
meet agreed service due to 
economic, social or other 
reasons. 
DIR: 1/1 - 1/10 (ex.: 
contractor's bankruptcy) 
LOG: 1/1 - 1/10 ("there is no 
stock"; since 10 years ago: 
local->global; terrorism, 
political changes, economic; 
high dependence on one 
supplier (IS, SCADA, energy, 
valves) 
DGA: 1/100 - 1/1000 
("nowadays, the process is 
controlled  and stable)" 
EPAL has already 
experienced contractor's 
bankruptcy, due to the 
actual economic crisis. 
For some of the 
products, there is no 
stock. 
In some cases there is a 
high dependence on 
one supplier. 
The process is 
controlled and stable, 
but there is a need to 
improve the process of 
evaluating the suppliers. 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
38 Strikes Event  Occurrence of strikes in EPAL. DRH: 1/1- 1/10 (it has been 
happening over the years) 
DGA: 1/10 - 1/100 
PCG: 1/10- 1/100 
It has occurred in the 
last years and the 
economic and financial 
crisis tend to increase 
the frequency of strikes. 
39 Pandemic Event     
40 Critical assets' 
failure 
Exposure  Failure of the assets due to 
mechanical, electrical or 
structural problems. 
DGA: 1/10 - 1/100 (ex.: 
C.Bode-> even with AM best 
practices barrier, it may not 
be as robust as that, 
depends on political 
decision) 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
41 Power outage Exposure  Power outage may be caused 
by internal problems in the 
power supply system or be 
due to natural catastrophes. 
P = P(36 - Tornados, floods, 
earthquakes (Event)) = 1/10 - 
1/100 
"A major natural 
catastrophe is due to 
happen in 50 years". 
42 Dependence on 
supply of 
chemicals, 
materials, 
equipment, 
services 
Exposure  The system functionality is 
highly dependent on the 
supply of chemicals, materials, 
equipment and, in some 
cases, outsourced work force. 
P = 1/1 (especially in the 
case of electricity) 
 
43 Insufficient 
human 
resources to 
operate the 
system 
Exposure  Unavailability of human 
resources in such a way that 
water supply system cannot be 
operated, due to social 
problems (demonstrations, 
strikes, etc.) or to pandemic. 
P = 1/1000 - 1/100000  
(because of the strength of 
the barrier, which is due to a 
high level of consciousness) 
or 
P = 1/10 - 1/100 (because 
social tension is increasing) 
Social tension is high, 
but awareness of 
EPAL's mission is also 
high. 
44 Critical 
infrastructures' 
unavailability for 
an extended 
period 
Harm  Critical assets unavailability for 
an extended period, due to 
mechanical, electrical or 
structural failure, to lack of 
chemicals to treat water, to 
lack of people to operate the 
system, to a power outage or 
to the presence of 
contaminated water in the 
system. 
P = 1/10 - 1/100 (from natural 
disasters + assets ageing) 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
45 Water losses 
increase 
Event  Water losses (either in EPAL's 
system or in the distribution 
systems of the Municipal 
Clients) may increase due to 
ageing of the mains and to 
insufficient maintenance or 
renewal practices. 
DGA: P = 1/10000 - 
1/100000 
(data show that it is 
happening the opposite) 
 
46 Consumption 
increase 
Event  Consumption may increase 
due to an increase in 
population or in economic 
activity 
All: P = 1/10000 - 1/100000 
(data show that the opposite 
is happening) 
 
47 Droughts / 
Capture in 
Spain 
Event Adaptaclima Occurrence of severe or 
extreme droughts, which may 
lead to retention of water in the 
Spanish basin of Tagus River 
DGA: P = 1/10 - 1/100(there 
is no evidence that it might 
happen until next year; 
C.Bode proved to be resilient 
in 2005) 
Adaptaclima project 
foresees that extreme 
droughts will occur 
within the next 20 years, 
but C. Bode reservoir is 
very resilient and it will 
not happen during this 
hydrological year. 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
48 High turbination 
or major works 
at C.Bode 
Event  C.Bode reservoir is shared 
with EDP that uses it for 
electricity production. If the 
turbination lowers the water 
level below EPAL's intakes, 
EPAL will not be able to 
abstract water from that 
source. 
DGA: P = 1/100 - 1/1000 
(presently, there is a contract 
that establishes the minimum 
level below which the 
hydropower plant cannot 
operate; EDP's awareness of 
the importance of complying 
with that is very high; no 
major works in the dam (that 
might lead to the emptying of 
the reservoir) are foreseen 
(source: EDP). 
It is safeguarded in 
EDP's concession 
contract with APA that 
they cannot turbinate 
below a level that 
compromises EPAL. 
50 Increase in the 
demand 
Exposure  Increase in the demand (by 
actual clients) result from an 
effective increase in 
consumption and/or an 
increase in water losses. 
All: P = P(46 - Consumption 
increase (Event)) 
 = 1/10000 - 1/100000 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
51 Reduced water 
availability at 
sources 
Exposure  Water availability at sources is 
reduced due to the occurrence 
of droughts or, for C.Bode, 
problems at the dam/high 
turbination. 
P = P(48 - High turbination or 
major works at C.Bode 
(Event)) = 1/100 - 1/1000, 
since C.Bode represents 
approximately 70% of the 
sources and is located in the 
most upstream of the system 
(this allowing to cover for any 
needs downstream) 
Adaptaclima project 
foresees that extreme 
droughts will occur 
within the next 20 years, 
but C. Bode reservoir is 
very resilient and it will 
not happen during this 
hydrological year. It is 
safeguarded in EDP's 
concession contract with 
APA that they cannot 
turbinate below a level 
that compromises 
EPAL. 
49 Under capacity 
of the assets 
Exposure  Assets are under designed for 
the actual demand 
P = 1/1000 - 1/10000 
(the opposite is happening) 
 
52 Water doesn't 
flow from 
sources to the 
delivery points 
Harm  Assets are functioning but are 
not able to deliver the total 
demanded flow because of 
their under capacity. 
P = 1/10000 - 1/100000  
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
53 Supply/Demand 
balance in 
deficit 
Harm  The demand for water exceeds 
the availability at sources. 
P = P(50 - Increase in the 
demand (Exposure)) = 
1/10000 - 1/100000, 
(since demand is decreasing, 
there is a kind of 
compensation for a potential 
effect of droughts) 
 
54 Pipe bursts in 
Lisbon network 
(abbrev.) 
Event  Pipe bursts occur every week 
in the distribution system. This 
can cause "brown water" to 
flow from taps (after the repair) 
and, in some cases, damages 
to private properties. 
Organoleptic issues may also 
arise from the operational 
conditions (low flow velocities). 
P = 1/1 - 1/10  
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
55 Fraud, non-
compliance with 
Ethic Code 
Event  Fraud or other actions that do 
not comply with EPAL's ethic 
code. 
LOG: P = {1,2} (there is still a 
lot to improve: "preference, 
dependencies, …"; the 
suppliers evaluation 
procedure can be improved 
(and more evident) 
JUR: P = 1/100 - 1/1000 
("Public Contracting Code" is 
much more restrictive; there 
is no track of problems) 
DGA:  P = 1/100 - 1/1000 
(Problems reported by LOG 
are real specially regarding 
procedure optimization - they 
have no strategic impact; bad 
classification of suppliers, or 
lack of willing for 
improvement. 
The mechanisms to 
avoid non-compliances 
with Ethic Code exist. 
56 Health and 
Safety of 
employees 
compromised 
Event "Relatório e 
Contas 2011" 
Employees may be seriously 
injured (or killed) during their 
working activities. 
DRH: 1/10 - 1/100 (due to a 
lack of knowledge transfer) 
DGA: 1/10- 1/100 (risk 
related to interventions in 
power stations, DGA is 
aware and alert) 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
57 Inadequate 
relationship with 
Unions / Media / 
Stakeholders 
Event  An inadequate relationship 
with Unions / Media / 
Stakeholders may lead to an 
increase in the release of 
defaming news. 
DGA: 1/1 - 1/10 (historically, 
although it has improved a lot 
-> next year: 1/10 - 1/100) 
It has happened in the 
past. 
58 Noncompliance 
of organoleptic 
parameters 
Exposure  Organoleptic parameters 
(colour, smell, taste) may be 
beyond the required level. 
P = 1/1 - 1/10 or 1/10 - 1/100 Number of claims is low. 
59 3rd parties 
injured 
Exposure  3rd parties may be injured due 
to the occurrence of pipe 
bursts, non-compliance with 
ethical code or health and 
safety failure. 
P = P(55 - Fraud, non-
compliance with Ethic Code 
(Event)) = P(56 - Health and 
Safety of employees 
compromised (Event)) = 1/10 
- 1/100 
(Pipe burst occur every week 
but the 'big ones' do not 
occur so often) 
Mainly due to pipe 
bursts in Lisbon. 
60 Negative 
influence on 
public opinion 
Exposure  Unions, media and 
stakeholders have the power 
to influence public opinion, 
through the release of 
defaming news. 
P = P(57 - Inadequate 
relationship with Unions / 
Media / Stakeholders 
(Event)) = 1/10 - 1/100 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
61 Public opinion 
damage 
Harm  Damage in public opinion may 
arise from "direct causes" 
(non-compliance with 
organoleptic parameters, 3rd 
parties injured, inadequate 
relationship with syndicates 
and media) or "indirect 
causes" (failure to achieve 
each of the other strategic 
objectives). 
P = 1/10 - 1/100 (direct 
causes -> syndicates) 
 
The range is due to the 
contribution of both 
"direct" and "indirect 
causes". 
100 Inadequate 
governance 
Risk factor  Inadequate governance may 
be due to an excessive 
interference of the 
Government in EPAL's 
management. It has effects on 
the image (identification of 
EPAL with the image of the 
public sector in general), on 
the approval of investments, 
on the salaries and EPAL's 
capacity to capture talent, etc. 
(Profitability), etc. 
P = 1/1 - 1/10  
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
101 Lack of 
communication 
Risk factor  Lack of communication 
between people (especially 
from different departments) 
may lead to several 
inefficiencies in the processes. 
It affects profitability (non-
optimized working processes) 
and may affect the disruption 
in the supply or the health and 
safety of employees. 
DGA: 1/1 - 1/10  
102 Poor HR 
practices 
Risk factor  Poor HR practices result from 
difficulties in capturing talent to 
the company; in ensuring that 
knowledge transfer is made 
when employees get retired or 
move to another company; and 
also in renewing "minds" in the 
company ("familiar dynasties"). 
This directly affects AM 
practices. 
 
NOTE:  >200 / 700 employees 
are aged 55+ 
DRH: 1/1 - 1/10 ("there is no 
HR strategic plan to 
retain/capture kwon-how, 
including on-job training") 
DIR: 1/1 - 1/10 (no 
procedures) 
DGA: 1/1 - 1/10 (no 
knowledge transfer; no new 
admissions) 
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No. Box Type Evidences Notes Probabilities Probabilities notes 
103 Legal non-
compliance 
Risk factor  Non-compliance with current 
legislation. It affects reputation 
and trust. 
JUR: 1/100 - 1/1000  
- There are mechanisms of 
control set up. 
- Noncompliance may occur 
either because laws change 
too often (and control 
mechanisms fail) or because 
we decide to (ex. monthly 
billing). 
- There is a lack of stability 
that does not allow proper 
long or mid-term planning to 
be done. 
 
104 Inadequate 
data/information 
Risk factor  Inadequate data or information 
about the different subjects of 
the company - namely the 
assets - leads to an increase in 
the inefficiency of the 
processes and to bad 
decision-making (affects 
Profitability). 
DGA: 1/1 - 1/10 (ex. 
MAXIMO) 
DIR: 1/1 - 1/10 (ex. 
MAXIMO) 
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Appendix F – Validation workshop: materials provided 
and other arrangements  
 
1. ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Workshop: Strategic Risk Management
Venue:  Hotel Plaza
Tuesday Wednesday
22-01-2013 23-01-2013
09h15-09h50
Presentation of the participants
(All)
09h50-10h00
Framework and objectives
(Simon Pollard)
10h00-11h00
RISK ASSESSMENT (IN THE PRESENT)
Presentation of the main conclusions from the meetings with risk experts
(Ana Luis)
11h00-11h20 Coffe-Break Coffe-Break
11h20-13h15
- Discussion of the results and presentation of the conclusions 
(Work ing groups)
- Analysis of the key-drivers and respective connections
(Fiona Lickorish + specialists + Work ing groups)
13h15-14h30 Break (lunch not included) Break (lunch not included)
14h30-16h00
BUILDING FUTURES' SCENARIOS
- Introduction 
(Fiona Lickorish)
- Analysis of the key-drivers and respective connections
(Fiona Lickorish + specialists + Work ing groups)
16h00-16h20 Coffe-Break Coffe-Break
16h20-18h00
-  Presentation of exisitng methodologies
(Fiona Lickorish)
- Analysis of the key-drivers and respective connections
(Fiona Lickorish + specialists + Work ing groups)
18h00-18h15 Closing remarks Closing remarks
BUILDING FUTURES' SCENARIOS (cont.)
-  key-drivers presentation and validation
(Fiona Lickorish + specialists + Work ing groups)
NOTE: Working group discussions will be supported and oriented by Prof. Simon Pollard and other specialists.
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2. PARTICIPANTS 
 
3. WORKING GROUPS – DAY #1 
 
Risk Managers Risk Experts
Joaquim José Nunes Sereno <jsereno@epal.pt> Nuno Medeiros
José Salgueiro
 Luis Manuel de Lemos Branco <luisbran@epal.pt> Helena Silva
Diana Constant
Cláudia André
 Francisco F.S. Serranito <fserrani@epal.pt> Maria João Capela
Francisco Braga
Nuno Reis
 José Fernando Crisóstomo Figueira <JoseFigueira@epal.pt> Marco Santos
Helena Saraiva
 Mário Jorge Santos Maria <mariom@epal.pt> Sérgio Rodrigues
Guilherme Hora
 Maria João Araujo Gouveia Benoliel <mjbenol@epal.pt> Rui Neves Carneiro
Sofia Damião
 Anita Lourenço Bento Ferreira <aferreir@epal.pt> Joaquim Broes
 Barnabé Pisco <barnabep@epal.pt> Alberto Martins
 Marcos Miguel António Matos
 Conceição Almeida <conceal@epal.pt> Ana Amélia
Ricardo Silva
 Paulo Marco C. Rodrigues <paulord@epal.pt> Carlos Gonçalves
 José Manuel Oliveira Zenha <Jose.Zenha@epal.pt> -----
 Bruno Cortes Lopes <blopes@epal.pt> Bruno Lopes
Carlos Saraiva Ivo Joaquim
Paula Serrinha
Anita Ferreira António Matos
Joaquim Broes Luis Branco José Zenha Helena Silva
Paula Rodrigues Cláudia André Helena Saraiva Carlos saraiva
Marcos Miguel Bruno Lopes Diana Constant Ivo Joaquim 
Francisco Braga Maria João Capela Barnabé Pisco Carlos Gonçalves
Maria João BenolielLuis Bucha Mário Maria Marcos Sá
Rui Neves Carneiro Sérgio Rodrigues Guilherme Hora João Mugeiro
Sofia Damião Alberto Martins Francisco Serranito C. Vieira Gomes
Marco Santos Ana Amélia Andrew Donnelly Ricardo Silva
Joaquim Sereno Conceição Almeida
Nuno Medeiros Paula Serrinha
José Salgueiro José Figueira
Paulo Rodrigues Nuno Reis
SUSTAINABILITY PROFITABILITY 
QUALITY
REPUTATION
QUANTITY
RELIABILITY
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4. WORKING GROUPS – DAY #2 
 
5. INFLUENCE DIAGRAM (A1 FORMAT) COLOURED ACCORDING TO 
LIKELIHOOD OF EVENTS, EXPOSURES AND RISKS 
Not suitable to be shown here, due to its size. It is similar to Figure 6-5 in the 
main document, but without a full characterization of the existing barriers. Each 
group was given one A1 sheet.  
6. EVENTS, EXPOSURES AND HARMS’ RECORDS 
1 
Competition in water supply  
Event 
Municipalities may start producing their own water (in case the price of 
water gets too high for them, for example). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
- 
Impact on: 
6 - Loss of monopoly (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Contractual safeguards ( _____ ) --> 6 
- Competitive advantadges ( ____ ) --> 6 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
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2 
Non-revenue from municipal clients  
Event 
Municipal clients do not pay their water bills either because they cannot afford 
them or because they do not want to (litigation). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1) 
Taking into account the economic and financial situation of Portugal. 
Impact on: 
7 - Inability to cope with high fixed costs 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Other markets ( _____ ) --> 7 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
3 
Inadequate long-term planning  
Event 
Long-term planning does not anticipate assets' needs or demand evolution, 
leading to bad resource allocation (maintenance, rehabilitation) or inadequate 
assets' design (over or undercapacity of the assets). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1) 
The existing Master Plan may not be perfect ("How far will the decrease in 
the consumption go?"), but it might be compensated by the increase in the 
knowledge about the assets that has been occurring. The planning is not 
rigid, and to a certain extent it can be adjusted in face of reality. 
Impact on: 
8 - Bad resource allocation (Exposure) 
20 - Decrease in sales (Exposure) 
49 - Undercapacity of the assets 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Periodic review ( _____ ) --> 8, 20, 49 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
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4 
Inadequate relationship with banks  
Event 
Due to a bad reputation or to a bad financial health of EPAL, banks do not 
trust EPAL's capacity to pay the loans. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Very Low to Low (1/10000 - 1/100) 
"EPAL has a very good relationship with EIB". 
Impact on: 
9 - Lack of financing (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Build trusty relations ( _____ ) --> 9 
- Diverse banks ( _____ ) --> 9 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
5 
Changes in politics/economy  
Event 
There is a lack of stability in politics/economy that may adversly impact the 
financing capacity as well as the operational costs of EPAL. Uncertainty about 
future is high. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
9 - Lack of financing (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Anticipate changes ( _____ ) --> 9 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
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6 
Loss of monopoly  
Exposure 
 
Influenced by: 
1 - Competition in water supply (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Contractual safeguards ( _____ ) --> 6 
- Competitive advantadges ( ____ ) --> 6  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
 
Impact on: 
10 - Loss of market share (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
7 
Inability to cope with high fixed costs  
Exposure 
 
Influenced by: 
2 - Non-revenue from municipal clients 
(Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Other markets ( _____ ) --> 7  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
11 - Difficulties in raising self-capital 
(Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 197 
8 
Bad resource allocation  
Exposure 
Continuosly bad resource allocation, so that sustainability might be 
compromised. 
Influenced by: 
3 - Inadequate long-term planning (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Periodic review ( _____ ) --> 8, 20, 49  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
 
Impact on: 
12 - Excessive rehabilitation / 
maintenance needs (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
 
9 
Lack of financing  
Exposure 
There is no financing to EPAL, due either to a bad relationship with banks or 
to changes in Politics/Economy. 
Influenced by: 
4 - Inadequate relationship with banks 
(Event) 
5 - Changes in politics/economy (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Build trusty relations ( _____ ) --> 9 
- Diverse banks ( _____ ) --> 9 
- Anticipate changes ( _____ ) --> 9  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
13 - Inability to meet investment needs 
(AM best practices) (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Use cash flow (self-financing) ( _____ ) --> 13 
- Retained earnings ( _____ ) --> 13 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
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10 
Loss of market share  
Harm 
 
Influenced by: 
6 - Loss of monopoly (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
-  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
11 
Difficulties in raising self-capital  
Harm 
 
Influenced by: 
7 - Inability to cope with high fixed costs 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
-  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
12 
Excessive rehabilitation / maintenance needs  
Harm 
Assets' condition and performance are such that the ammount of CAPEX and 
OPEX needed for the system to operate are so high that might compromise 
business sustainability. 
Influenced by: 
8 - Bad resource allocation (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
-  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
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13 
Inability to meet investment needs (AM best practices)  
Harm 
The capacity to invest in new assets or in the renewal of the existing ones is 
not enough to cope with all the needs. 
Influenced by: 
9 - Lack of financing (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Use cash flow (self-financing) ( _____ ) --> 13 
- Retained earnings ( _____ ) --> 13  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
14 
Increase in the price of energy  
Event 
Energy is the highest operational cost of the company, and its price has been 
increasing over the last years. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
18 - High dependence on energy supply 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
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15 
Regulation - Lack of rule making  
Event 
The regulatory model for EPAL is explained by rules and codes that are not 
sufficient to clarify what is expected from EPAL. Consequently, it is not clear 
the way how profitability should be evaluated as well as the way tariffs are 
approved by the regulator. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
19 - Inadequate guidance regarding 
profitability (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Discuss models with Regulator ( _____ ) --> 
19 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
16 
Limitations in setting tariffs  
Event 
Tariffs cannot be increased regardless the surplus that may be needed to 
cope with the fixed costs, due to  regulation constraints. It depends upon a 
political decision. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
20 - Decrease in sales (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Lobbying ( _____ ) --> 20 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
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17 
Consumption decrease  
Event 
Decrease in consumption of the actual customers, due to either change of 
practices, economic constraints or to a reduction in their water losses (for 
municipal or multimunicipal clients). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
21 - Overcapacity of the assets 
(Exposure) 
22 - OPEX increase (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- New clients ( _____ ) --> 21, 22 
- Increase market share ( _____ ) --> 21, 22 
- Contractual safeguards ( _____ ) --> 22 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
18 
High dependence on energy supply  
Exposure 
The water supply system of EPAL is designed in such a way that energy is 
needed not only to abstract water from all of the current sources (superficial 
and urderground) but also to deliver it to the customers. 
Influenced by: 
14 - Increase in the price of energy 
(Event) 
with the following barriers: 
-  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
22 - OPEX increase (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increase efficiency ( _____ ) --> 22 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
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19 
Inadequate guidance regarding profitability  
Exposure 
The regulatory model for EPAL is explained by rules and codes that are not 
sufficient to clarify what is expected from EPAL. Consequently, it is not clear 
the way how profitability should be evaluated as well as the way tariffs are 
approved by the regulator. 
Influenced by: 
15 - Regulation - Lack of rule making 
(Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Discuss models with Regulator ( _____ ) --> 
19  
Probability class:  High (1/10 - 1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
23 - Bad decisions from Regulator (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Shared goals with regulator ( _____ ) --> 23 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
20 
Decrease in sales  
Exposure 
Decrease in sales for the actual clients. 
Influenced by: 
15 - Regulation - Lack of rule making 
(Event) 
16 - Limitations in setting tariffs (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Discuss models with Regulator ( _____ ) --> 
19  
Probability class:  High to Certain (1/10 - 1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
23 - Bad decisions from Regulator (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
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21 
Overcapacity of the assets  
Exposure 
Assets had been designed taking into account an estimated level in demand 
that has proven to be excessive in the present (due to an inadequate planning 
or to a decrease in the consumption). 
Influenced by: 
3 - Inadequate long-term planning (Event) 
17 - Consumption decrease (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- New clients ( _____ ) --> 21, 22 
- Increase market share ( _____ ) --> 21, 22 
- Periodic review ( _____ ) --> 9, 21, 52  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
25 - High temperatures / dry weather 
(Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices ( _____ ) --> 25 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
22 
OPEX increase  
Harm 
Operational costs may increase due to the increase on the different parcels 
that contribute to it, namely external supplies and services (FSE), including 
energy. 
Influenced by: 
18 - High dependence on energy supply 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increase efficiency ( _____ ) --> 22  
Probability class:  High (1/10 - 1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Innovation 
- Increase overall efficiency 
- Other markets 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
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23 
Bad decisions from Regulator  
Harm 
The regulatory model for EPAL is explained by rules and codes that are not 
sufficient to clarify what is expected from EPAL. Consequently, it is not clear 
the way how profitability should be evaluated as well as the way tariffs are 
approved by the regulator. 
Influenced by: 
19 - Inadequate guidance regarding 
profitability (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Shared goals with regulator ( _____ ) --> 23  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Other markets 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
24 
Difficulties in obtaining return on investments  
Harm 
Difficulties result from a decrease in sales and from an overcapacity of the 
assets, that were designed to supply higher levels of demand. It should be 
noted, though, that ROI is not always easy to be measured. 
Influenced by: 
21 - Overcapacity of the assets 
(Exposure) 
20 - Decrease in sales (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
-  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Other markets 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
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25 
High temperatures / dry weather  
Event 
The increase in the number of days per year with high temperatures (T>30 
ºC) in dry weather may lead to a degradation of water quality in the superficial 
water sources (considering that pollution loads are as usual for that season). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
It happened last summer in Valada-Tejo. 
Impact on: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement ( _____ ) --> 31 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
 
26 
Radioactivity (Problems at Almaraz)  
Event 
Problems at Almaraz - nuclear power plant is located ≈100 km upstream the 
boarder Portugal/Spain, on the bank of Tagus river. If an accident occurs, 
water may be contaminated either by propagation of the nuclear radiation by 
air or by the river. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100) 
A study is undergoing to find out more about this subject. 
Impact on: 
28 - Diffuse pollution (Event) 
29 – Point source pollution (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement ( _____ ) --> 28 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
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27 
Forest fires  
Event 
The land use around C.Bode is mostly comprised by forest areas, many of 
which usually are set on fire on the summer seasons. If the magnitude and 
location of the burnt areas are such that ashes get into the reservoir (either 
via atmosphere or following heavy rain episodes), the raw water quality may 
be affected by higher turbidity and HAPC (hydro carbonates). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  High (1/10 - 1/1) 
Until now, severity of the forest fires has been such that did not affect the 
treatment of water at Asseiceira. 
Impact on: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement ( _____ ) --> 32 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
 
28 
Diffuse pollution  
Event 
Diffuse pollution may occur in the watershed upstream the water sources or 
along the supply system. It may be due to agriculture practices (pesticides, 
nitrates, phosphates) or to cattle (organic matter, crypto, giardia). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
It is detected in raw water. 
Impact on: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement ( _____ ) --> 31 
- AM best practices ( _____ ) --> 32 
- Mix sources ( _____ ) --> 32 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
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29 
Point source pollution  
Event 
Point source pollution may occur in the watershed upstream water sources or 
along the supply system. It may be due to treated or untreated wastewater 
discharges, to spillage of dangerous substances or to the leaking from 
landfills or quarries. In the distribution system, it may also be due to 
contamination during maintenance actions. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
Wastewater is the major contribution. 
Impact on: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement ( _____ ) --> 31 
- AM best practices ( _____ ) --> 32 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
 
30 
Vandalism  
Event 
An act of vandalism within water supply system that may put in danger asset 
integrity or the safety of the delivered water quality. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
It has been occuring in the last years 
Impact on: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increased security ( _____ ) --> 31, 32, 40 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
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31 
Reduced water quality / contamination at sources  
Exposure 
Water quality at surface or underground sources may decrease due to natural 
or anthropogenic causes. Contaminants may be biological, chemical, toxic or 
radioactive. 
Influenced by: 
25 - High temperatures / dry weather 
(Event) 
26 - Radioactivity (Problems at Almaraz) 
(Event) 
27 - Forest fires (Event) 
28 - Diffuse pollution (Event) 
29 – Point source pollution (Event) 
30 - Vandalism (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement ( _____ ) --> 31 
- Increased security ( _____ ) --> 31, 32, 40  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
Due to the point source and diffuse pollution that occurs at Valada-Tejo, 
Ota and Alenquer.  
A recent study has shown that Panasqueira mines' landfill pose no threat to 
raw water quality at C.Bode. 
Impact on: 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- WTPs' efficiency ( _____ ) --> 32 
- Sources' diversification ( _____ ) --> 44,32 
- Increase system's flexibility ( _____ ) --> 44 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
Disruption in the water supply 
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32 
Reduced water quality / contamination in the Transport or Distribution 
system  
Exposure 
Water quality in the transport or distribution system  may decrease due to 
contamination from the source or directly in the supply system. This latter is 
specially relevant in Alviela and Tagus aqueducts (free surface flow) and 
mainly at Alviela (very bad condition; water pressure drains). It may also 
occur due to an overcapacity of the mains that lead to a decrease in the flow 
velocity. 
Influenced by: 
21 - Overcapacity of the assets 
(Exposure) 
28 - Diffuse pollution (Event) 
29 – Point source pollution (Event) 
30 - Vandalism (Event) 
34 - Inadequate AM practices / design / 
operation / maintenance (Event) 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contaminatimation at sources 
with the following barriers: 
- WTPs' efficiency ( _____ ) --> 32 
- Sources' diversification ( _____ ) --> 44,32 
- AM best practices ( _____ ) --> 32  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1) 
Vale da Pedra WTP is not so robust as Asseiciera WTP, but the mix of 
waters prove to be effective.  
Analysis to samples in the Transport or Distribution system indicate that 
direct contamination is not relevant, although Alviela aqueduct's 
vulnerability is very high.   
 
Impact on: 
33 - Presence of contaminants in the 
delivery points (biological, chemical, 
toxic, radioactive) (Harm) 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- PCQA ( _____ ) --> 33, 44 
- Online monitoring ( _____ ) --> 33, 44 
- Optimal location of disinfection points ( _____ 
) --> 33, 44 
- Increase system's flexibility ( _____ ) --> 44 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
Disruption in the water supply 
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33 
Presence of contaminants in the delivery points (biological, chemical, 
toxic, radioactive)  
Harm 
Presence of contaminants in the delivery points in such a way that may affect 
consumers health. 
Influenced by: 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- PCQA ( _____ ) --> 33, 44 
- Online monitoring ( _____ ) --> 33, 44 
- Optimal location of disinfection points ( _____ 
) --> 33, 44  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100) 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Business continuity (contigency plans) 
- PCQA 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
 
34 
Inadequate AM practices / design / operation / maintenance  
Event 
Inadequate AM practices / design / operation / maintenance due to poorly 
qualified workers, insufficient supervising or other control measures, financial 
or time constraints, etc. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  High (1/10 - 1/1) 
More than 200 employees are aged 55+ and there is no HR strategic plan. 
Government rules do not allow the recruitment of new people. 
Impact on: 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
40 - Critical assets' failure (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices ( _____ ) --> 40, 31 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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35 
Assets natural ageing  
Event 
EPAL's water supply system is comprised by recent sub-systems (ex.: 
C.Bode, Circunvalação, V.F.Xira-Telheiras, significant part of Distribution 
network) but also by old systems (Alviela, Tejo, part of Distribution network). 
The likelihood of failure of the latter is getting higher, although these are not 
the most critical infrastructures (with exception to V.Pedra WTP, which will 
soon be refurbished). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
MSc. thesis ―Forecasting the failure probability for water mains" (Padmraj 
Patil) evidences that failures in trunk mains will occur within the next 100 
years. 
Impact on: 
40 - Critical assets' failure (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices ( _____ ) --> 40 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
 
36 
Very bad weather conditions  
Event 
Bad or extreme events such as tornados and floods may destroy assets, 
contaminate water and/or affect power production and distribution. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
"Mini-tornados have been occurring in recent years". 
Impact on: 
40 - Critical assets' failure (Exposure) 
41 - Power outage (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Structural protection of the assets ( _____ ) --
> 40 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
 
  
 212 
37 
Failure in the suppliers' / contractors' / service  
Event 
Suppliers/contractors fail to meet agreed service due to economic, social or 
other reasons. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
EPAL has already experienced contractor's bankruptcy, due to the actual 
economic crisis. 
For some of the products, there is no stock. 
In some cases there is a high dependence on one supplier. 
The process is controlled  and stable, but there is a need to improve the 
process of evaluating the suppliers. 
Impact on: 
41 - Power outage (Exposure) 
42 - Dependence on supply of chemicals, 
materials, equipment, services 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Ready available alternatives ( _____ ) --> 41, 
42 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
 
38 
Strikes  
Event 
Occurence of strikes in EPAL. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
It has occured in the last years and the economic and financial crisis tend 
to increase the frequency of strikes. 
Impact on: 
43 - Insufficient human resources to 
operate the system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Minimum services guaranteed ( _____ ) --> 
43 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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39 
Pandemic  
Event 
 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Very Low (1/10000 - 1/1000) 
 
Impact on: with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
 
40 
Critical assets' failure  
Exposure 
Failure of the assets due to mechanical, electrical or structural problems. 
Influenced by: 
30 - Vandalism (Event) 
34 - Inadequate AM practices / design / 
operation / maintenance (Event) 
35 - Assets natural ageing (Event) 
36 - Tornados, floods, earthquakes 
(Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Structural protection of the assets ( _____ ) --
> 40 
- AM best practices ( _____ ) --> 40 
- Increased security ( _____ ) --> 31, 32, 40  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
 
Impact on: 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increase system's flexibility ( _____ ) --> 44 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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41 
Power outage  
Exposure 
Power outage may be caused by internal problems in the power supply 
system or be due to natural catastrophes. 
Influenced by: 
36 - Tornados, floods, earthquakes 
(Event) 
37 - Failure in the suppliers' / contractors' / 
service (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Ready available alternatives ( _____ ) --> 41, 
42  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
"A major natural catastrophe is due to happen in 50 years". 
Impact on: 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increase system's flexibility ( _____ ) --> 44 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
 
42 
Dependence on supply of chemicals, materials, equipment, services  
Exposure 
The system functionality is highly dependent on the supply of chemicals, 
materials, equipments and, in some cases, outsourced work force. 
Influenced by: 
37 - Failure in the suppliers' / contractors' / 
service (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Ready available alternatives ( _____ ) --> 41, 
42  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increase system's flexibility ( _____ ) --> 44 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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43 
Insufficient human resources to operate the system  
Exposure 
Unavailability of human resources in such a way that water supply system can 
not be operated, due to to social problems (demonstrations, strikes, etc.) or to 
pandemic. 
Influenced by: 
38 - Strikes (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Minimum services guaranteed ( _____ ) --> 
43  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1) 
Social tension is high, but awareness of EPAL's mission is also high. 
Impact on: 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increase system's flexibility ( _____ ) --> 44 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
 
44 
Critical infrastructures' unavailability for an extended period  
Harm 
Critical assets unavailability for an extended period, due to mechanical, 
electrical or structural failure, to lack of chemicals to treat water, to lack of 
people to operate the system, to a power outage or to the presence of 
contaminated water in the system. 
Influenced by: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
40 - Critical assets' failure (Exposure) 
41 - Power outage (Exposure) 
42 - Dependence on supply 
with the following barriers: 
- WTPs' efficiency ( ___ ) --> 44 
- PCQA ( _____ ) --> 33, 44 
- Online monitoring ( _____ ) --> 33, 44 
- Optimal location of disinfection points ( _____ 
) --> 33, 44 
- Sources' diversification ( ___ ) --> 44 
- Increase system's flexibility ( ___ ) --> 44  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Business continuity (contigency plans) 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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45 
Water losses increase  
Event 
Water losses (either in EPAL's system or in the distribution systems of the 
Municipal Clients) may increase due to ageing of the mains and to insufficient 
maintenance or renewal practices. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100) 
 
Impact on: 
50 - Increase in the demand (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
 
46 
Consumption increase  
Event 
Consumption may increase due to an increase in population or in economic 
activity. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Very Low (1/10000 - 1/1000) 
 
Impact on: 
50 - Increase in the demand (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Marketing ( _____ ) --> 50 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
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47 
Droughts / Capture in Spain  
Event 
Occurence of severe or extreme droughts, which may lead to retention of 
water in the Spanish basin of Tagus River. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100) 
Adaptaclima project foresees that extreme droughts will occur within the 
next 20 years, but C. Bode reservoir is very resilient and it will not happen 
during this hydrological year. 
Impact on: 
51 - Reduced water availability at sources 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
 
48 
High turbination or major works at C.Bode  
Event 
C.Bode reservoir is shared with EDP that uses it for electricity production. If 
the turbination lowers the water level below EPAL's intakes, EPAL will not be 
able to abstract water from that source. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100) 
It is safeguarded in EDP's concession contract with APA that they cannot 
turbinate below a level that compromises EPAL. 
Impact on: 
51 - Reduced water availability at sources 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Relation with EDP ( _____ ) --> 51 
- C.Bode reservoir management commission ( 
_____ ) --> 51 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
 
  
 218 
50 
Increase in the demand  
Exposure 
Increase in the demand (by actual clients) result from an effective increase in 
consumption and/or an increase in water losses. 
Influenced by: 
45 - Water losses increase (Event) 
46 - Consumption increase (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Very Low (1/10000 - 1/1000) 
 
Impact on: 
53 - Supply/Demand balance in deficit 
(Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
 
51 
Reduced water availability at sources  
Exposure 
Water availability at sources is reduced due to the occurence of droughts or, 
for C.Bode, problems at the dam/high turbination. 
Influenced by: 
47 - Droughts / Capture in Spain (Event) 
48 - High turbination or major works at 
C.Bode (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Relation with EDP ( _____ ) --> 51 
- C.Bode reservoir management commission ( 
_____ ) --> 51  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100) 
Adaptaclima project foresees that extreme droughts will occur within the 
next 20 years, but C. Bode reservoir is very resilient and it will not happen 
during this hydrological year.It is safeguarded in EDP's concession contract 
with APA that they cannot turbinate below a level that compromises EPAL. 
Impact on: 
53 - Supply/Demand balance in deficit 
(Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Sources' diversification ( _____ ) --> 53 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
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49 
Undercapacity of the assets  
Exposure 
Assets are underdesigned for the actual demand. 
Influenced by: 
3 - Inadequate long-term planning (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Very Low to Low (1/10000 - 1/100) 
 
Impact on: 
52 - Water doesn't flow from sources to 
the delivery points (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
 
52 
Water doesn't flow from sources to the delivery points  
Harm 
Assets are functioning but are not able to deliver the total demanded flow 
because of their undercapacity. 
Influenced by: 
49 - Undercapacity of the assets 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Very Low (1/10000 - 1/1000) 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Business continuity (contigency plans) 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
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53 
Supply/Demand balance in deficit  
Harm 
The demand for water exceeds the availability at sources. 
Influenced by: 
50 - Increase in the demand (Exposure) 
51 - Reduced water availability at sources 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100) 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Business continuity (contigency plans) 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
 
54 
Pipe bursts in Lisbon network (abbrev.)  
Event 
Pipe bursts occur every week in the distribution system. This can cause 
"brown water" to flow from taps (after the repair) and, in some cases, 
damages to private properties. Organoleptic issues may also arise from the 
operation conditions (low flow velocities). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
58 - Non compliance of organoleptic 
parameters (Exposure) 
59 - 3rd parties injured (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices ( _____ ) --> 58, 59 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
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55 
Fraud, non-compliance with Ethic Code  
Event 
Fraud or other actions that do not comply with EPAL's ethic code. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100) 
The mechanisms to avoid non-compliances with Ethic Code exist. 
Impact on: 
59 - 3rd parties injured (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
 
56 
Health and Safety of employees compromised  
Event 
Employees may be seriously injured (or killed) during their working activities. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
 
Impact on: 
59 - 3rd parties injured (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
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57 
Inadequate relationship with Unions / Media / Stakeholders  
Event 
An inadequate relationship with Unions/Media/Stakeholders may lead to an 
increse in the release of defaming news. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
It has happened in the past. 
Impact on: 
60 - Power to influence public opinion 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
 
58 
Non compliance of organoleptic parameters  
Exposure 
Organoleptic parameters (colour, smell, taste) may be beyond the required 
level. 
Influenced by: 
54 - Pipe bursts in Lisbon network 
(abbrev.) (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices ( _____ ) --> 58, 59  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100) 
Number of claims is low. 
Impact on: 
61 - Public opinion damage (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Information to the customers ( _____ ) --> 61 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
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59 
3rd parties injured  
Exposure 
3rd parties may be injured due to the occurence of pipe bursts, non-
compliance with ethical code or health and safety failure. 
Influenced by: 
54 - Pipe bursts in Lisbon network 
(abbrev.) (Event) 
55 - Fraud, non-compliance with Ethic 
Code (Event) 
56 - Health and Safety of employees 
compromised (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices ( _____ ) --> 58, 59  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
Mainly due to pipe bursts in Lisbon. 
Impact on: 
61 - Public opinion damage (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Adequate compensation policy ( _____ ) --> 
61 
- Re-enforcement of positive image ( _____ ) --
> 61 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
 
60 
Power to influence public opinion  
Exposure 
Unions, media and stakeholders have the power to influence public opinion, 
through the release of defaming news. 
Influenced by: 
57 - Inadequate relationship with Unions / 
Media / Stakeholders (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Certain (1/1) 
 
Impact on: 
61 - Public opinion damage (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Re-enforcement of positive image ( _____ ) --
> 61 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
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61 
Public opinion damage  
Harm 
Damage in public opinion may arise from "direct causes" (non-compliance 
with organolectic parameters, 3rd parties injured, inadequate relationship with 
syndicates and media) or "indirect causes" (failure to achieve each of the 
other strategic objectives). 
Influenced by: 
60 - Power to influence public opinion 
(Exposure) 
59 - 3rd parties injured (Exposure) 
58 - Non compliance of organoleptic 
parameters (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Adequate compensation policy ( _____ ) --> 
61 
- Information to the customers ( _____ ) --> 61 
- Re-enforcement of positive image ( _____ ) --
> 61  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10) 
The range is due to the contribution of both "direct" and "indirect causes". 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Re-enforcement of positive image 
- Contingency plans 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
 
100 
Inadequate governance  
Risk factor 
Inadequate governance may be due to an excessive interference of the 
Government in EPAL's management. It has effects on the image 
(identification of EPAL with the image of the public sector in general), on the 
approval of investments, on the salaries and EPAL's capacity to capture 
talent, etc. (Profitability), etc. 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
Probability class:   
 
Impact on: with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
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101 
Lack of communication  
Risk factor 
Lack of communication between people (especially from different 
departments) may lead to several inefficiencies in the processes. It affects 
profitability (unoptimized working processes) and may affect the disruption in 
the supply or the health and safety of employees. 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
Probability class:   
 
Impact on: with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
 
102 
Poor HR practices  
Risk factor 
Poor HR practices result from difficulties in capturing talent to the company; in 
ensuring that knowledge transfer is made when employees get retired or 
move to another company; and also in renewing "minds" in the company 
("familiar dynasties"). This directly affects AM practices. 
 
NOTE:  >200 / 700 employees are aged 55+ 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
Probability class:   
 
Impact on: with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
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103 
Legal non-compliance  
Risk factor 
Non-compliance with current legislation. It affects reputation and trust. 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
Probability class:   
 
Impact on: with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
 
104 
Inadequate data/information  
Risk factor 
Inadequate data or information about the different subjects of the company - 
namely the assets - leads to an increase in the innefficiency of the processes 
and to bad decision-making (affects Profitability). 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
Probability class:   
 
Impact on: with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
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Appendix G – Validation workshop main outcomes: 
revised events, exposure and harms’ records and 
narratives  
1. REVISED RECORDS 
1 
Competition in water supply  
Event 
Municipalities may start producing their own water (in case the price of water 
gets too high for them, for example) 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                    Confidence: High 
- 
Impact on: 
6 - Loss of monopoly (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Contractual safeguards (E=3, V=4, NC) --> 6 
- Competitive advantadges (E=2, V=2, C) --> 6 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
2 
Non-revenue from municipal clients  
Event 
Municipal clients do not pay their water bills either because they cannot afford 
them or because they do not want to (litigation). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1)          Confidence: Moderate 
Taking into account the economic and financial situation of Portugal. 
Impact on: 
7 - Inability to cope with high fixed costs 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Quality of service (E=2, V=3, C) --> 7 
- Monitor customer debt (E=5, V=5, NC) --> 7 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
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3 
Inadequate long-term planning  
Event 
Long-term planning does not anticipate assets' needs or demand evolution, 
leading to bad resource allocation (maintenance, rehabilitation) or inadequate 
assets' design (over or undercapacity of the assets). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1)             Confidence: Moderate 
The existing Master Plan may not be perfect ("How far will the decrease in 
the consumption go?"), but it might be compensated by the increase in the 
knowledge about the assets that has been occurring. The planning is not 
rigid, and to a certain extent it can be adjusted in face of reality. 
Impact on: 
8 - Bad resource allocation (Exposure) 
21 - Overcapacity of the assets 
(Exposure) 
49 - Undercapacity of the assets 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Periodic review (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 8, 21, 49 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
4 
Inadequate relationship with banks  
Event 
Due to a bad reputation or to a bad financial health of EPAL, banks do not 
trust EPAL's capacity to pay the loans. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Very Low to Low (1/10000 - 1/100)   Confidence: High 
"EPAL has a very good relationship with EIB". 
Impact on: 
9 - Lack of financing (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Build trusty relations (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 9 
- Diverse banks (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 9 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
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5 
Changes in politics/economy  
Event 
There is a lack of stability in politics/economy that may adversly impact the 
financing capacity as well as the operational costs of EPAL. Uncertainty about 
future is high. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                    Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
9 - Lack of financing (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Anticipate changes (E=4, V=4, NC) --> 9 
- Diverse banks (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 9 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
6 
Loss of monopoly  
Exposure 
 
Influenced by: 
1 - Competition in water supply (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Contractual safeguards (E=3, V=4, NC) --> 6 
- Competitive advantadges (E=2, V=2, C) --> 6  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                            Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
10 - Loss of market share (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
 230 
7 
Inability to cope with high fixed costs  
Exposure 
 
Influenced by: 
2 - Non-revenue from municipal clients 
(Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Quality of service (E=2, V=3, C) --> 7 
- Monitor customer debt (E=5, V=5, NC) --> 7  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1)              Confidence: Low 
 
Impact on: 
11 - Difficulties in raising self-capital 
(Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
8 
Bad resource allocation  
Exposure 
Continuosly bad resource allocation, so that sustainability might be 
compromised. 
Influenced by: 
3 - Inadequate long-term planning (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Periodic review (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 8, 21, 49  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                            Confidence: Moderate 
 
Impact on: 
12 - Excessive rehabilitation / 
maintenance needs (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
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9 
Lack of financing  
Exposure 
There is no financing to EPAL, due either to a bad relationship with banks or 
to changes in Politics/Economy. 
Influenced by: 
4 - Inadequate relationship with banks 
(Event) 
5 - Changes in politics/economy (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Build trusty relations (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 9 
- Diverse banks (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 9 
- Anticipate changes (E=4, V=4, NC) --> 9 
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                            Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
13 - Inability to meet investment needs 
(AM best practices) (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Use cash flow (self-financing) (E=2, V=1, NC) 
--> 13 
- Retained earnings (E=2, V=1, NC) --> 13 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
10 
Loss of market share  
Harm 
 
Influenced by: 
6 - Loss of monopoly (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
-  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                            Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
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11 
Difficulties in raising self-capital  
Harm 
 
Influenced by: 
7 - Inability to cope with high fixed costs 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
-  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1)               Confidence: Moderate 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
12 
Excessive rehabilitation / maintenance needs  
Harm 
Assets' condition and performance are such that the ammount of CAPEX and 
OPEX needed for the system to operate are so high that might compromise 
business sustainability. 
Influenced by: 
8 - Bad resource allocation (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
-  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                            Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
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13 
Inability to meet investment needs (AM best practices)  
Harm 
The capacity to invest in new assets or in the renewal of the existing ones is 
not enough to cope with all the needs. 
Influenced by: 
9 - Lack of financing (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Use cash flow (self-financing) (E=2, V=1, NC) 
--> 13 
- Retained earnings (E=2, V=1, NC) --> 13  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100)                                  Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 
14 
Increase in the price of energy  
Event 
Energy is the highest operational cost of the company, and its price has been 
increasing over the last years. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                    Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
18 - High dependence on energy supply 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
 234 
15 
Economic Regulation - Lack of rule making  
Event 
The regulatory model for EPAL is explained by rules and codes that are not 
sufficient to clarify what is expected from EPAL. Consequently, it is not clear 
the way how profitability should be evaluated as well as the way tariffs are 
approved by the regulator. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                    Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
19 - Insufficient  guidance in economic 
regulation (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Competitive advantages (E=2, V=2, NC) --> 
19 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
16 
Limitations in setting tariffs  
Event 
Tariffs cannot be increased regardless the surplus that may be needed to 
cope with the fixed costs, due to  regulation constraints. It depends upon a 
political decision. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                     Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
20 - Decrease in sales (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Discuss with regulator (E=2/3, V=3, C) --> 20 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
 235 
17 
Consumption decrease  
Event 
Decrease in consumption of the actual customers, due to either change of 
practices, economics constraints or to a reduction in their water losses (for 
municipal or multimunicipal clients). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                    Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
21 - Overcapacity of the assets 
(Exposure) 
20 - Decrease in sales (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- New clients (E=5, V=5, NC) --> 21, 20 
- Increase market share (E=5, V=5, NC) --> 21, 
20 
- Contractual safeguards (E=5, V=5, NC) --> 20 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
18 
High dependence on energy supply  
Exposure 
The water supply system of EPAL is designed in such a way that energy is 
needed not only to abstract water from all of the current sources (superficial 
and urderground) but also to deliver it to the customers. 
Influenced by: 
14 - Increase in the price of energy 
(Event) 
with the following barriers: 
-  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                    Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
22 - OPEX increase (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increase efficiency (E=4, V=4, NC) --> 22 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
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19 
Insufficient  guidance in economic regulation  
Exposure 
The regulatory model for EPAL is explained by rules and codes that are not 
sufficient to clarify what is expected from EPAL. Consequently, it is not clear 
the way how profitability should be evaluated as well as the way tariffs are 
approved by the regulator. 
Influenced by: 
15 - Economic Regulation - Lack of rule 
making (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Competitive advantages (E=2, V=2, NC) --> 
19  
Probability class:  High (1/10 - 1/1)                                             Confidence: Moderate 
 
Impact on: 
23 - Negative impact from economic 
regulation (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Discuss with Regulator (E=2/3, V=3, C) --> 23 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
20 
Decrease in sales  
Exposure 
Decrease in sales for the actual clients 
Influenced by: 
16 - Limitations in setting tariffs (Event) 
17 - Consumption decrease (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Discuss with regulator (E=2/3, V=3, C) --> 20 
- New clients (E=5, V=5, NC) --> 21, 20 
- Increase market share (E=5, V=5, NC) --> 21, 
20 
- Contractual safeguards (E=5, V=5, NC) --> 20  
Probability class:  High to Certain (1/10 - 1/1)                     Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
24 - Difficulties in obtaining return on 
investments (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
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21 
Overcapacity of the assets  
Exposure 
Assets had been designed taking into account na estimated level in demand 
that has proven to be excessive in the present (due to an inadequated 
planning or to a decrease in the consumption). 
Influenced by: 
3 - Inadequate long-term planning (Event) 
17 - Consumption decrease (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- New clients (E=5, V=5, NC) --> 21, 22 
- Increase market share (E=5, V=5, NC) --> 21, 
22 
- Periodic review (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 9, 21, 52  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1)               Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
24 - Difficulties in obtaining return on 
investments (Harm) 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices (E=3, V=4, C) --> 24, 32 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
22 
OPEX increase  
Harm 
Operational costs may increase due to the increase on the different parcels 
that contribute to it, namely external supplies and services (FSE), including 
energy. 
Influenced by: 
18 - High dependence on energy supply 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increase efficiency (E=4, V=4, NC) --> 22  
Probability class:  High (1/10 - 1/1)                                            Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increase efficiency (E=4, V=4, NC) 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
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23 
Negative impact from economic regulation  
Harm 
The regulatory model for EPAL is explained by rules and codes that are not 
sufficient to clarify what is expected from EPAL. Consequently, it is not clear 
the way how profitability should be evaluated as well as the way tariffs are 
approved by the regulator. 
Influenced by: 
19 - Insufficient  guidance in economic 
regulation (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Discuss with Regulator (E=2/3, V=3, C) --> 23  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1)               Confidence: Moderate 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
 
24 
Difficulties in obtaining return on investments  
Harm 
Difficulties result from a decrease in sales and from an overcapacity of the 
assets, that were designed to supply higher levels of demand. It should be 
noted, though, that ROI is not always easy to be measured. 
Influenced by: 
21 - Overcapacity of the assets 
(Exposure) 
20 - Decrease in sales (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices (E=3, V=4, C) --> 24, 32  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                             Confidence: Moderate 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Profitability compromised 
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25 
High temperatures / dry weather  
Event 
The increase in the number of days per year with high temperatures (T>30 
ºC) in dry weather may lead to a degradation of water quality in the superficial 
water sources (considering that pollution loads are as usual for that season). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                     Confidence: High 
It happened last summer in Valada-Tejo. 
Impact on: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement (E=5, V=n/a, NC) -
-> 31 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
 
26 
Radioactivity (Problems at Almaraz)  
Event 
Problems at Almaraz - nuclear power plant is located ≈100 km upstream the 
boarder Portugal/Spain, on the bank of Tagus river. If an accident occurs, 
water may be contaminated either by propagation of the nuclear radiation by 
air or by the river. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100)                                    Confidence: Moderate 
A study is undergoing to find out more about this subject. 
Impact on: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement (E=5, V=n/a, NC) -
-> 31 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
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27 
Forest fires  
Event 
The land use around C.Bode is mostly comprised by forest areas, many of 
which usually are set on fire on the summer seasons. If the magnitude and 
location of the burnt areas are such that ashes get into the reservoir (either 
via atmosphere or following  heavy rain episodes), the raw water quality may 
be affected by higher turbidity and HAPC (hydrocarbonates). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  High (1/10 - 1/1)                                             Confidence: Moderate 
Until now, severity of the forest fires has been such that did not affect the 
treatment of water at Asseiceira. 
Impact on: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement (E=5, V=n/a, NC) -
-> 31 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
 
28 
Diffuse pollution  
Event 
Difuse pollution may occur in the watershed upstream the water sources or 
along the supply system. It may be due to agriculture practices (pesticides, 
nitrates, phosphates) or to cattle (organic matter, crypto, giardia). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                     Confidence: High 
It is detected in raw water. 
Impact on: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement (E=5, V=n/a, NC) -
-> 31 
- Protected perimeters (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 31 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, C) --> 32 
- On line monitoring (E=1, V=1, C) --> 32 
- PCQA (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 32 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
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29 
Point source pollution  
Event 
Point source pollution may occur in the watershed upstream water sources or 
along the supply system. It may be due to treated or untreated wastewater 
discharges, to spillage of dangerous substances or to the leaking from 
landfills or quarries. In the distribution system, it may also be due to 
contamination during maintenance actions. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                     Confidence: High 
Wastewater is the major contribution. 
Impact on: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement (E=5, V=n/a, NC) -
-> 31 
- Protected perimeters (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 31 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, C) --> 32 
- On line monitoring (E=1, V=1, C) --> 32 
- PCQA (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 32 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
 
30 
Vandalism  
Event 
An act of vandalism within water supply system that may put in danger asset 
integrity or the safety of the delivered water quality. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                     Confidence: High 
It has been occuring in the last years 
Impact on: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
40 - Critical assets' failure (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increased security (E=3, V=5, NC) --> 31, 32, 
40 
- On line monitoring (E=1, V=1, C) --> 32 
- PCQA (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 32 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
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31 
Reduced water quality / contamination at sources  
Exposure 
Water quality at surface or underground sources may decrease due to natural 
or anthropogenic causes. Contaminants may be biological, chemical, toxic or 
radioactive. 
Influenced by: 
25 - High temperatures / dry weather 
(Event) 
26 - Radioactivity (Problems at Almaraz) 
(Event) 
27 - Forest fires (Event) 
28 - Diffuse pollution (Event) 
29 – Point source pollution (Event) 
30 - Vandalism (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement (E=5, V=n/a, NC) -
-> 31 
- Protected perimeters (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 31 
- Increased security (E=3, V=5, NC) --> 31, 32, 
40  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                    Confidence: High 
Due to the point source and diffuse pollution that occurs at Valada-Tejo, 
Ota and Alenquer.  
A recent study has shown that Panasqueira mines' landfill pose no threat to 
raw water quality at C.Bode. 
Impact on: 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- WTPs' efficiency (E=1, V=1, C) --> 44,32 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, C) --> 32 
- PCQA (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 32 
- On line monitoring (E=1, V=1, C) --> 32 
- Sources' diversification (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 
44,32 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
Disruption in the water supply 
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32 
Reduced water quality / contamination in the Transport or Distribution 
system  
Exposure 
Water quality in the transport or distribution system  may decrease due to 
contamination from the source or directly in the supply system. This latter is 
specially relevant in Alviela and Tagus aqueducts (free surface flow) and 
mainly at Alviela (very bad condition; water pressure drains). It may also 
occur due to an overcapacity of the mains that lead to a decrease in the flow 
velocity. 
Influenced by: 
21 - Overcapacity of the assets 
(Exposure) 
28 - Diffuse pollution (Event) 
29 – Point source pollution (Event) 
30 - Vandalism (Event) 
34 - Inadequate AM practices / design / 
operation / maintenance (Event) 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources  
with the following barriers: 
- WTPs' efficiency (E=1, V=1, C) --> 32,44 
- Sources' diversification (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 
44,32 
- PCQA (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 32 
- On line monitoring (E=1, V=1, C) --> 32 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, C) --> 32  
Probability class:  Moderate to High (1/100 -1/1)               Confidence: High 
Vale da Pedra WTP is not so robust as Asseiciera WTP, but the mix of 
waters prove to be effective.  
Analysis to samples in the Transport or Distribution system indicate that 
direct contamination is not relevant, although Alviela aqueduct's 
vulnerability is very high.   
 
Impact on: 
33 - Presence of contaminants in the 
delivery points (biological, chemical, 
toxic, radioactive) (Harm) 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- PCQA (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 33, 44 
- Online monitoring (E=1, V=1, C) --> 33, 44 
- Optimal location of disinfection points (E=1, 
V=1, NC) --> 33, 44 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, C) --> 33 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
Disruption in the water supply 
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33 
Presence of contaminants in the delivery points (biological, chemical, 
toxic, radioactive)  
Harm 
Presence of contaminants in the delivery points in such a way that may affect 
consumers health. 
Influenced by: 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- PCQA (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 33, 44 
- Online monitoring (E=1, V=1, C) --> 33, 44 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, C) --> 33 
- Optimal location of disinfection points (E=1, 
V=1, NC) --> 33, 44  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100)                                   Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Business continuity - contigency plans (E=5, 
V=n/a, NC) 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quality supplied 
 
34 
Inadequate AM practices / design / operation / maintenance  
Event 
Inadequate AM practices / design / operation / maintenance due to poorly 
qualified workers, insufficient supervising or other control measures, financial 
or time constraints, etc. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  High (1/10 - 1/1)                                             Confidence: High 
More than 200 employees are aged 55+ and there is no HR strategic plan. 
Government rules do not allow the recruitment of new people. 
Impact on: 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
40 - Critical assets' failure (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, C) --> 40, 32 
- On line monitoring (E=1, V=1, C) --> 32 
- PCQA (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 32 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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35 
Assets natural ageing  
Event 
EPAL's water supply system is comprised by recent sub-systems (ex.: 
C.Bode, Circunvalação, V.F.Xira-Telheiras, significant part of Distribution 
network) but also by old systems (Alviela, Tejo, part of Distribution network). 
The likelihood of failure of the latter is getting higher, although these are not 
the most critical infrastructures (with exception to V.Pedra WTP, which will 
soon be refurbished). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                             Confidence: High 
MSc. thesis ―Forecasting the failure probability for water mains" (Padmraj 
Patil) evidences that failures in trunk mains will occur within the next 100 
years. 
Impact on: 
40 - Critical assets' failure (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, C) --> 40 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
 
36 
Very bad weather conditions  
Event 
Bad or extreme events such as tornados and floods may destroy assets, 
contaminate water and/or affect power production and distribution. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  High (1/10 - 1/1)                                              Confidence: Moderate 
"Mini-tornados have been occurring in recent years". 
Impact on: 
40 - Critical assets' failure (Exposure) 
41 - Power / telecommunications outage 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Structural protection of the assets (E=3, V=3, 
NC) --> 40 
- Stakeholders engagement (E=3, V=3, C) --> 
41 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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37 
Failure in the suppliers' / contractors' / service  
Event 
Suppliers/contractors fail to meet agreed service due to economic, social or 
other reasons. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                     Confidence: High 
EPAL has already experienced contractor's bankruptcy, due to the actual 
economic crisis. 
For some of the products, there is no stock. 
In some cases there is a high dependence on one supplier. 
The process is controlled  and stable, but there is a need to improve the 
process of evaluating the suppliers. 
Impact on: 
41 - Power / telecommunications outage 
(Exposure) 
42 - Dependence on supply of chemicals, 
materials, equipment, services 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Ready available alternatives (E=5, V=5, C) --> 
41, 42 
- Stakeholders engagement (E=3, V=3, C) --> 
41 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
 
38 
Strikes  
Event 
Occurence of strikes in EPAL. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                     Confidence: High 
It has occured in the last years and the economic and financial crisis tend 
to increase the frequency of strikes. 
Impact on: 
43 - Insufficient human resources to 
operate the system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Minimum services guaranteed (E=1, V=3, C) -
-> 43 
- Equipment automation (E=3, V=3, NC) --> 43 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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39 
Pandemic  
Event 
 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Very Low (1/10000 - 1/1000)                   Confidence: Moderate 
 
Impact on: 
43 - Insufficient human resources to 
operate the system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Equipment automation (E=3, V=3, NC) --> 43 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
 
40 
Critical assets' failure  
Exposure 
Failure of the assets due to mechanical, electrical or structural problems. 
Influenced by: 
30 - Vandalism (Event) 
34 - Inadequate AM practices / design / 
operation / maintenance (Event) 
35 - Assets natural ageing (Event) 
36 - Very bad weather conditions (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Structural protection of the assets (E=3, V=3, 
NC) --> 40 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, C) --> 40 
- Increased security (E=3, V=5, NC) --> 31, 32, 
40  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                              Confidence: Moderate 
 
Impact on: 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increase system's flexibility (E=3, V=5, C) --> 
44 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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41 
Power / telecommunications outage  
Exposure 
Power outage may be caused by internal problems in the power supply 
system or be due to natural capastrophes. 
Influenced by: 
36 - Very bad weather conditions (Event) 
37 - Failure in the suppliers' / contractors' / 
service (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders engagement (E=3, V=3, C) --> 
41 
- Ready available alternatives (E=5, V=5, C) --> 
41, 42  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                              Confidence: Moderate 
"A major natural catastrophe is due to happen in 50 years". 
Impact on: 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
 
42 
Unavailability of supply of chemicals, materials, equipment, services  
Exposure 
The system functionality is highly dependent on the supply of chemicals, 
materials, equipments and, in some cases, outsourced work force. 
Influenced by: 
37 - Failure in the suppliers' / contractors' / 
service (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Ready available alternatives (E=5, V=5, C) --> 
42  
Probability class:  High (1/10 - 1/1)                                             Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Increase system's flexibility (E=3, V=5, C) --> 
44 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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43 
Insufficient human resources to operate the system  
Exposure 
Unavailability of human resources in such a way that water supply system can 
not be operated, due to to social problems (demonstrations, strikes, etc.) or to 
pandemic. 
Influenced by: 
38 - Strikes (Event) 
39 - Pandemic (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Minimum services guaranteed (E=1, V=3, C) -
-> 43 
- Equipment automation (E=3, V=3, NC) --> 43  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 -1/10)               Confidence: Moderate 
Social tension is high, but awareness of EPAL's mission is also high. 
Impact on: 
44 - Critical infrastructures' unavailability 
for an extended period (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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44 
Critical infrastructures' unavailability for an extended period  
Harm 
Critical assets unavailability for an extended period, due to mechanical, 
electrical or structural failure, to lack of chemicals to treat water, to lack of 
people to operate the system, to a power outage or to the presence of 
contaminated water in the system. 
Influenced by: 
31 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination at sources (Exposure) 
32 - Reduced water quality / 
contamination in the Transport or 
Distribution system (Exposure) 
40 - Critical assets' failure (Exposure) 
41 - Power / telecommunications outage 
(Exposure) 
42 - Unavailability of supply of chemicals, 
materials, equipment, services 
(Exposure) 
43 - Insufficient human resources to 
operate the system (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- WTPs' efficiency (E=1, V=1, C) --> 44 
- PCQA (E=3, V=n/a, NC) --> 33, 44 
- Online monitoring (E=1, V=1, C) --> 33, 44 
- Optimal location of disinfection points (E=1, 
V=1, NC) --> 33, 44 
- Sources' diversification (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 44 
- Increase system's flexibility (E=3, V=5, C) --> 
44  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                             Confidence: Moderate 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Business continuity -contigency plans: 
knowledge sharing - internal and external; what 
to do in case of harm - for ex., tele-
communications - (E=3, V=5, C). 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Disruption in the water supply 
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45 
Water losses increase  
Event 
Water losses (either in EPAL's system or in the distribution systems of the 
Municipal Clients) may increase due to ageing of the mains and to insufficient 
maintenance or renewal practices. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100)                                    Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
50 - Increase in the demand (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Active leakage control (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 50 
- Sensibilization campaign (E=4, V=n/a, NC) --> 
50 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
 
46 
Consumption increase  
Event 
Consumption may increase due to an increase in population or in economic 
activity 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Very Low (1/10000 - 1/1000)                   Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
50 - Increase in the demand (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Scarcity tariffs (E=4, V=5, NC) --> 50 
- Sensibilization campaigns (E=4, V=n/a, NC) --
> 50 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
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47 
Droughts / Capture in Spain  
Event 
Occurence of severe or extreme droughts, which may lead to retention of 
water in the Spanish basin of Tagus River 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100)                                    Confidence: High 
Adaptaclima project foresees that extreme droughts will occur within the 
next 20 years, but C. Bode reservoir is very resilient and it will not happen 
during this hydrological year. 
Impact on: 
51 - Reduced water availability at sources 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
 
48 
High power generation or major works at C.Bode  
Event 
C.Bode reservoir is shared with EDP that uses it for electricity production. If 
the turbination lowers the water level below EPAL's intakes, EPAL will not be 
able to abstract water from that source. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100)                                    Confidence: High 
It is safeguarded in EDP's concession contract with APA that they cannot 
turbinate below a level that compromises EPAL. 
Impact on: 
51 - Reduced water availability at sources 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Relation with EDP (E=3, V=5, C) --> 51 
- C.Bode reservoir management commission ( 
E=3, V=5, C) --> 51 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
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50 
Increase in the demand  
Exposure 
Increase in the demand (by actual clients) result from an effective increase in 
consumption and/or an increase in water losses 
Influenced by: 
45 - Water losses increase (Event) 
46 - Consumption increase (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Scarcity tariffs (E=4, V=5, NC) --> 50 
- Sensibilization campaigns (E=4, V=n/a, NC) --
> 50 
- Active leakage control (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 50 
Probability class:  Very Low (1/10000 - 1/1000)                   Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
53 - Supply/Demand balance in deficit 
(Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
 
51 
Reduced water availability at sources  
Exposure 
Water availability at sources is reduced due to the occurence of droughts or, 
for C.Bode, problems at the dam/high turbination. 
Influenced by: 
47 - Droughts / Capture in Spain (Event) 
48 - High power generation or major 
works at C.Bode (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Relation with EDP (E=3, V=5, C) --> 51 
- C.Bode reservoir management commission ( 
E=3, V=5, C) --> 51  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100)                                   Confidence: High 
Adaptaclima project foresees that extreme droughts will occur within the 
next 20 years, but C. Bode reservoir is very resilient and it will not happen 
during this hydrological year.It is safeguarded in EDP's concession contract 
with APA that they cannot turbinate below a level that compromises EPAL. 
Impact on: 
53 - Supply/Demand balance in deficit 
(Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Sources' diversification (E=2, V=3, C) --> 53 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
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49 
Undercapacity of the assets  
Exposure 
Assets are underdesigned for the actual demand 
Influenced by: 
3 - Inadequate long-term planning (Event) 
with the following barriers:  
- Periodic review (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 8, 21, 49 
Probability class:  Very Low to Low (1/10000 - 1/100)    Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
52 - Water doesn't flow from sources to 
the delivery points (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
 
52 
Water doesn't flow from sources to the delivery points  
Harm 
Assets are functioning but are not able to deliver the total demanded flow 
because of their undercapacity 
Influenced by: 
49 - Undercapacity of the assets 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Very Low (1/10000 - 1/1000)                   Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Business continuity (contigency plans) 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
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53 
Supply/Demand balance in deficit  
Harm 
The demand for water exceeds the availability at sources. 
Influenced by: 
50 - Increase in the demand (Exposure) 
51 - Reduced water availability at sources 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Sources' diversification (E=2, V=3, C) --> 53  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100)                                    Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Business continuity (contigency plans) 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Lack of adequate Water Quantity supplied 
 
54 
Pipe bursts in Lisbon network (abbrev.)  
Event 
Pipe bursts occur every week in the distribution system. This can cause 
"brown water" to flow from taps (after the repair) and, in some cases, 
damages to private properties. Organoleptic issues may also arise from the 
operation conditions (low flow velocities). 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                     Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: 
58 - Non compliance of organoleptic 
parameters (Exposure) 
59 - 3rd parties injured (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, NC) --> 58, 59 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
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55 
Fraud, non-compliance with Ethic Code  
Event 
Fraud or other actions that do not comply with EPAL's ethic code. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100)                                   Confidence: Moderate 
The mechanisms to avoid non-compliances with Ethic Code exist. 
Impact on: 
59 - 3rd parties injured (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Fighting corruption plan (E=2, V=3, NC) --> 59 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
 
56 
Health and Safety of employees compromised  
Event 
Employees may be seriously injured (or killed) during their working activities. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                              Confidence: Moderate 
 
Impact on: 
59 - 3rd parties injured (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Health and Safety System (E=2, V=5, NC) --> 
59 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
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57 
Inadequate relationship with Unions / Media / Stakeholders  
Event 
An inadequate relationship with Unions/Media/Stakeholders may lead to an 
increse in the release of defaming news. 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                              Confidence: High 
It has happened in the past. 
Impact on: 
60 - Power to influence public opinion 
(Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders consultation 
 (E=2, V=1, NC) --> 60 
- Workers relationship policy 
 (E=1, V=5, NC) --> 60 
- Media relationship 
 (E=1, V=1, C) --> 60 
- Communication consultation 
 (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 60 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
 
58 
Non compliance of organoleptic parameters  
Exposure 
Organoleptic parameters (colour, smell, taste) may be beyond the required 
level. 
Influenced by: 
54 - Pipe bursts in Lisbon network 
(abbrev.) (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, NC) --> 58, 59  
Probability class:  Low (1/1000 - 1/100)                                    Confidence: High 
Number of claims is low. 
Impact on: 
61 - Public opinion damage (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Information to the customers (E=3, V=n/a, 
NC) --> 61 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
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59 
3rd parties injured  
Exposure 
3rd parties may be injured due to the occurence of pipe bursts, non-
compliance with ethical code or health and safety failure. 
Influenced by: 
54 - Pipe bursts in Lisbon network 
(abbrev.) (Event) 
55 - Fraud, non-compliance with Ethic 
Code (Event) 
56 - Health and Safety of employees 
compromised (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- AM best practices (E=1, V=5, NC) --> 58, 59  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                             Confidence: High 
Mainly due to pipe bursts in Lisbon. 
Impact on: 
61 - Public opinion damage (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Adequate compensation policy (E=1, V=n/a, 
NC) --> 61 
- Re-enforcement of positive image (E=2, V=3, 
C) --> 61 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
 
60 
Negative influence on public opinion  
Exposure 
Unions, media and stakeholders have the power to influence public opinion, 
through the release of defaming news. 
Influenced by: 
57 - Inadequate relationship with Unions / 
Media / Stakeholders (Event) 
with the following barriers: 
- Stakeholders consultation 
 (E=2, V=1, NC) --> 60 
- Workers relationship policy 
 (E=1, V=5, NC) --> 60 
- Media relationship 
 (E=1, V=1, C) --> 60 
- Communication consultation 
 (E=1, V=1, NC) --> 60  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 – 1/10)                             Confidence: High 
This refers to the strenght of the exposure (vulnerability). 
Impact on: 
61 - Public opinion damage (Harm) 
with the following barriers: 
- Re-enforcement of positive image (E=2, V=3, 
C) --> 61 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
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61 
Public opinion damage  
Harm 
A damage in public opinion may arise from "direct causes" (non-compliance 
with organolectic parameters, 3rd parties injured, inadequate relationship with 
syndicates and media) or "indirect causes" (failure to achieve each of the 
other strategic objectives). 
Influenced by: 
60 - Power to influence public opinion 
(Exposure) 
59 - 3rd parties injured (Exposure) 
58 - Non compliance of organoleptic 
parameters (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Adequate compensation policy (E=1, V=n/a, 
NC) --> 61 
- Information to the customers (E=3, V=n/a, 
NC) --> 61 
- Re-enforcement of positive image (E=2, V=3, 
C) --> 61  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                              Confidence: Moderate 
The range is due to the contribution of both "direct" and "indirect causes". 
Impact on: 
(strategic objective) 
with the following barriers: 
- Re-enforcement of positive image 
(contingency plans) 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Reputation and trust compromised 
 
100 
Inadequate governance  
Risk factor 
Inadequate governance may be due to and excessive interference of the 
Government in EPAL's management. It has effects on the image 
(identification of EPAL with the image of the public sector in general), on the 
approval of investments, on the salaries and EPAL's capacity to capture 
talent, etc. (Profitability), etc. 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                             Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
 
 260 
101 
Lack of communication  
Risk factor 
Lack of communication between people (especially from different 
departments) may lead to several inefficiencies in the processes. It affects 
profitability (unoptimized working processes) and may affect the disruption in 
the supply or the health and safety of employees. 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                     Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
 
102 
Poor HR practices  
Risk factor 
Poor HR practices result from difficulties in capturing talent to the company; in 
ensuring that knowledge transfer is made when employees get retired or 
move to another company; and also in renewing "minds" in the company 
("familiar dynasties"). This directly affects AM practices. 
NOTE:  >200 / 700 employees are aged 55+ 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Certain (1/1)                                                     Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
 
103 
Legal non-compliance  
Risk factor 
Non-compliance with current legislation. It affects reputation and trust. 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                              Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
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104 
Inadequate data/information  
Risk factor 
Inadequate data or information about the different subjects of the company - 
namely the assets - leads to an increase in the innefficiency of the processes 
and to bad decision-making (affects Profitability). 
Influenced by: with the following barriers: 
Probability class:  High (1/10 - 1/1)                                             Confidence: High 
 
Impact on: with the following barriers: 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
 
2. NARRATIVES 
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BUSINESS SUSTAINABILITY 
 
1| STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
To guarantee economic and financial Business Sustainability in the long-term.  
2| LIKELIHOOD OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
Events / Exposures / Harms Likelihoods 
 
Business sustainability has a moderate-to-high likelihood of being compromised, mainly due to difficulties in raising self-capital. This results from the inability to cope with high fixed costs 
in case municipal clients stop paying for the water, which has a moderate-to-high likelihood to happen either because they cannot afford it (due to the economic crisis the country is 
facing) or because they do not want to (litigations)1. This strategic objective may be also affected by a loss of market share, if municipal clients produce their own water2, or by the 
excessive need to proceed with capital or operational expenditures, though these harms have a moderate likelihood of occurrence, because clients still rely on EPAL to cover their needs 
and long–term planning is improving. Even more unlikely to happen, is the inability to meet investment needs, due to lack of financing, since EPAL can use its cash flow or retain 
earnings. Lack of external financing may occur due to an inadequate relationship with banks or to changes in politics/economy3; notwithstanding, the relation of EPAL with EIB is very 
strong, and it acts as a highly efficient “barrier”. 
 
Existing barriers – Efficacy, Criticality and Vulnerability 
Most barriers reveal to be highly effective: the competitive advantages of EPAL (its history, location, scale), the quality of the service provided, the periodic review of the long-term plan, 
the trusty relationships with banks, the diversification of banks as sources of financing as well as self-financing and retaining earnings from the shareholder. The three latter barriers 
contribute to lower the likelihood of “inability to meet investment needs”, in spite of the higher likelihood associated to the respective events and exposure. Contractual safeguards is a 
medium effective barrier, since it applies to a limited number of municipal clients. Monitoring customer debts and trying to anticipate changes in politics or economy are low effective 
barriers. The most critical barriers are the competitive advantages of the company as well as the quality of service. The most vulnerable ones are contractual safeguards (litigation 
processes are lagging), customer debts’ monitoring (it is not preventative) and anticipating changes (there are no mechanisms implemented in the company with that aim). 
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3| CONSEQUENCES OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
The company will be able to accomplish its mission in the next 20 years but struggling with high 
economic or financial constraints. This is a  consequence of a hypothetical lack of financing, 
difficulties in raising self-capital and of the uncertainty in the sector. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
4| STRATEGIC RISK  
EPAL is a centenary water supply company, which is already a proof of its resilience. Nonetheless, four harms were identified as a potential 
threat to business sustainability: loss of market share, difficulties in raising self-capital, excessive rehabilitation or maintenance needs and 
inability to meet investment needs. Despite of EPAL’s capability of self-financing and the competitive advantages, including the quality of the 
service provided, there is a moderate to high likelihood that the company will struggle with high economic or financial constraints in 
accomplishing its mission in the next 20 years, especially due to the difficulties in raising self-capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
1 It already happened in one municipality. 
2 It happens partially in some municipalities. 
3 For example, in 2011 the economic situation of the country led the European Investment Bank (EIB) to postpone the process of financing EPAL’s investments. 
 
 
 
 
Residual Risk 
Catastrophic: The company will not be able to accomplish its mission in the next 
10 years
Very bad: The company will not be able to accomplish its mission in the next 
20 years
Bad: The company will be able to accomplish its mission in the next 20 
years but struggling with high economic or financial constraints
Moderate: The company will be able to accomplish its mission in the next 20 
years with moderate economic or financial constraints
Minor: The company will be able to accomplish its mission in the next 20 
years with minor economic or financial constraints
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BUSINESS PROFITABILITY 
 
1| STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
To guarantee adequate levels of Business Profitability, each year.  
2| LIKELIHOOD OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
Events / Exposures / Harms Likelihoods 
 
 
Business profitability has a moderate-to-high likelihood of being compromised, mainly due to a potential increase in the operational expenditure (Opex), resulting from the increase in the 
price of energy1 conjugated with a high dependence on energy to operate the system2. The accomplishment of this strategic objective may also be affected by a negative impact from 
economic regulation, which derives from an insufficient guidance from the regulator. There is a moderate likelihood that difficulties in obtaining return on investments may compromise 
business profitability, due to the decrease in sales and to the overcapacity of the assets, which were designed to supply higher levels of demand. 
 
Existing barriers – Efficacy, Criticality and Vulnerability 
Existing barriers present different degrees of efficacy, being the most effective ones EPAL’s competitive advantages (history, location and scale) and the periodic review of long-term 
plans. Establishing contractual safeguards is not very effective, at present, because these only exist for a minority of the municipal clients. Critical barriers are asset management best 
practices, in order to overcome potential problems related with the overcapacity of the assets, and discussions with the regulators about the economic regulation guidance, so that a 
negative impact from regulation may be minimized. The most vulnerable barriers are: increasing market share and finding new clients, since foreseen changes in the sector will make 
this more difficult to happen; reinforcing contractual safeguards, because it does not depend only on EPAL; increase energy efficiency, since a lot has already been done in this domain 
and financial constraints are preventing new actions to be implemented; and, finally, implementing asset management best practices, due to urgent need to renew the human capital of 
EPAL, which is now restricted by law.  
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3| CONSEQUENCES OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
The company will decrease its profits by more than 25% and less than 75% (representing 10 to 30 
million euros, approximately). This is a  consequence of the increase in the price of energy, 
or the negative impact from regulation or from the difficulties in obtaining return from the investments. 
 . 
 
 
 
 
4| STRATEGIC RISK  
EPAL is a profitable organization, generating profits of around 40 million euros a year. These profits are intended to remunerate the shareholder as 
well as the invested capital. With operational costs likely to increase, mainly due to energy costs, and given the limitations in setting the tariffs as well 
as the decrease in the consumption, there is a moderate-to-high likelihood of this objective being compromised in such a way that the company will 
decrease its profits by more than 25% and less than 75%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
1 Energy is the highest operational cost of the company, and its price has been increasing over the last years (Annual Accounts Report, 2011). 
2 The water supply system of EPAL is designed in such a way that energy is needed not only to abstract water from all of the current sources (superficial and underground) but also to deliver it to the 
customers. 
3 For example, in 2011 the economic situation of the country led the European Investment Bank (EIB) to postpone the process of financing EPAL’s investments. 
 
 
 
 
Residual Risk 
Very bad : The company will be in deficit
Bad : The company will decrease its profits by more than 
75% up to 100%
Moderate : The company will decrease its profits by more than 
25% and less than 75%
Minor : The company will decrease its profits by less than 
25%
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WATER QUALITY 
 
1| STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
To supply water with such Quality that it will not harm customers’ health.   
2| LIKELIHOOD OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
Events / Exposures / Harms Likelihoods 
 
 
Water quality is compromised from the sources: high temperatures in dry weather lead to the occurrence of algal blooms1, and treated or untreated wastewater discharges, as well as 
agriculture, mine2 and quarries run-off occur in the watershed. Forest fires haven’t affected water quality in the abstraction points3, despite their yearly occurrence in the surroundings of 
Castelo do Bode reservoir. However, in the coming years their magnitude may change for worst. Some of EPAL’s premises have been subject to vandalism, which might, as well, put in 
danger the water quality. Terrorism actions or natural catastrophes such as earthquakes are less likely to happen. With a rare likelihood of occurrence there is the possibility of failure in 
the nuclear power plant in Almaraz, or a cryptosporidium outbreak. Along the distribution system contamination may occur due to point source or diffuse pollution, but that has not been 
happening4. Contamination may also be due to inadequate actions in the WTP or during maintenance activity – although the likelihood for this to happen is low, it might increase in the 
future, since a significant part of the employees is about to retire5 and it is difficult to guarantee knowledge transfer. Water quality may also get worse due to the low flow velocities in the 
mains6, which is derived from their overcapacity.  
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Catastrophic: 50 or more customers will present non-reversible health problems, 
including the possibility of death
Very bad: Less than 50 customers will present non-reversible health 
problems, including the possibility of death OR more than 5000 
customers will present reversible health problems
Bad: Less than 5000 and more than 500 customers will present 
reversible health problems
Moderate: Less than 500 and more than 50 customers will present reversible 
health problems
Minor: Less than 50 customers will present reversible health problems
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Existing barriers – Efficacy, Criticality and Vulnerability 
The most effective barriers are: Water Treatment Plants, Chlorination Points, Mixing Water from different sources, On-line monitoring and Asset Management Best Practices (selection of 
materials, construction methodologies, preparedness of the teams, washing and disinfection of water tanks, compliance with health and safety code). Laboratory analysis of water 
samples (PCQA), the existence of Protected Zones around water sources and increase of Security measures in EPAL’s premises reveal to be medium effective barriers. Watershed 
stakeholders engagement appears to be a low effective barrier. The most critical barriers are Water Treatment Plants, On-line monitoring and Asset Management Best Practices. The 
latter is also the most vulnerable one, given the fact that a significant part of the employees is about to retire5 and it is difficult to guarantee knowledge transfer. 
 
3| CONSEQUENCES OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
The impact on human health of supplying water with biological, chemical or radioactive 
contaminants depends on the number of people potentially affected and on the reversibility of 
the diseases. For some rare events (ex.:  cryptosporidium outburst), the associated 
consequences may be : more than 50 people may have irreversible health 
problems, including death. However, for the events and their respective exposures identified, the 
associated consequences may be : between 500 and 5000 people may present reversible 
health problems. The existing Contingency Plans are not effective in case harms with bad to 
catastrophic consequences occur in the system.  
 
 
4| STRATEGIC RISK  
Quality of the water supplied depends mainly on the raw water quality and on the Water Treatment Plants efficacy. Along the distribution system 
contamination may also occur, so monitoring (on-line and in lab) and chlorination assume a very important role. Mixing water from different sources 
and different trunk mains contributes to risk reduction, as well. Analytical results show that despite raw water quality being bad (especially in Valada-
Tejo), the degree of compliance with legal parameters in terms of the supplied Water Quality is of 99,50%7, which outlines the importance of the 
existing barriers for the fulfilment of the strategic objective. The system is not prepared, however, to deal with the consequences of rare events such as 
crypto or giardia outbursts or terrorism actions, which would be catastrophic. 
________________________________ 
1 This phenomenon has occurred every year in Valada-Tejo and in the summer of 2012 it lasted for more than 12 weeks, leading to the abandon of this source during that period.  
2 According to the “Minas da Panasqueira study”, 2012, these pose no danger for the water quality in Castelo do Bode. 
3 Data from LAB. 
4 Even in the case of free surface aqueducts, like Alviela (in a very bad condition) and Tejo, laboratory analysis of the water showed that, in the last years, the legal parameters are being complied with. 
5 More than 200 out of the 740 employees of EPAL are aged 55 years or more. 
6 Average flow velocities in Lisbon distribution system is 0.09 m/s, according to the hydraulic simulation model of the network. 
7 Annual activities and accounts report, 2011. 
 
Residual Risk 
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RELIABILITY OF SUPPLY 
 
1| STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
To supply water with such Reliability that there are no major disruptions (regardless of the water quantity and quality).   
2| LIKELIHOOD OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
Events / Exposures / Harms Likelihoods 
 
Major disruptions in the water supply have a moderate likelihood of occurrence, due to the unavailability of critical infrastructures for an extended period. This can be caused by a large 
number of interconnected events, which, despite being very likely to happen, have already barriers along the pathway that lower the likelihood of this harm. Besides the more intuitive 
events that can lead to this harm – assets natural ageing1, bad weather conditions2, failure in the supply chain3 and strikes4 as well as pandemia, terrorism or natural catastrophes -, 
unavailability of critical infrastructures may also be caused by water quality problems.   
Existing barriers – Efficacy, Criticality and Vulnerability 
The most effective and, simultaneously, most critical barriers are: asset management best practices, in a context of assets ageing, and the capability of requesting minimum services in 
case of strikes; and also all the barriers that lower the likelihood of having a reduced water quality in the distribution system, like Water Treatment Plants, Mixing Water from different 
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sources, On-line monitoring and Asset Management Best Practices. Laboratory analysis of water samples (PCQA), the existence of Protected Zones around water sources and increase 
of Security measures in EPAL’s premises reveal to be medium effective barriers, just like the equipment automation, the contractors’ engagement, the increase of the flexibility of the 
system and the structural protection of the assets against bad weather and vandalism. Watershed stakeholders’ engagement and having ready-available alternatives to cope with 
failures in the supply chain are low effective barriers. Some of these are considered critical barriers, though they are not fully effective. The most vulnerable barriers are the asset 
management best practices, given the fact that a significant part of the employees is about to retire5  and the difficulty to guarantee knowledge transfer; the ready available alternatives 
and the increase in system’s flexibility, due to financial constraints; and the increased security, because it is very difficult to protect against vandalism such a large and disperse 
infrastructural system as EPAL’s. Contingency plans are critical, but they are moderately effective, since they are not fully implemented yet, and are highly vulnerable, because they 
depend on other entities.   
 
3| CONSEQUENCES OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
The impact of the unavailability of critical assets depends on the number of people potentially 
affected (without full or partial supply) and on the duration of the period. Taking into account the 
specific configuration of EPAL’ s system and, on the other hand, the nature of the events that may 
affect the accomplishment of this strategic objective, the associated consequences may be 
: 2,0 million or more customers may not be supplied at all during 4 days or more, due 
to a natural catastrophe or to a failure of a critical asset.  
 
 
 
 
4| STRATEGIC RISK  
 Reliability of supply depends on factors that the utility both can and cannot control. Asset management best practices help preventing major 
failures from occurring, and adequate human resources and suppliers’ relationships help in dealing with strikes or supply chain failures, 
respectively. Nonetheless, reinforcing the assets against vandalism or bad weather conditions are not very effective barriers. Critical assets may 
also become unavailable due to water quality issues, in case of contamination. Although the likelihood of occurrence of a major disruption in the 
supply is moderate, the respective consequences may be catastrophic, with impact on more than 2 million people.  
_________________________ 
1 The sub-system responsible for the delivery of approx.90% of the water is already 25 years old, and is now beginning to present its first failures.  
2 In recent years, some sites of EPAL were hit by mini-tornados, and some assets were destroyed.  
3 Suppliers/contractors may fail to meet agreed service due to economic, social or other reasons. EPAL has already experienced contractor's bankruptcy, due to 
the actual economic crisis. 
  For some of the products, there is no stock, and in some cases there is a high dependence on one supplier.  
4 Strikes have occurred in the last years and the economic and financial crisis tend to increase its frequency. 
5 More than 200 out of the 740 employees of EPAL are aged 55 years or more. 
RELIABILITY
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WATER QUANTITY 
 
1| STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
To supply Water in such a Quantity that satisfies the demand needs (regardless its quality or reliability). 
2| LIKELIHOOD OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
Events / Exposures / Harms Likelihoods 
 
 
There is a low likelihood that a lack of adequate water quantity is supplied, either in terms of the supply/demand balance or of the capacity of production and transport of the water supply 
system. On the one hand, there is no shortage of water expected to occur in the next 18 months (period of analysis), since C. Bode reservoir has enough capacity to deal with a drought 
if it occurred in the next year. On the other hand, the consumption maintains its decreasing trend, and water losses are kept under control. Moreover, there are no constraints in terms of 
the system’s capacity, since it is designed for past consumption thresholds, which are, by far, higher than the ones in the present. 
 
Existing barriers – Efficacy, Criticality and Vulnerability 
Existing barriers are mostly moderately effective, namely sensibilization campaigns1 and application of water scarcity tariffs to reduce demand, as well as reinforcing the relationship with 
the electrical company, EDP2 and the participation in the C. Bode reservoir management commission, in order to prevent the reduction of available water in the reservoir. The latter are 
considered to be the most critical barriers to manage this strategic objective, along with the diversification of water sources. Most barriers are medium to high vulnerable, since their 
implementation does not depend fully on EPAL, and the counter parties might not be willing to cooperate. 
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3| CONSEQUENCES OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
If water availability at sources is reduced due to the occurence of extreme droughts in successive 
years or to problems at C. Bode dam or reservoir (e.g.: high turbination), the consequences will be 
, which means that 50% or more of the daily average flow may not be supplied during 1-6 
months. 
 
 . 
 
 
 
  
 
 
4| STRATEGIC RISK  
Supplying adequate water quantity is one core strategic objective of every water supply company. At present, EPAL has a low likelihood of facing 
shortage of water, due to the decrease in demand, to the available storage at Castelo do Bode reservoir and to the overcapacity of the water 
production and transportation systems.  
 
As this reservoir is jointly explored with the electricity company, EDP, the relationship between the two utilities emerges as a critical barrier, since the 
hydropower generation may lower the levels of water in the reservoir in such a way that EPAL’s abstraction gets compromised. Although this has 
never occurred in the past, this issue will be even more critical in periods of drought, which are expected to become more frequent and more severe 
in the next decades. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
1 A campaign took place at national level in 2005, when a severe drought occurred. It is considered one of the contributing factors for the decrease in the demand that happened since then. 
2 C.Bode reservoir is shared with EDP that uses it for electricity production. If the turbination lowers the water level below EPAL's intakes, EPAL will not be able to abstract water from that source. 
 
 
Residual Risk 
Catastrophic: 50% or more of the daily average flow will not be 
supplied during 6 months or more
Very bad: 50% or more of the daily average flow will not be 
supplied during 1-6 months
Bad: 25%-50% of the daily average flow will not be supplied 
during 6 months or more
Moderate: 25%-50% of the daily average flow will not be supplied 
during 1-6 months
Minor: Less than 25% of the daily average flow will not be 
supplied during more than 1 month
QUANTITY
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REPUTATION AND TRUST 
 
1| STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
To assure the Trust from the customers, as well as EPAL’s Reputation among other national and international water utilities.   
2| LIKELIHOOD OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
Events / Exposures / Harms Likelihoods 
 
 
There is a moderate likelihood that reputation and trust become compromised, due to damages in public opinion. This may result from the non-compliance of organoleptic parameters1, 
which may be due to pipe bursts, for example, though there are empirical evidences that it is low likely to happen. It may also be caused by injuries to third parties, as consequence of 
pipe bursts, fraud2 or bad practices regarding the health and safety of workers. Unions, media and other stakeholders are very likely to negatively influence public opinion3, in case the 
Board does not keep an adequate relation with them. This strategic risk is also very highly dependent on the other strategic risks, namely on the way EPAL deals with the respective 
harms, should they occur.  
Existing barriers – Efficacy, Criticality and Vulnerability 
Asset management practices have proven to be highly effective in preventing damages caused by pipe bursts, either relating to injuries to third parties, or to non-compliance of 
organoleptic parameters. However, this is one of the most vulnerable barriers, mainly due to difficulties in transferring knowledge from aged employees to new ones4.  The existing plan 
to fight corruption and the Health and Safety system reveal to be moderately effective barriers, in order to avoid third parties’ injuries, and are also vulnerable, due to the same Human 
Resources issues and to the lack of an effective supervision, respectively.  With the aim of building a good relation with unions, media and stakeholders, several barriers are in place, 
most of which reveal to be highly efficient: stakeholders consultation, set up of a workers relation policy, media relationship policy and using communication consultation. Providing 
information to the customers about the characteristics of organoleptic parameters and re-enforcing the positive image of the company on a continuous base reveal to be moderately 
effective barriers, while adopting an adequate compensation policy to injured people has proven to be highly effective in preventing damage in public opinion. Re-enforcing the positive 
image of the company on a continuous base may also be used as a contingency measure, in case public opinion damage occurs; together with the media relationship policy, these are 
the most critical barriers.  
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3| CONSEQUENCES OF NOT MEETING THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 
 
The impact of the public opinion damage depends on whether the company is negatively referenced in 
breaking news or non-breaking news, as well as on the type of issues that are mentioned. Taking into account 
the afore mentioned issue of human resources ageing, the consequences of not meeting this strategic 
objective may be considered : one breaking news  or more than one non-breaking news per year, related 
with 3rd parties or H&S injuries.  
 
 
 
4| STRATEGIC RISK  
EPAL has a good reputation and secures the trust of its customers. However, as Warren Buffett once said, “It takes 20 years to build a reputation 
and five minutes to ruin it.”. Reputation and trust is highly dependent of the public opinion, which can be damaged by non-compliance of 
organoleptic parameters in the water, third parties’ injuries or negative influence from unions, media or other stakeholders. In the present 
situation, there is a moderate likelihood that this strategic objective gets compromised, with bad consequences associated. The most critical 
barriers are the media relationship policy and the re-enforcement of EPAL’s positive image, the latter showing potential to improve in terms of its 
effectiveness.   
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
1 Pipe bursts occur every week in the distribution system. This can cause "brown water" to flow from taps (after the repair) and, in some cases, damages to private properties. Organoleptic issues may also 
arise from the operation conditions (low flow velocities). 
2 Despite some improvements that can still be made on the suppliers evaluation procedure, the mechanisms to avoid non-compliances with Ethic Code exist (for example, “Public Contracting Code" is now 
much more restrictive) and there is no track of problems.  
3 It has happened in the past. 
4 More than 200 out of the 740 employees of EPAL are aged 55 years or more. 
 
Residual Risk 
Very bad : One breaking news OR more than one non 
breaking news per year defaming the quality of the 
water supplied
Bad : One breaking news OR more than one non 
breaking news per year related with 3rd parties or 
H&S injuries
Moderate : One breaking news OR more than one non 
breaking news per year defaming the reliability of the 
water supplied
Minor : One breaking news OR more than one non 
breaking news per year defaming the governance of 
the company
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Appendix H – CCA matrix - assumptions and outputs  
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# Comment 
1 Energy prices tend to grow, regardless of the state of the economy. Even with the recession in Europe and USA in recent 
years, price of energy has not decreased. But, according to ―Shell energy scenarios to 2050‖ (2008), benefits may emerge 
from accelerated growth in distributed power generation from wind and solar energy; furthermore, OPEC may raise oil 
production to maintain lower prices and defer the development of more costly substitutes.  
2 Consumption patterns are not so related to the state of the economy as they are with climate patterns and behaviours. 
3 Increased energy prices may be reflected in water tariffs, leading to a decrease in consumption. 
4 State of the economy may influence water quality in two ways: 
1) growth = more industrial activity = more effluents / more emissions and increased rate of climate changes' effects; 
2) growth = more money to treat effluents, monitor, etc. (environmental sustainable growth). 
5 Higher energy prices may lower industry activity, but may also reduce wastewater treatment rates. 
6 There is no relation between these 2 parameters. 
7 There is no relation between these 2 parameters. 
8 If energy prices increase, EDP will use C. Bode reservoir more often. 
9 < 100 m will increase the cost of energy in production and hence the tariff; 
< 89 m will pose limitations to the consumption. 
10 This was completed taking into account possible relations between water quality and water quantity, excluding other factors 
such as anthropogenic causes. 
11 Economic regulation via tariffs and leakage reduction incentives 
12 It was assumed that EU legislation is the most restrictive 
13 Lobbies and self-regulation will lead to a reservoir level higher than 89 (EDP needs water height to produce energy). 
Albufeira trans boundary agreement allows levels to become lower than -1 m in Valada-Tejo if there is a drought in Spain. 
Lobby groups may be Spain and EDP (the Portuguese electricity supply company). 
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# Comment 
14 Increased energy prices will lead EPAL to invest in more energy-efficient or self-production solutions. But, on the other 
hand, it may increase Opex (and, thus, reduce cash-flow or increase the tariffs). 
15 Higher consumption means there is a higher revenue/cash-flow. 
16 Water quality improvement means there is no need to significantly invest in WTP or chlorination points. 
17 Water availability means there is no need to invest in further abstractions or solutions to produce water. But, if levels in the 
reservoir get too high, it will be necessary to invest in assuring the integrity of the infrastructures. 
18 The higher the energy price, the best technological solutions are developed in order to reduce energy consumption 
19 Degradation of water quality in the sources will lead to the need to install/develop new technology for treatment and 
monitoring. 
20 Too much or too few water will enhance the need to further monitor the system. 
21 Even in a context of resource scarcity, it will be possible to become best-in-class in a specific domain. It will be derived from 
the sense of need to find new (cheaper) solutions. 
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Appendix I - Baseline risks reassessment under futures scenarios
Scenario 1 - Water Scarcity
Competition in water supply
Inadequate long-term planning
Inadequate relationship with banks
Changes in politics/economy
Increase in price of energy
Lack of rule making (economic regulation)
Limitations in setting tariffs
Consumption decrease
High temperatures/dry weather
Nuclear radioactivity
Forest fires
Diffuse pollution
Point source pollution
Vandalism
Inadequate design/build/operation/maintenace
Assets natural ageing
Very bad weather conditions
Failure in the suppliers/contractors service
Strikes
Pandemic
Water losses increase
Consumption increase
Droughts/Capture in Spain
High power generation/major works at C. Bode
Pipe bursts in Lisbon network
Fraud, non-compliance with Ethic Code
Health and Safety of employees compromised
Inadequate relation with Unions/Media/Stakeholders
Non-revenue from Municipal Clients
Contractual
safeguards
Quality of
service
Competitive
advantages
Monitor
customer debt
Periodic
review
Build trusty
relations
Diverse banks
Anticipate
changes
Competitive
advantages
New clients
Discuss with
regulator
Increase market
share
Contractual
safeguards
Stakeholders
engagement
Increased
security
Structural protection
of the assets
Stakeholders
engagementReady available
alternatives
Min.
services
Equipment
automation
Sensibilization
campaign
Active leakage
control
Tariffs
Relation
with EDP
C. Bode manag.
comission
Fighting
corruption plan
H&S
System
Stakeholders
consultation
Workers
relation policy
Media
relationship policy
Communication
consultation
Negative  influence on public opinion
3rd parties injured
Non compliance of organoleptic parameters
Reduced water availability at sources
Increase in the demand
Under capacity of the assets
Insufficient human resources available to operate the system
Unavailability of chemicals, materials, equipment, contractors
Power/telecommunications outage
Critical assets failure
Reduced water
quality/contamination
at sources
Decrease in sales
Overcapacity of the assets
Insufficient guidance in economic regulation
High dependence on energy supply
Lack of financing
Bad resources allocation
Inability to cope with high fixed costs
Loss of monopoly
Use cash flow
(self financing)
Retained
earnings
Increase
efficiency
Discuss with
regulator
WTPs'
efficiency
Mix
sources
PCQA
On-line
monitoring
Reduced water
quality/contamination
in the Transport or
Distribution system
On-line
monitoring
Optimal location
disinfection points
PCQA
Presence of
contaminants in the
delivery points
(biological, chemical,
toxic, radioactive)
Business Continuity
(contingency plans)
Lack of adequate
WATER QUALITY
supplied
Increase system's
flexibility
Critical
infrastructures'
unavailability for an
extended period
Sources'
diversification
Information
Adequate
compensation policy
Re-enforcement of
positive image
Public opinion damage
REPUTATION and
TRUST
compromised
Re-enforcement of positive
 image (contingency)
Lack of adequate
WATER QUANTITY
supplied
Water doesn't flow from
sources to delivery points
Supply/Demand balance in
deficit
Business Continuity
(contingency plans)
Business Continuity
(contingency plans) DISRUPTION in the
water supply
Loss of market share
Difficulties in raising self-capital
Excessive rehab./maint. needs
Inability to meet investment needs
Opex increase
Negative impact from economic regulation
Increase
efficiency
Difficulties in obtaining return on
investments
Business
PROFITABILITY
compromised
Business
SUSTAINABILITY
compromised
EVENTS EXPOSURES HARMS STRATEGIC RISKS
Sensibilization
campaign
Protected
perimeters
Increase system's
flexibility
Certain
High
Moderate
Low
Very low
1/1
1/1 - 1/10
1/10  - 1/100
1/100 - 1/1000
1/1000 - 1/10000
Likelihood class
Asset mng.
best practices
Asset mng.
best practices
Asset mng.
best practices
Asset mng.
best practices
Asset mng.
best practices
Asset mng.
best practices
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Scenario 2 - Financial resources' scarcity
Competition in water supply
Inadequate long-term planning
Inadequate relationship with banks
Changes in politics/economy
Increase in price of energy
Lack of rule making (economic regulation)
Limitations in setting tariffs
Consumption decrease
High temperatures/dry weather
Nuclear radioactivity
Forest fires
Diffuse pollution
Point source pollution
Vandalism
Inadequate design/build/operation/maintenace
Assets natural ageing
Very bad weather conditions
Failure in the suppliers/contractors service
Strikes
Pandemic
Water losses increase
Consumption increase
Droughts/Capture in Spain
High power generation/major works at C. Bode
Pipe bursts in Lisbon network
Fraud, non-compliance with Ethic Code
Health and Safety of employees compromised
Inadequate relation with Unions/Media/Stakeholders
Non-revenue from Municipal Clients
Contractual
safeguards
Quality of
service
Competitive
advantages
Monitor
customer debt
Periodic
review
Build trusty
relations
Diverse banks
Anticipate
changes
Competitive
advantages
New clients
Discuss with
regulator
Increase market
share
Contractual
safeguards
Stakeholders
engagement
Increased
security Asset mng.
best practices
Structural protection
of the assets
Stakeholders
engagementReady available
alternatives
Min.
services
Equipment
automation
Sensibilization
campaign
Active leakage
control
Tariffs
Relation
with EDP
C. Bode manag.
comission
Asset mng.
best practices
Fighting
corruption plan
H&S
System
Stakeholders
consultation
Workers
relation policy
Media
relationship policy
Communication
consultation
Negative  influence on public opinion
3rd parties injured
Non compliance of organoleptic parameters
Reduced water availability at sources
Increase in the demand
Under capacity of the assets
Insufficient human resources available to operate the system
Unavailability of chemicals, materials, equipment, contractors
Power/telecommunications outage
Critical assets failure
Reduced water
quality/contamination
at sources
Decrease in sales
Overcapacity of the assets
Insufficient guidance in economic regulation
High dependence on energy supply
Lack of financing
Bad resources allocation
Inability to cope with high fixed costs
Loss of monopoly
Use cash flow
(self financing)
Retained
earnings
Increase
efficiency
Discuss with
regulator
Asset mng.
best practices
WTPs'
efficiency
Mix
sources
PCQA
On-line
monitoring
Asset mng.
best practices
Reduced water
quality/contamination
in the Transport or
Distribution system
On-line
monitoring
Optimal location
disinfection points
PCQA
Asset mng.
best practices
Presence of
contaminants in the
delivery points
(biological, chemical,
toxic, radioactive)
Business Continuity
(contingency plans)
Lack of adequate
WATER QUALITY
supplied
Increase system's
flexibility
Critical
infrastructures'
unavailability for an
extended period
Sources'
diversification
Information
Adequate
compensation policy
Re-enforcement of
positive image
Public opinion damage
REPUTATION and
TRUST
compromised
Re-enforcement of positive
 image (contingency)
Lack of adequate
WATER QUANTITY
supplied
Water doesn't flow from
sources to delivery points
Supply/Demand balance in
deficit
Business Continuity
(contingency plans)
Business Continuity
(contingency plans) DISRUPTION in the
water supply
Loss of market share
Difficulties in raising self-capital
Excessive rehab./maint. needs
Inability to meet investment needs
Opex increase
Negative impact from economic regulation
Increase
efficiency
Difficulties in obtaining return on
investments
Business
PROFITABILITY
compromised
Business
SUSTAINABILITY
compromised
EVENTS EXPOSURES HARMS STRATEGIC RISKS
Asset mng.
best practices
Sensibilization
campaign
Protected
perimeters
Increase system's
flexibility
Certain
High
Moderate
Low
Very low
1/1
1/1 - 1/10
1/10  - 1/100
1/100 - 1/1000
1/1000 - 1/10000
Likelihood class
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Scenario 3 - Strong economic growth
